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A considerable body of literature on the “gig economy” is dedicated to exploited and 
precarious labour. This thesis set out to examine the undertheorised role of capitals 
(economic, social and cultural) and the relationship between these capitals and labour on gig 
platforms. It found that capitals, in combination with debt, play an important role in shaping 
the lived experiences of “entrepreneurs” in the “gig economy”. It is argued, therefore, that 
class analysis of the “gig economy” must consider not only exploited labour, but also debt and 
forms of capital. Methodologically, this thesis engages in thematic analysis of 40 in-depth 
interviews with “entrepreneurs” who use three “gig economy” platforms: AirBnB, Uber and 
Amazon Flex. These analyses offer insights into how obligations on platform users’ future 
labour, that is debt, degrade agency for the worker while increasing it for the company, 
increasing risk for the worker while decreasing it for the company. Debt is a core functionality 
of some “gig” platforms and built into their wider business model where some platforms 
operate in ways which produce dependency among their workers. Economic, social and 
cultural capitals, on the other hand, allow for some “entrepreneurs” to set themselves apart 
through distinction on platforms such as AirBnB; escape risk (across all three platforms); avoid 
aspects of labour (particularly on Amazon Flex and AirBnB); and avoid some of the downsides 
that other “gig” workers face. Rating systems play a big part in this, but a different part 
depending on the platform in question – on some competitive market platforms (AirBnB, for 
instance) they allow those with the right forms of capital to stand out and earn more money 
on the platform; on non-competitive market platforms (Uber, Amazon Flex) they serve 
predominantly as disciplinary mechanisms which put the driver under constant pressure to 
provide better service (without economic recognition). Overall, it is argued that, through 
these dynamics, the “gig economy” has the potential to increase existing inequalities by 
devaluing the indebted subject and those who bring mainly their labour, while valuing the 
capital-rich subject who is able earn more through digital platforms than they could in 
traditional markets. This thesis therefore offers a theorisation of the “gig economy” that does 
not exclusively focus on destabilised labour, but rather, contextualises labour within 
frameworks of debt and capital that clarify dramatically different outcomes for 
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1 – Introduction   
This thesis deals with the concept of social class in the proverbial “gig economy”. It is certainly not the 
first project to do so – many have spoken about how labour is exploited and how value is extracted 
from a precarious workforce through these platforms – indeed, I highlight many who have done this 
in the second chapter. So, what is different about the approach that I take here? I want to argue that 
there is more to learn about class in the “gig economy” by widening the scope of class analysis beyond 
labour exploitation. That is not to say that this thesis will dismiss the exploitation of labour – the 
opposite is true: it will bring in broader conceptualisations of class to look at how forms of capital and 
debt position labour exploitation on these platforms. It aims to employ this wider class lens to 
understand why some “entrepreneurs” on these platforms have better or worse experiences than 
others, why some are economically successful while others struggle to get by. In so doing, it also draws 
out the divisions that exist in the “gig economy” along two axes: The first involves differentiation in 
the mixture of labour, capital and debt being put to work. The second involves a division between 
competitive and non-competitive platforms. I argue that we need to understand these divisions across 
and within platforms in order to best utilise a pluralistic theoretical approach to class and classed 
subjectivity in the “gig economy”.  
 
1.1 – Thesis questions  
The wider approach to class of this thesis is instigated through two research questions – the first takes 
a more traditional socio-economic approach and asks: How do relations of economic capital, labour 
and debt present themselves within the platform economy? The second turns attention towards the 
symbolic economy and capitals which have to go through forms of transformation to realise an 
economic form – asking: How are cultural and social capitals put to work in the platform economy? 
In the second chapter (2) I discuss in detail how these questions emerge from the literature, and then 
in the methodology chapter (3) I expand upon the specific methodological approach to these 
questions that I employ – though I will also introduce this briefly later within this chapter (1.4).  
 
1.2 – “Entrepreneurs”? 
There is a significant debate over the terminology used to refer to those who seek out an income in 
the “gig economy” – this debate stems largely from the legal implications of classifying somebody as 
a freelancer, worker or employee (Crouch, 2019). Scholars such as Woodcock and Graham (2020), 
who look specifically at labour based platforms, take a clear position in describing people using 
platforms such as Uber and Deliveroo as workers. At the time of writing (March 2021), the UK Supreme 
Court has upheld a decision that Uber drivers are workers, against the counter arguments of the 
platform, and therefore subject to the additional rights that workers are entitled to receive – such as 
a minimum wage and holiday pay. While Uber contests that it has changed its relationship with drivers 
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over recent years, which it believes makes the ruling that related to a case from 2016 inapplicable to 
current drivers, it remains to be seen what the practical outcome will be for current drivers. Something 
that became apparent during my own research with Uber drivers was a level of confusion over what 
different these different statuses – freelancer, worker and employee – actually meant in practice. 
Some of the drivers that I spoke to were concerned that recognition as workers would mean they 
would be forced to surrender the flexibility of the job; leading them to take a stand against other 
drivers who were pushing for this type of recognition. As the Supreme Court has ruled that Uber 
drivers are already workers, the discussion over flexibility is less related to a driver’s classification than 
it is to the platform’s decisions and how they choose to operate.  
 
The terminology of the “entrepreneur” has ascribed itself in many marketing and promotional 
discourses around the “gig economy” (Ravenelle, 2019). The terminology evokes the image of 
somebody independently establishing a business and operating on their own terms. This is an image 
that scholars of the “gig economy” have been keen to contest due to the reality of workers who have 
limited freedoms and opportunities, with their actions largely mandated by the platforms for which 
they work (Ravenelle, 2019; Rosenblat, 2018; Schor & Attwood-Charles, 2017; Woodcock & Graham, 
2020).  
 
An important consideration for this study is the distinction between those who put their labour to 
work in the “gig economy” and those who rent out their capital – which presents further terminology 
problems of its own. The terminology of the “worker”, adopted by Woodcock and Graham (2020) in 
relation to labour based platforms, offers limited potential when attention is turned to those using 
platforms such as AirBnB – where the focus becomes less about working and supplying labour than 
about renting a property. The point being made is that there is a distinction between capital and 
labour platforms – and while users of the latter might accurately be described as workers, the former 
are often closer to rentier capitalists. This thesis will draw out this difference in great detail as the 
findings of the study are introduced – I will argue that classed divisions between capital and labour 
are extremely important within the “gig economy”.  
 
Within the text I will utilise the quoted marketing terminology of “entrepreneur(s)” as a shorthand 
collective term for anybody within this study who is seeking an income, through capital or labour, as 
a rentier capitalist or a worker, from a platform – this is not an acceptance of the term as legitimate, 
my argument is that it is not an accurate descriptor at all, but rather a way of saving the debate until 
such a time as it can be drawn out in greater detail within the text. Later on, I will fully expand upon 
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the range and types of work and rentier practices I have found within what platforms have 
optimistically described as “entrepreneurship”. 
 
1.3 – Trendy terminology  
The “gig economy” itself is another contested term among scholars, as will be discussed more 
thoroughly in the following chapter. It has, however, found its way into popular discourse.  Google 
Trends is a tool that provides insights into how often a term has been searched for using the Google 
search engine. In September 2016 when this research project began, the term “gig economy” had just 
6 percent of the searches that it received at its current peak, occurring more recently in March of 2020. 
Intriguingly, within the United States (U.S.) the term receives its highest proportion of searches from 
within the District of Columbia (D.C.), the legislative hub of the country. California on the other hand, 
while being the corporate home of many of the platforms which fall under the term, has around half 
the proportional share of “gig economy” searches when comparted to D.C. In contrast, the term 
“sharing economy”, which has often been used to refer to similar or even the same platforms as those 
within the “gig economy” has actually become less popular over recent years – achieving its search 
term peak in March of 2016 and more recently falling to just 49 percent in the same month of 2020. 
Once again, the term received its highest proportion of U.S. searches within D.C.  
 
In the second chapter, I will discuss these terms in detail and relate them to the body of literature 
which has emerged over recent years in an attempt to explain them. I will show how the term “sharing 
economy” has fallen out of favour as it becomes increasingly apparent that there is not much actual 
sharing taking place within an economy heavily focused on economic transaction and exchange. I will 
also present literature that is highly critical of the precarious labour underpinning the “gig economy”, 
which might understandably make it a subject of interest for those with a legislative attention – and 
also a term less appealing to the corporations which have been defined by it. I will show how many of 
the key attributes which define this “new” economy are actually part of wider trends towards worker 
precarity and towards surveillance capitalism. While the “gig economy” is the object of this study, I 
will argue that it is a colloquial term rather than a scholarly one.  
 
There is an understanding in public discourse of the trendy “gig economy” or “sharing economy” 
(Schor, 2014), but when we try to unpack what these terms actually mean conceptually, it starts to 
fall apart. What this study focuses on, to put it in more accountable language, is a sub-section of the 
digital platform economy wherein labour and capital are matched to people requiring services or 
products through market-making platforms – which has colloquially been referred to as the “gig 
economy” or “sharing economy”.  
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1.4 – Methodological approach  
Methodologically, this thesis employs in-depth semi-structured qualitative interviews with 38 
platform users who live or work within the Greater London Area. I will briefly introduce the sampling, 
interview and analysis approach that this project utilises here, as a way of introducing the more 
thorough discussion provided in the third chapter.   
 
1.4.1 – Sampling  
These platforms were chosen because they showcase a variety of classed subjectivities – AirBnB hosts 
may, at the extreme, be using the platform to gain rents on their properties (forms of capital and 
wealth). Amazon Flex and Uber, on the other hand, are more about labour – and as it emerged through 
the process of this thesis, Uber drivers are often tied into debt and financial obligations. These 
platforms, therefore, show a range of “entrepreneurs” from different class positions within a capital-
labour divide. Within each platform, sampling aimed to show further class diversity, to the extent that 
this is possible within platforms which may appeal to subjects from different class backgrounds. 
“Entrepreneurs” on AirBnB were mostly rentier capitalists, earning an income from renting out 
property – sometimes barely providing any labour at all; but there were also hosts who did not own 
the property that they were listing on the platform, they often laboured extensively to make sure that 
the property was ready for guests each night and relied upon the money to make ends meet.  Within 
Uber, there were highly indebted drivers who were struggling to repay their debts each week while 
earning enough to survive – but there was also a driver who simply drove as a way to keep busy and 
earn a little extra money during his retirement. This project captures these ranges of class experiences 
that are positioned by capital, labour and debt.  
 
1.4.2 – Interviews and analysis  
All participants within this study are anonymised and any names that appear throughout this thesis 
are pseudonyms. Interviews were transcribed and thematically analysed, inductively seeking out 
forms of capital: economic, cultural and social, which appeared to be important to “entrepreneurs” in 
their use of the platforms. At the point of interview, this was led by a series of questions asking about 
the “entrepreneurs”’ educational and work history, their home ownership status, any other forms of 
income they have access to, and how they might utilise different assets and skills in their engagement 
with the platform in question. Overall, this approach is intended to collect a wide perspective of the 
class position of the subject, and how this relates to the platform that they are using. Labour is another 
important aspect to this project – understanding how much and the types of labour “entrepreneurs”  
provide; and also, if all of their labour is compensated. The role of debt largely emerged deductively 
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but proved extremely prominent among the majority of Uber drivers in this study – there was some 
scope for this in the pre-interview questionnaire which specifically asked Uber and Flex drivers if their 
car is owned outright, rented, leased, or bought through a credit scheme. Flexibility in the interview 
guide allowed for this to be discussed in detail. Another difference that emerged deductively was the 
striking difference between competitive and non-competitive platforms in terms of how forms of 
capital, and “entrepreneurial” subjects themselves, come to be valued.  A more complete discussion 
of the interviews and analysis is provided in the methodology chapter (3) – for now I want to generate 
a general understanding of what is being looked at within this thesis.  
 
1.5 – Key findings 
This thesis has five main findings which emerge from the analysis: Firstly, in relation to the importance 
of debt I will showcase a role for debt in the positioning of labour within the “gig economy”: I argue 
that some platforms use debt traps which actively produce precarity and worker dependency. Next, I 
argue the importance of economic capital in allowing some income-seekers to avoid obligations of 
labour and reduce their experiences of risk. Third, I argue the importance of cultural and social 
capitals for allowing privileged “entrepreneurs” to achieve an economic benefit on certain platforms 
which provide room for such forms of subjectivity to be economised. Fourth, I argue that non-
competitive platforms limit this form of subjectivity by providing a marketplace which misrecognises 
their workers as solely providers of unskilled labour, denying any economic advantage to a more 
skilled worker or one who makes additional effort - maintaining their workforce as ephemeral and 
replaceable. Finally, based on these previous arguments, I argue that these platforms widen 
economic inequalities among “entrepreneurs” by economically privileging already valued forms of 
capital while deprivileging labour and the forms of capital that working class “entrepreneurs” have 
access to.  
 
Through these empirical findings I argue that a singular theoretical approach to class in the “gig 
economy” is insufficient. Because platforms that fall under this title vary in terms of the mixture of 
labour, capital and debt put to work, and in their level of competitiveness between “entrepreneurs”, 
any singular theory of class can only explain a section of experiences. Instead, I bring together a 
selection of approaches. Specifically, Bourdieu’s (1986) notion of a capital accruing subject helps to 
explain the advantages that some “entrepreneurs” experience on platforms where they compete 
against each other for customers, such as AirBnB. Skeggs’ (2004b) complication of this approach, 
alongside Tyler’s (2013) work on abjection, are useful for understanding how other platforms, in this 
study those which were not competitive (Uber and Amazon Flex), position “entrepreneurs” as deficit 
and prime them for value extraction – building also upon the work of Mazzucato’s work with Shipman 
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(2014) as well as ideas of Marx (1887). I draw further upon Lazzarato’s (2012) indebted subject who 
owes a future obligation of their labour to their creditor – this insight is valuable for considering how 
some platforms produce dependency and precarity through debt and financial products. I also draw 
briefly upon Piketty (2014, 2015, 2016) to understand the more general economic trends that are 
playing out between capital and labour. I argue that it is only by combining these approaches that we 
can hope to understand the vast range of classed experiences in the “gig economy”.  
 
1.6 – Thesis structure 
Following this introductory chapter, I offer a chapter discussing the theoretical frameworks to which 
this thesis speaks. This begins with an examination of the underlying terminology of the “gig” or 
“sharing” economy before discussing a range of common tendencies attributed to the platforms under 
this heading – such as precarious labour, datafied surveillance mechanisms and discussions of barriers 
to access. From these discussions I aim to firstly connect the “gig economy” to trends in capitalism 
more generally to underline my need to place the term in quotation marks due to its lack of clear 
distinction. Secondly, I pull out aspects of this body of theory that I find particularly useful to the 
analysis and arguments I present in this thesis – the work which I aim to meaningfully build upon. I 
summarise this chapter by speaking about my research questions in relation to the existing body of 
theory – showing how this project builds upon work that has come before.  
 
Next, attention is turned to the methodological approach employed by the thesis. This starts with an 
epistemological reflection on what the project is really looking at: the underlying class relationships 
which position subjects – and a note on how the methodology attempts to approach this. The majority 
of this chapter deals with the practicalities of the research: The case studies are explained and justified 
in detail, along with the sampling strategies employed. The final realised sample is discussed, along 
with its strengths and limitations. The approach to analysis is also discussed, explained and justified.  
 
There are three chapters focusing on analysis in this thesis. The first of these (chapter 4) deals 
exclusively with the first research question of the project that looks at the economic relations between 
capital, labour and debt. Here I bring forward data from all three of the platforms examined within 
the project to show how these provide different opportunities for subjects from different class 
positions while looking at the economic resources and obligations of the “entrepreneur”. I theorise a 
double articulation whereby both the potential opportunities offered the platform (being more labour 
or capital focused) and the class position of the “entrepreneur”  (having more or less capital, or debt) 
combine to provide an economic positionality. I argue the importance of both economic capital and 
debt in the positioning of labour on platforms.  
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The following chapter of analysis (5) shifts focus to cultural and social capitals and how these might 
be utilised on platforms – starting to address the second research question of the project. This chapter 
employs Bourdieu’s (1986) theorisation of the capital accruing subject but applies it specifically to the 
contexts of these platforms – understanding how they provide scope for the transference of cultural 
capitals into economic benefit. I argue that, once again, there are differences both at the level of the 
platform and the individual: some platforms provide more scope for these types of capital to achieve 
an economic benefit than others, and within this, subjects with more of these capitals see more of an 
advantage. Those without the right forms of capital fall behind. I further argue that these capitals can 
reduce necessities for labour time. Where this theorisation holds on competitive market platforms, 
the “entrepreneur” with the right forms of capital is able to leverage them meaningfully for economic 
advantage. The individual, therefore, retains some sense of socio-economic power arising from an 
agency over their outcome. For the most part I use chapter 5 to address competitive market platforms, 
where these forms of capital allow “entrepreneurs” to stand out through a rating and review system 
– contrasting chapter 6 where I look at non-competitive market platforms where rating and review 
systems take a disciplinary approach and provide no economic advantage to the “entrepreneur”.  
 
The final chapter of analysis (6) addresses the same research question from a slightly different 
perspective. While the previous chapter dealt with “entrepreneurs” who achieved Bourdieu’s (1986) 
subjectivity, being able to convert their cultural and social forms of capital into advantageous 
economic outcomes, this chapter deals with those who are not able to do so. This includes instances 
where the platform itself limits the possibilities of the “entrepreneur” in this regard by denying them 
possibilities for this type of individualised subjectivity – specifically, I argue that this is done through 
the way the platform is structured as a non-competitive market. I therefore argue that some platforms 
reduce the possibility for capital-based income to be realised by misrecognising the “entrepreneur” 
as an unskilled provider of labour. What I argue is that the “entrepreneurs” are not as unskilled as the 
platform might suggest, and often have skills (forms of cultural capital) that aid in their ability to 
provide high levels of customer service, but that the additional value produced by these actions is 
entirely absorbed by the platform. In these instances, “entrepreneurs” may receive high ratings, but 
these exist within rating systems that have no ability to increase their income potential. I therefore 
use theoretical approaches from Skeggs (2004b) which help construct an understanding of class closer 
to that of Marx’s (1887) ideas first put forward in 1867, where power is articulated less clearly 
between individuals, instead being framed on broader scale between collectives (the “entrepreneurs” 
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and the platform). In these instances, the “entrepreneurs” are systemically devalued as a means of 
exploitation.  
 
I then come to conclusions (in chapter 7), to summarise and connect the arguments that I have made 
throughout the thesis – showing how I have addressed both the research questions and existing 
literature through the research I have presented. I address this in relation to the wider question of 
inequality also – linking together findings that collectively show a devaluing of labour and a valuing of 
certain capitals on these platforms that may serve to widen socio-economic gaps more generally. I 
talk about the implications of the thesis, especially in relation to how we theorise the “gig economy” 
going forward, and the need for further research to build upon particular aspects of what I present 
here.   
 
Overall, this thesis contributes to literature on the “gig economy” by offering clarity in relation to how 
a broad range of Neo-Marxist theoretical approaches to contemporary capitalism map onto platforms. 
By going beyond a perspective that looks at labour exploitation in isolation, by contextualising it within 
understandings of a subject’s capitals and debt, this thesis shows how labour exploitation is not a 
uniform phenomenon on these platforms. Instead, it is highly contextualised within complex capitalist 























2 – Theorising class in the “gig economy” 
This chapter provides a discussion of the theoretical framework that this project builds upon. It is 
worth noting that when this research project began a large section of the work cited here in relation 
to the “gig economy” had not yet been published – this is still an emergent subject of research. Some 
of the key works of scholarship that I draw upon, such as Ravenelle (2019), Woodcock and Graham 
(2020) and Rosenblat (2018), emerged after the fieldwork had concluded and therefore did not 
influence the research design - but nonetheless, proved extremely beneficial to the analysis that I 
provide within this thesis.  
 
This chapter will be structured as follows: I will begin by delving into the debates that exist over the 
very terminology that we use to talk about the “gig”, “sharing” or “platform” economies. I try to deal 
with the ambiguity embedded within these terms to understand the limits of what this project speaks 
to. In doing so, I also offer some broad definitional insights into what is actually meant when we refer 
to, for instance, the “gig economy”. Some attention is also given to how these terms transcend the 
boundaries between academic and marketing discourses – and how often, rather than being a 
scholarly categorisation, platforms simply associate themselves with the trendy language of these 
emergent economies. Through this discussion I situate this projects object of study not as something 
entirely distinct from modern capitalism, as naming in popular culture might suggest – but rather a 
range of market platforms which have been colloquially distinguished.  
 
Afterwards, I will discuss a number of key themes that emerge from the literature on these platforms. 
These are discussions of symptomatic features of the “gig economy”, such as low barriers to access, 
high levels of individualised risk, algorithmic surveillance and control. The main purpose of these 
sections will be linking these ideas to the concept of class – which will serve as the background for this 
project. I will also show that the distinctiveness of these platforms is often overstated when compared 
to pre-existing movements in capitalism where algorithmic surveillance and individualisation of risk 
are becoming more common overall.   
 
I then turn attention to the wider body of research on class and subjectivity. I introduce Bourdieu’s 
(1986) theorisation of capital accruing subjectivity as a key basis for class analysis that I will employ – 
and then critiques of this offered by Skeggs (2004b) which I develop throughout my thesis to show 
how cultural and social capitals play a complex role across the “gig economy”. Finally, towards the end 
of this chapter I setup how I wish to address the existing literature through this research project – 
including the presentation of the key research questions and a discussion of how these connect to 
existing theory.   
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2.1 – Defining the “gig economy”  
To begin with, it is useful to define the arena of focus for this thesis. While the “gig economy” is 
something that ‘everybody is talking about’ (Woodcock & Graham, 2020, p. 1), there is an immediately 
terminology problem.  The vocabularies of a “gig economy”, “sharing economy”, “platform economy” 
and even “matchmaker economy” have often been used interchangeably. These terms have been 
applied in reference to a wide range of emergent forms of income-seeking that utilise digital platforms 
to match people with short shifts of work (“gigs”) or other opportunities to earn an income. It has 
been pointed out that there is a distinct lack of consensus on what these terms mean (Sundararajan, 
2016) and that ‘definitions of the field vary and often seem arbitrary’ (Ravenelle, 2019, p. 26). In this 
section I will try to deal with some of this ambiguity and layout a groundwork of understanding that 
emerges from the literature.  
 
2.1.1 – A general definition  
Putting the challenge of naming aside briefly, what are these platforms? This is a question that many 
scholars have offered insights on. Ravenelle broadly explains that this economy ‘encompasses 
everything from the multibillion-dollar companies such as AirBnB (room rental) and Uber (on-call taxi 
service) to free durable-goods-sharing sites such as Neighbourgoods’ (2019, p. 26). This points towards 
the wide scope of what has been incorporated within these terminologies – but offers little insight 
into how they have come to be grouped together. So, what is it that unites them? 
 
Schor and Attwood-Charles (2017) have been more specific to focus on the platforms’ technological 
function to claim that they ‘use sophisticated software to organise workers and asset holders, who 
provide the actual services to consumers, using crowdsourced rating and reputational data to 
facilitate stranger exchange’ – this technological focus occurs multiple times throughout the literature, 
with mentions of platforms serving as the digital matchmaker between economic parties (Evans & 
Schmalensee, 2016). In addition, these platforms are often referred to as being “lean” (Srnicek, 2017) 
– a terminology that points to corporations that tend to have few physically owned assets or 
customer-facing employees.  
 
Instead, they operate with a focus on providing a market matching service, often utilising high 
unemployment rates and taking advantage of an increasingly digital world which allows for platforms 
based on cloud architecture to sustain a high scalability factor (Schor, 2017; Srnicek, 2017). These 
platforms become increasingly popular due to their low-cost advantage for consumers (Balck & Cracau, 
2015) and potential for workers to earn an quick income (Schor, 2015). Network effects cause the 
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value of the platforms to increase as more users engage; these effects result in these platforms 
tending towards monopoly (Evans & Schmalensee, 2016) – this means that both consumers and 
“entrepreneurs” often end up gravitating towards dominant platforms through a lack of alternative 
platforms that have an adequate market share.   
 
So, in brief: the “gig economy” contains a wide range of digital platforms run by lean corporations, 
serving as market matchmakers between those with labour or assets to provide and those with a 
demand. Because of their lean model, cloud-based infrastructure and susceptibility to network effects 
they tend to grow rapidly and quickly monopolise. But this definition is incomplete – later in this 
chapter I will discuss how they also tend to share a focus on low barriers to access (2.2), precarious 
labour (2.3) and datafied surveillance (2.4). Throughout this thesis I will complicate some of these 
ideas further – by looking at how barriers to access relate to class inequalities and key differences 
emerge between platforms and individuals who bring forward different resources – which has an 
effect on how labour is positioned. Likewise, I argue that datafied surveillance means different things 
across platforms where ratings and reviews offer dissimilar positioning of the subject. On some non-
competitive platforms this surveillance is only disciplinary – on others it provides opportunities for 
economic advantage through the recognition of capitals where “entrepreneurs” can competitively set 
themselves apart.  
 
2.1.2 – Naming  
This sector as a whole has been referred to as the “sharing economy” based on its peer-to-peer nature 
and the possibility of reduced consumption through the sharing of assets (Sundararajan, 2016). Along 
a similar vein, others have referred to it as the “matchmaker economy” (Evans & Schmalensee, 2016), 
focusing on how the apps bring together two client bases – the people with the service or capital, and 
their customers. However, these sharing terminologies have been widely critiqued for masking the 
underlying economic nature of transactions undertaken by many of the for-profit platforms available 
(Ravenelle, 2017; Schor, 2017; Schor & Attwood-Charles, 2017). As Woodcock and Graham note of 
the “sharing economy”, this is a term ‘that sounds very optimistic in light of the evidence that followed’ 
(2020, p. 11). The economic arrangements of many dominant platforms challenge the terminology of 
“sharing” – for instance, ‘an AirBnB host isn’t so much “sharing” her home or “hosting guests” as she 
is renting her home out’ (Ravenelle, 2019, p. 29).  The term has further been critiqued for its 
conceptual vagueness – as Schor argues: 
coming up with a solid definition of the sharing economy that reflects common usage is nearly 
impossible. There is great diversity among activities as well as baffling boundaries drawn by 
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participants … self-definition by the platforms and the press defines who is in and who is out 
(2014). 
Because the terminology of the “sharing economy” is often constructed through marketing discourses 
as a self-defining process, rather than through external academic assessments, it becomes unclear if 
the term can be used in any convincing way to group platforms together conceptually. As Gibbings 
and Taylor’s study of Ubers arrival in Winnipeg demonstrates, there is a symbolic value attached to 
these emergent economies. As they describe, Uber is held up as an ‘icon of innovation …  key to the 
future of cities’ (2019, p. 575). For this reason, there is a prestige in the discourse of the “gig” and 
“sharing” economies that marketing departments may be eager to adopt. As Crouch (2019) expands, 
it is a central strategy of these platforms to define themselves at the cutting edge of modernity, 
something exceptional and new, so that opposition to them can be framed as opposition to progress 
more generally. The core of these platforms, however, is a more widely known form of capitalist 
exploitation.  
 
Another popular vernacular is that of the “gig economy”. As Woodcock and Graham explain, ‘the “gig” 
in the term “gig economy” refers back to the short-term arrangements typical of a musical event … 
this is of course no guarantee that they will get to perform regularly’ (2020, p. 3). Unlike the 
terminology of the “sharing economy”, which appears in ways that focus on the equitable sharing of 
assets (Sundararajan, 2016), “gig economy” brings a focus to labour. Woodcock and Graham (2020) 
further discuss how the “gig economy” works around a relationship in which one person sells their 
time to another. The labourer transfers their labour power (the capacity to work) to the owner of 
capital.  
 
This distinction between labour and capital is theoretically important in ways that exceed terminology 
but reflect back upon the language that we use to describe these platforms (where “gig” has attached 
itself to the more labour-focused platforms and “sharing” has attached to those which utilise assets 
and capital). The fact that some platform users are simply renting out their assets, such as AirBnB 
hosts who contract out the management of multiple properties that they own, rather than labouring 
themselves, is why I choose to utilise the ideologically loaded term of “entrepreneur”, rather than 
“worker”, in this thesis. The former allows an inclusion those who don’t actually do any work for the 
income that they obtain from the “gig economy”.  
 
As an alternate interjection to the understanding developed thus far, Ravenelle does not distinguish 
between “sharing” and “gig” economies based on an asset/labour division, instead she argues that 
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more generally that “sharing economy” is ‘a collection of app-based technologies that focus on the 
lending/renting of assets or services either for profit or for a higher good’ (2019, p. 31) – the use of 
“services” here implies that labour is  shared in a similar manner to assets. Instead she appears to use 
“gig” to refer to platforms which have a focus on short-term income opportunities – therefore, ‘while 
not all aspects of the sharing economy are part of the gig economy, platform based gig-economy 
services fall under the sharing economy heading’ (2019, p. 31). Ravenelle satisfies this by using the 
terms interchangeably to refer to companies that she considers to be operating platforms that are 
simultaneously both “sharing” (exchanging assets or services) and “gig” (short duration) platforms.  
 
A more general term is that of the “platform economy” or, indeed “platform capitalism” – the latter 
being a language that Srnicek utilises to bring attention to the ‘economic context and the imperatives 
of a capitalist system’ (2017, p. 2). Talking about platforms allows researchers to overcome some of 
the pitfalls associated with the “gig” and “sharing” labels by bringing focus to the one unambiguous 
uniting feature: the utilisation of a digital platform. Hill (2015) argues that the dominant feature of 
these platforms is the use of digital technologies to link buyers and sellers of good, labour or services. 
Srnicek offers a similar general definition of the platforms that he refers to, arguing that: At the most 
general level, platforms are digital infrastructures that enable two or more groups to interact, 
positioning themselves as intermediaries (2017). Unfortunately, the terminology labyrinth does not 
find an absolute resolution here for the purposes of those wishing to look at the “gig” and “sharing” 
economies, because while they can be fitted into the wider and more conceptually clear definition of 
the platform economy - This use of “platform” goes beyond what we would usually include in studies 
of the “gig” or “sharing” economies – Srnicek provides examples of Google and even Microsoft’s 
Windows operating system. Therefore, when we say “gig” or “sharing” economy we might be referring 
to a sub-section of a wider movement towards “platform capitalism”. A question therefore remains 
over how we might convincingly distinguish platforms such as Uber and AirBnB that appear in popular 
discourse as self-evident case-based definitions of the “gig” or “sharing” economy.  
 
Thus far, this thesis has solely dealt with these terminologies through quotation marks – This is a 
deliberate attempt to draw distance from any scholarly claim to representing any of these particular 
terms in their entirety – or to take a position on the ambiguities that any of these terms might present. 
While platform capitalism has emerged as a scholarly category it is important to underline that this 
thesis is representing a sub-category of this economy – one which has often been colloquially, 
academically and/or self-referenced as the “gig” or “sharing” economy. The specific platforms that 
this study engages with (AirBnB, Uber and Amazon Flex) have each been named through a variety of 
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these vocabularies – but it could also be contested that on occasions these points of reference are 
less than perfect.  
 
I argue that these naming systems are not always conceptually useful because the range of platforms 
that have been addressed by them often vary significantly – muting any attempt to draw clear 
conceptual lines. These companies are part of a movement towards platform capitalism, but they are 
often sporadic parts of this movement. While I draw upon vocabularies of the “gig” and “sharing” 
economy myself - utilising quotation marks - I do so colloquially without intending to locate an 
underlying conceptual category that exists in a way that is more meaningful than a reference point in 
popular discourse. As De Stefano argues, the “gig economy” ‘should not be seen as a parallel and 
watertight dimension of the labor market with structurally separated needs’ (2016, p. 472) – the 
distinction of these platforms is often colloquial rather than scholarly. In the following sections of this 
chapter I highlight a range of features which are identified as common characteristics of the “gig” or 
“sharing” economy, but it is notable that many of these, such as precarious labour and datafied 
surveillance, are commonplace across the entirety of modern capitalism – not just in these platforms 
which have developed their own discursive reference points.  
 
2.2 – Access barriers  
A theme that has been widely identified across the “gig economy” is its relatively low barriers to access 
for “entrepreneurs” wishing to earn money. Ravenelle (2019) splits this idea into two sections: skill 
barriers and capital investment barriers. She argues that there is variation between platforms as they 
tend to have different levels of barrier across these two axes. AirBnB, for instance, might have a high 
barrier to entry in the form of investment capital – the host needing to have a property with surplus 
living space in order to earn an income from the platform. Other platforms do not present such 
barriers; as Woodcock and Graham discuss, ‘many platforms operate with limited barriers to entry for 
workers, in part because of the relatively low levels of formal training needed for workers to engage 
in the job’ (Woodcock & Graham, 2020, p. 67). But I would argue that this approach can be nuanced 
in a number of ways. Firstly, capital barriers to access may be overcome through financing and credit 
products (which allows access but may also have detrimental impacts). Secondly, individuals bring in 
different levels of resources when they use a platform – not all “entrepreneurs” on the same platform 
have an equal starting point (either in economic, social or cultural capitals). Third, often these 
perspectives of low skill barriers rely upon a devaluation of working-class skillsets, related to a history 
of class exploitation. These are three of the complications I want to highlight to allow for a more 
comprehensive class analysis of these platforms – the first two of these I expand upon in the following 
sections while the third is discussed later in this chapter.  
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2.2.1 – Using debt to gain access 
While it has been pointed out that labour-focused platforms ‘often create a lower barrier to entry for 
work, … this does not mean that workers start out on an equal playing field’ (Ticona, Mateescu, & 
Rosenblat, 2018, p. 53). One aspect of this that I particularly want to draw attention to is the common 
relationship of debt that Uber drivers enter into. Because Uber’s rules often mean that drivers are 
required to have relatively new cars which meet particular requirements (Ravenelle, 2019), many 
drivers are forced to obtain new cars using credit or finance options. More concerningly, Uber 
themselves have been acting as a credit broker and generating revenue from its drivers who take on 
debt. Ravenelle (2019) discusses Uber’s partnership with Santander Bank to offer sub-prime lending 
to drivers that trapped them into an obligation to continue working for the platform – which she 
relates to indentured servitude. Uber’s credit brokering has taken multiple forms in different countries. 
The specific service described above by Ravenelle, which operated in the United States, was halted 
briefly in 2015 but then resurfaced less than a year later. Currently, in the United Kingdom Uber is 
brokering car financing through its subsidiary company Xuberance Limited, trading as “Partner Point”. 
This financing arrangement complicates access barriers to access significantly – while the barrier might 
at first appear low with sub-prime finance options enabling “entrepreneurs” quick access to 
appropriate vehicles, it comes with the subsequent cost of what appears to resemble indentured 
servitude. I address the importance of debt in my response to the first research question of this project, 
provided in chapter 4. 
 
2.2.2 – Entry point inequalities 
While the traditional job market provides a more sophisticated gatekeeping service, “gig economy” 
platforms allow a wider variety of “entrepreneurs” access to the marketplace and begin offering their 
labour, skills and assets. However, this barrier to entry is simply a starting point to an “entrepreneur’s” 
experience on the platform. As Schor (2017) points out, more research is needed to determine if 
people with differing levels of income or educational attainment generate different outcomes from 
the use of gig economy platforms. This thesis offers a response to this requirement by bringing the 
focus to wider conceptualisations of class. Later in this chapter (2.6) I offer a conceptualisation of 
capital accruing subjectivity provided by Bourdieu (1986) which I will utilise throughout the thesis to 
aid in an analysis of unequal experiences within the “gig economy” based upon class. Rather than 
speaking of capital investment and skill barriers, as Ravenelle (2019) does, I utilise Bourdieu’s 
theorisation of capitals to offer a more diverse understanding of economic subjectivity; this includes 
a full range of economic capitals and skillsets (which Bourdieu refers to as forms of cultural capitals). 
Overall, I want to shift from simply seeing entry point barriers – which can sometimes be overcome 
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with financial products (see 2.2.1) – to instead look at entry point inequalities which take into account 
the wider class positioning of the “entrepreneurial” subject.  
 
2.3 – Precarious labour  
The precarity associated with working in the “gig economy” has attracted a wide range of scholarly 
attention. Woodcock and Graham (2020) note that, despite being framed as independent contractors, 
workers in the gig economy are highly alienated from their labour and suffer from extremely low rates 
of pay. In an increasingly competitive international market ‘many workers have no choice but to 
accept whatever work they can find’ (2020, p. 92). This is not an issue that is unique to the “gig 
economy”; There is a significant stand of scholarship stemming from Marx (1887) that poses a 
challenge to the mythology that a worker is free to exchange their labour (Woodcock & Graham, 2020) 
– instead they are ‘obliged to do so in order to subsist’ (Huws, 2014, p. 152). Rather than being 
something entirely new about these platforms, the precarity of labour in the “gig economy” is part of 
a larger downwards harmonization of labour rights and a reduction in the labour share of income that 
has been taking place for some time (Crouch, 2019). Piketty (2014) provides data showing that, since 
the 1970s, capital’s share of income has been increasing while labour’s share of income has decreased 
in Britain.  This indicates that more generally within the economy, owners of capital are benefiting to 
a greater degree from economic growth than waged labourers.  
 
In this thesis, I take the debates over precarious labour further by framing the provision of labour 
against the “entrepreneur’s” debt and capital – to understand how labour is positioned within the “gig 
economy” by the subject’s class position. In the following section (2.3.1) I bring forward a more 
detailed discussion of debt and, in particular, Lazzarato’s (2012) theorisation of debt as an obligation 
on future labour. Then (in 2.3.2) I talk about how labour is positioned by forms of capital – 
predominantly utilising Bourdieu’s (1986) theorisation of the capital accruing subject.  
 
2.3.1 – Positioned by debt  
Hill describes how Uber is able to ‘suddenly and unilaterally change the drivers split with the company 
of the income from each ride, as well as the rate charged to passengers … [Uber] has shown no 
willingness to dialogue, much less negotiate, with drivers’  (2015, p. 87). This evidence is not in keeping 
with the idea of an agentic worker who is free to remove their labour if the company does not treat 
them fairly. As discussed earlier (section 2.2.1) many Uber drivers enter into financial arrangements 
which limit their ability to move freely in and out of their arrangements with the company, further 
negating the mythology of agentic providers of labour.  
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Debt is not a new economic occurrence – In Graeber’s (2014) anthropological history of debt he argues 
that it both precedes and forms the basis of all currency. However, shifts towards neoliberal 
financialisation since the 1970s have produced an acceleration of a debt economy; Lazzarato (2015) 
notes that there has been a restructuring of class relationships from the division between capitalists 
and wage-earners towards debtors and creditors. The difference between the two relationships, 
however, is not clear cut. As Harvey (2017, p. 23) argues, debts are a claim on a future value production 
that depends upon the provision of labour. In fact, Lazzarato (2012, 2015), Graeber (2014) and Harvey 
(2017) agree that debt is a way to force the labouring subject into capitalist productivity. This 
disciplinary power is explained by Lazzarato, who argues that by ‘training the governed to “promise” 
(to honour their debt), capitalism exercises “control over the future”, since debt obligations allow one 
to foresee, calculate, measure and establish equivalences between current and future behaviour’ 
(2012, p. 46). On a macroeconomic level, therefore, high levels of debt among the working class allows 
capitalism to reliably guarantee a supply of labour into the future because the debtors are under a 
requirement to continue selling their labour power on the market to whichever capitalist will offer 
them work.   
 
But there is also a more direct function of debt borne out through the idea of indentured servitude. 
Such a relationship exists when the debtor and the capitalist are a combined entity, as are the labourer 
and debtor – in these instances the debtor owes their labour directly to their creditor. The difference 
between indentured servitude and an indebted labourer is the mobility of the debtor’s labour power. 
In indentured servitude, the labourer is no longer able to provide their labour elsewhere, to another 
capitalist, to pay their debts. Instead, they become bound to a particular capitalist through a 
relationship of debt. As Graeber (2014) explains, indentured service has traditionally been a form of 
contract labour where workers were bound into providing their labour for long periods of time, often 
years, as a way to repay a debt. This form of contract is illegal now across much of the world, and is 
specifically delegitimised by article four of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (The United 
Nations, 1948) – the idea of contractually forcing a labourer to provide service to any particular 
creditor is unenforceable.  
 
In discussing the phenomena of drivers getting their cars through sub-prime leases and lending 
agreements, Rosenblat refers to a ‘debt-to-work pipeline’ (2018, p. 65), while Ravenelle (2019) goes 
somewhat further to make a passing reference to indentured servitude. But neither really expand 
upon what these debt relationships really mean.  The role that financial obligations play in positioning 
“gig economy” labour remains undertheorised. Debt has a long history of mirroring class inequalities, 
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and reinforcing them as markers of symbolic difference when the indebted subject is seen as not only 
economically but also morally lacking (Graeber, 2014) – this ties in to arguments I will make later about 
abjection and how precarious labourers often get symbolically positioned as undeserving of rights.  
 
2.3.2 – Positioned by capital 
While there is relatively extensive discussion of labour exploitation in the “gig economy” literature – 
something that is less discussed is the role of capital and the specific relations between capital and 
labour that explain a range of experienced outcomes. The Marxist tradition has generally argued that 
inequalities stem out from ‘the class struggle between capital and labour’ (Harvey, 2010, p. 56). Marx 
argues, in relation to productive capitalism, that capital accumulation occurs when a capitalist 
‘extracts unpaid labour directly from the labourers, and fixes it in commodities’ (1887, p. 400). The 
capitalist is then able to sell these commodities and convert the money gained into capital. The surplus 
value extracted from the labourer therefore accumulates in the form of capital owned by the capitalist.  
Recently, economists have used extensive international data sets to map the empirical importance 
resonating out of  ‘the unequal ownership of capital’ (Piketty, 2015, p. 26); and though this, show how 
capital accumulates over time as its rate of returns on capital exceeds the rate of growth in the 
economy (2014). Data presented and analysed by Piketty (2014, 2015, 2016) has indicated that, at the 
national level, capital’s share of income has significantly risen throughout the final quarter of the 20th 
century, while also concentrating to a smaller group of capitalist elites. I argue throughout this thesis 
that the role of capital is undertheorised in relation to the “gig economy”. This project aims to draw 
further attention to capital and the relationship that exists between capital and labour in the “gig 
economy” in order to contextualise platform work within these wider debates on inequality.  
 
2.4 – Surveillance and control  
A key theme of the “gig economy” that emerges from the literature is that of surveillance as a means 
of control. Woodcock and Graham address the digital legibility of “gig work” – pointing back to its 
roots in managerial control: They discuss how ‘managers wanted to ensure they got the most out of 
buying a worker’s time’ (2020, p. 23) but often struggled to do so effectively, especially in cases where 
workers might work inefficiently because of their bad working conditions or low compensation. 
Therefore, there was a movement towards ‘trying to make the work legible, making it visible so it 
could be understood by managers’ (2020, p. 24).  
 
 As with increasingly precarious labour, surveillance modes are becoming more commonplace across 
modern capitalism. Zuboff (2019) refers to this shift as a movement towards surveillance capitalism, 
a system of datafication as a means to exploitation, commodification and profit-making. Zuboff builds 
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upon the Marxist framework by offering eight varying definitions of surveillance capitalism that relate 
to the different mechanisms through which a datafied form of capitalism operates – covering a wide 
range of progressions within modernity. The type of surveillance capitalism that operates within the 
“gig economy” is just one part of Zuboff’s model – wherein it is possible to modify real-time actions in 
a ‘means of behaviour modification’ (2019, p. 293). This is an approach that has already been noted 
on platforms. Because of an oversupply of labour power, workers do everything in their power to 
avoid bad feedback, this includes agreeing to work extra hours, to provide extra deliverables to the 
client or even offer lower rates (Rosenblat, 2018; Rosenblat & Stark, 2016; Woodcock & Graham, 2020, 
p. 92). 
 
In this thesis, I will argue that not all “gig economy” surveillance systems work in the same way. In 
particular, I argue that some appear to recognise perceptions of value within a competitive 
marketplace to allow customers to choose between providers (as I argue happens on AirBnB). This 
type of surveillance system encourages “entrepreneurs” to  
“stand out” and “make a connection” … to navigate the unspoken cultural norms that shape 
activity on these platforms … [therefore] these platforms are structured around the 
assumption that workers will employ “self-branding” (Ticona et al., 2018, p. 26). 
This phenomenon is something which I argue can be connected to the theory of a capital-accruing 
subjectivity offered by Bourdieu (1986) (discussed further below in section 2.6).  
 
However, this self-branding initiative is not present in the same way on all platforms. In other parts of 
the “gig economy”, especially those which lack the same type of consumer choice (such as Uber), I 
argue that surveillance functions more as a simple disciplinary measure. Rosenblat and Stark (2016) 
argue that the consumers are encouraged embody the role of the manager themselves. In their study 
of Uber, they claim that passengers act as middle managers through their ratings. Importantly, they 
argue that this is part of a wider pattern where companies ‘create expectations about their service 
that workers must fulfil through the mediating power of the rating system’ (2016, p. 3772). As I will 
discuss in chapter 7, the rating and surveillance systems of Uber and Amazon Flex do not provide 
scope for drivers to set themselves apart in a competitive marketplace, but rather serve as an 
overhanging threat to their ability to earn an income if they do not score high enough. In this thesis I 
will draw these two modes of legibility apart and tie them to the underlying forms of class subjectivity 
produced by platforms.  
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There is also evidence that, as well as using customers as supervisors, the corporations that manage 
platforms also partake in more direct forms of surveillance. Ravenelle (2019), for instance, discusses 
how discussion forums for drivers are known to be lurking grounds for Uber staff. If Uber are secretly 
monitoring online driver spaces, generally built by and designed for drivers to discuss issues and 
problems that they face, then this poses important ethical questions. This also poses problems for 
Uber drivers who might be engaging in forms of labour organisation using these spaces.  
 
2.5 – Risk and protection 
Risk is a concept that has been widely discussed in academic literature. One of the most routinely 
cited sources comes from Beck’s (1992) arguments put forward in Risk Society. Beck argues that 
‘poverty attracts an unfortunate abundance of risks. By contrast, the wealthy (in income, power or 
education) can purchase safety and freedom from risk’ (1992, p. 35)– but the more recent literature 
from the “gig economy” points to risk being less about “misfortune” for the impoverished than a direct 
trading of risk from the wealthy to the poor.  As Ravenelle (2019) argues, Uber has not entirely ignored 
worker risks – it’s just that any costs associated with protecting drivers passed to the workers 
themselves. Not only are the day to day risks (such as unexpected costs) passed to “entrepreneurs”, 
but due to their status as independent contractors, they risk being excluded from existing labour 
protections (De Stefano, 2016). Crouch (2019), however, highlights that these processes that 
Ravenelle and De Stefano describe are not unique facets of what we call the “gig economy”, instead 
they are found more generally in the economy as neoliberal policy and practice changes actively shift 
risks to the most vulnerable – it is therefore important to avoid “gig economy” exceptionalism. The 
process of risks being forced by the powerful onto the less powerful has an established tradition.  
 
In this thesis, I put forward an approach to risk that requires a consideration of an “entrepreneur’s” 
labour, capital and debt – to show how each of these three concepts relates to their experiences of 
risk. While many make (usually accurate) generalisations that ‘working in the so-called sharing 
economy both increases the risk that workers will get hurt on the job and forces them to assume sole 
financial responsibility for dealing with any such injuries to themselves or their property’ (Ravenelle, 
2019, p. 109) – I want to show in more detail how these risks relate to the classed positionality of the 
“entrepreneur”. Risks are passed to “entrepreneurs” in the “gig economy”, but they fall unequally – 
with some doing better than others – something that Ravenelle comes short of explaining. In this 
thesis, I argue that those with the least resources (and those with debt) face the more significant risks 
while those with capitals and resources are often able to escape it.  
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2.6 – Subjects of capital(ism) 
So far in this chapter, I have focused predominantly on platforms and their attributes – while 
sometimes discussing how these interact with the “entrepreneurial” subject. Now I will develop this 
subject of capitalism in greater detail. Marx (1887) explores class as a way of understating power 
relationships between groups who occupy distinct economic positions within a society. For Marx, 
capitalists occupy a position that is maintained through the extraction of value from labourers’ socially 
necessary labour time. Labourers, while producing the value that the capitalists extract, are 
maintained in a subordinate position due to their lack of capital – for Marx, capital specifically referred 
to the means of production.  
 
This division between value producers and value extractors has often been detrimentally blurred in 
modern neoclassical and neoliberal economics. Within these schemas, value extraction and rent 
seeking have been measured as if they were productive within national accounts in since the 1970s 
(see critical accounts by Mazzucato, 2019). This turn towards neoclassical and neoliberal economics 
as the orthodoxy blurs class relationships by seeing financial service workers and rentiers as being 
more productive than labourers simply because they receive higher sums of money. This irregularity 
occurs from a blurring of the separate concepts of value production and income – the result of this 
confluence being that high earners are seen as productive because of their high income, despite the 
real value of their earnings emerging from undercompensated productive labour elsewhere in the 
economy (Mazzucato, 2019; Mazzucato & Shipman, 2014).  
 
This shift in discourse points towards a symbolic form of class power, where those whose income 
comes from exploitation, extraction and dispossession are able to legitimise their economic activities 
and shape economic discourse. This blurring of income sources shifts focus from the relational nature 
of class that Marxist theory describes (exploiter/exploited) to the ideological idea of an economy 
where everyone earning an income is equally positioned and where the methods of income 
generation become less discussed. This is part of a symbolic shift towards the idea of a “classless 
society”; Scholars such as Beck (1992) and Giddens (1984, 1991) have interpreted this discursive shift 
by rejecting traditional categorisations of class all together – shifting instead to an individualistic 
model of society where subjects are seen to be agentic and increasingly free to move around society. 
This approach has been critiqued by the likes of Skeggs (2004a) and Savage (2000) for its rejection of 
the underlying class processes that still shape society – exploitation, dispossession and rent seeking.  
 
This thesis sets out to test the theorisations of capital accruing subjectivity put forward by Bourdieu 
(1986, 2013). Bourdieu (1986) builds upon Marx’s work by offering a view of classed subjectivity where 
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everyone is, to some extent, an owner of capital. Bourdieu’s capital accruing subject departs from the 
economic subject of Marx, in part, by broadening the scope for what is considered capital. Bourdieu 
argues that labour accrues not only into traditional economic capital, but also into cultural and social 
capitals that attach to a subject through ownership and embodiment. For instance, Bourdieu sees 
skills as a form of capital – so a labour utilising a specialist skillset to earn an increased income can, in 
this theoretical construct, be seen as earning income from capital. This approach allows for an 
understanding of how complex income stratifications occur in modern capitalism by mapping an 
individual’s forms of capital to their capacity to earn an income. It also links understandings of 
economic outcome to the cultural and social aspects of class, building upon the approach put forward 
by Weber (1964). What often gets lost in Bourdieuian approaches are the classed processes of 
exploitation, extraction and dispossession that were the focus of much Marxist analysis (as Skeggs 
(2015) discusses), and through this, the idea of classed groups who are collectively exploited or 
exploiting others. I will come back to these critiques later in this chapter and discuss their importance, 
but first I will lay out Bourdieu’s model of subjectivity in more detail.  
 
Cultural capital, for Bourdieu, builds up over time and takes three forms: the embodied state, the 
objectified state, and the institutionalised state. The embodied is that which has been internalised by 
the individual – ‘in the form of long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body’ (1986, p. 243) – a 
product of an individual’s specific socialisations and experiences; this can also include skillsets that a 
subject has the capacity to call upon as well as mannerisms that allow the subject to get ahead in the 
economy. Objectified cultural capital can be physically obtained as ‘cultural goods (pictures, books, 
dictionaries, instruments, machines, etc.)’ (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 243) – this broad list deals with objects 
that, through ownership or access, allow an individual to succeed economically. Then, finally, 
institutional cultural capital – which Bourdieu saw as a specific form of objectified cultural capital – 
‘confers entirely original properties on the cultural capital which it is presumed to guarantee’ 
(Bourdieu, 1986, p. 243). For instance, evidence shows that educational qualifications have an 
institutionally conferred assurance from the awarding institution, and discrepancies continue 
between individual institutions in the UK (Mike Savage, 2015; Wakeling & Savage, 2015). Meanwhile, 
social capital for Bourdieu refers to the social network resources of the individual, which they possess 
or have the access to utilise. This is demonstrated through largely institutionalised ‘relationships of 
mutual acquaintance and recognition’ (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 248).  
 
Bourdieu (1986) borrows Marx’s labour theory of value here, suggesting that all forms of capital 
originally emerge from labour power. As Skeggs emphasises: ‘labour is the source of all value. Without 
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labour there is no capital as capital develops through primitive accumulation’ (2014, p. 8). Skills, for 
Bourdieu (1986), are the result of the labour time expended in learning, while social capital is the 
result of spending time networking and building connections – in these ways labour is producing value. 
However, capital also has the potential to accumulate when value does not stay with its producer – 
something that Marx (1887) discussed extensively in the form of labour exploitation. Other have built 
upon the Marxist framework to discuss other pathways to accumulation in greater detail, for example 
the roles of extraction (in the form of rents) which Mazzucato (2019) discusses, or inheritance (Piketty, 
2014). These mechanisms, like exploitation, have the potential to expand inequalities by providing 
ways for value to accumulate through a relational tie – one person gets richer at the expense of others 
from whom they take value (who produce it through labour). While Bourdieu (1986, 2013) talks 
extensively about inheritance of capitals, he often overlooks exploitation and extraction (Skeggs, 
2015).  
 
The definition of capital that Bourdieu (1986) offers is broader than the one put forward by Marx 
(1887) not only in that it broadens focus beyond instantly convertible economic resources (by bringing 
in cultural and social capitals), but also in the economic sense. For Marx (1887) and the economic 
tradition more generally, there was a distinction between capital as the means of production and 
other economic elements such as income and wealth. Bourdieu’s model simplifies these nuances. But 
this simplification is also engaged with by economists when looking at inequality: Piketty uses the 
terms capital and wealth interchangeably, arguing that ‘capital in all its forms has always played a dual 
role, as both a store of value and a factor of production’ (Piketty, 2014, p. 48). Piketty’s approach to 
viewing them as alike in his analysis has been critiqued for its inability to distinguish between the 
different economic mechanisms of capital and wealth (Varoufakis, 2014). However, this study is not 
interested in separating the particular mechanisms (profit, rents, interest) that allow economic forms 
of capital to produce returns so much as how these are distributed and the realised experiences that 
“entrepreneurs” have when putting their capitals to work in the “gig economy”. Therefore, the 
broader conceptualisations of economic capital offered by Bourdieu and Piketty are utilised here.  
 
Bourdieu (1986) argues that the most important advantage of all types of capital is the freeing up of 
time; this emerges from the ability that capital provides to derive greater economic benefit from 
labour time (Piketty (2014) suggests that some degree of labour is usually required in order to obtain 
economic returns from all forms capital, for instance, associated administrative duties with renting 
out a property). Bourdieu recognises that this not only has an immediate impact (less time spent 
earning the same amount of money), but also has a secondary impact as this acquired spare time can 
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be used to gain further advantage through additional capital accrual. Capital, therefore, reduces the 
dependency on labour time by allowing subjects to earn higher incomes – it is this aspect of capital 
accrual at the level of the subject that I argue has importance for how we frame labour in the “gig 
economy”.  
 
Forms of capital, therefore, benefit a subject by allowing them to achieve a greater economic yield 
from their labour time, or even to potentially remove the requirement for labour in order to provide 
an income obtained solely from interest, profits and rents upon capital. This is one clear way in which 
Bourdieu’s form of capital is distinct from those posed by other social theorists; Putnam (1993), for 
instance, talks about social capital as a civic good within the collective society that benefits the 
potential of democracy. Instead, Bourdieu’s work keeps focus upon the individual as an economic 
subject who can gain personal economic benefit from their forms of capital. This approach allows for 
a closer analysis of interpersonal inequality by recognising the unequal distribution of resources within 
society and the potential for divisions to deepen between subjects. This core theoretical 
understanding also allows for analysis that branches away from the specific examples of capital that 
Bourdieu describes – capital in this sense is anything that exists as an accumulation of labour that can 
be utilised for economic advantage. As an extension, it is important to keep in mind that not 
everything is a form of capital within Bourdieu’s framework – only resources that can return economic 
benefit. There are cultural and social practices which fall outside of the potential for economisation 
(Skeggs, 2014). 
 
Later in this chapter I will further lay out critiques of Bourdieu (1986) and the limits to what his theory 
of capital accruing subjectivity can offer us. Further on in this thesis, I will showcase these limits more 
specifically, indicating how capital accrual is superseded by exploitation in the data I present for some 
cases. I say this now to highlight an important point: While the aim of this thesis is to look at forms of 
capital in the “gig economy”, it does not mean that this approach works in the ways that Bourdieu 
(1986) describes in all cases. My ambition is, instead, to highlight where and how a theory of capital 
accrual might be useful as well as producing a more nuanced theoretical understanding of what occurs 
at its limits.  
 
2.6.1 – Forms of capital in the “gig economy” 
I discussed how Ravenelle (2019) talked about the importance of skills and capital investment in her 
findings. However, she did not offer a thorough conceptualisation of these or position them within a 
wider theoretical consideration of inequality. In the conceptualisation of capital accruing subjectivity 
offered by Bourdieu these can be seen as forms of embodied cultural capital and economic capital 
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respectively. But beyond being a barrier to access – how do forms of capital provide an economic 
advantage within the “gig economy”?  
 
Sundararajan (2016) has argued optimistically that platforms have the potential to reduce inequality 
by giving a greater number of people access to methods of economic capital utilisation. Giving the 
example of Funding Circle, an investment-based platform, he argues that platforms could allow people 
to ‘experience the other side of the coin by making money through investing or owning rather than 
labouring’ (2016, p. 124). However, the idea of spare money for investment remains a challenge as 
levels of household debt are growing in the UK, both in low and middle income brackets (Henry et al., 
2017) – it is unclear how Funding Circle could offer a benefit to those who do not already have money 
to invest using non-“gig economy” methods. Likewise, as Schor (2017) found AirBnB hosts earning vast 
amounts of money, but only those who owned a valuable property. There appears to be a divide in 
who has the ability to benefit from these platforms. It has, therefore, been argued by some that a new 
theoretical understanding is needed to determine how categories such as labour, profit and rent relate 
to platform economies (Bernhardt, 2014; Fuchs, 2017; Huws, 2014; Schor & Attwood-Charles, 2017). 
As Schor (2017) points out, more research is needed to determine if people with differing levels of 
income or educational attainment generate different outcomes from the use of gig economy 
platforms.  
 
However, rather than offering something entirely new I have aimed, in this chapter, to link 
understandings of the “gig economy” to more established theoretical frameworks which allow us ways 
to see both how and why some people get ahead while others fall behind. In this chapter I have been 
resistant towards “gig economy” exceptionalism – building upon the work of those such as Crouch 
(2019) who link these platforms to pre-existing trends towards reduced worker rights, increased 
exploitation and precarity. As discussed, the even the terminologies of “gig economy” and “sharing 
economy”, among others, are ambiguous, interpreted pluralistically and used as marking spin (Schor, 
2014). I therefore look backwards, theoretically, to build upon Bourdieu’s theorisation of subjectivity 
to explore these types of question, to understand how individual “entrepreneurs” live out classed 
experiences in the “gig economy”. To investigate the range of different outcomes based on the 
capitals that “entrepreneurs” have access to – or, as I discuss in the following section, their lack of 
capital. I use these previous works as a basis to address the idea of capitals (and their relationship to 
labour) at a greater theoretical depth.  
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2.6.2 – The symbolic nature of capital 
Capitalism relies upon a symbolic realisation of value in capital at the point of conversion. It is through 
symbolic processes, for instance, that the skills involved in certain types of labour are deemed more 
valuable than others; or that certain objects are seen as more prestigious than others and, therefore, 
worth more. As Bourdieu (2013, p. 246) notes, ‘the conversion rate between one sort of capital and 
another is fought over at all times and is therefore subject to endless fluctuations’. Forms of capital 
do not derive their exchange value as a neutral property, but rather through symbolic struggles. 
Bourdieu (2013) handles this through the concepts of symbolic capital and distinction: respectively 
answering the question of who has the power to define exchange value and how do they do it.  
 
While symbolic capital is never defined at length by Bourdieu in the way that cultural and social 
capitals are, he does suggest that it is based around ‘a reputation for competence and an image of 
respectability and honourability’ (2013, p. 291). There is often overlap in his work between symbolic 
capital and forms of cultural capital. Having a degree from a highly ranked university, for instance, 
might simultaneously be a form of institutional cultural capital and a marker of competence that 
constitutes symbolic capital. Beyond this, those who have highly regarded resources that might 
simultaneously have an exchange value (cultural capital, for instance) and work as a marker of 
competence (symbolic capital) would tend to bring about judgements of taste (distinctions) which 
reinforce the value of their own forms of capital, as it is in their own interest to do so.  
 
Bourdieu (2013), at times, uses the terms symbolic capital and symbolic power as if they are 
interchangeable ideas – and it has been argued that symbolic capital is the basis of Bourdieu’s 
understanding of power (Skeggs, 2015). But the notion of symbolic capital requires more criticism 
here. There is a need to link together symbolic struggles with broader discourses that go beyond 
conceptualisations that are limited to individual subjectivity. Skeggs (2004b), for instance, links 
symbolic violence to broader themes of class, gender and race that cannot be contained within a 
theory of power limited to individual subjects as social actors – these forms of symbolic structuring 
are historically entrenched through colonialism, racism, sexism and a long running legitimisation of 
class exploitation. That is not to say that individuals aren’t the beneficiaries of symbolic power, just 
that it cannot be conceptualised in its entirety as if it were an individual’s possession that exists 
outside of these broader discourses. Likewise, it is critical to underline the importance of symbolic 
power for its real purpose: exploitation, extraction and dispossession of value. In departing from Marx 
(1887), Bourdieu (1986, 2013) often leaves behind the underlying nature of class as a relationship 
where one party gains through the loss of another. By delegitimising and devaluing the forms of capital 
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that a subordinate group has access to, dominant groups are able to extract value and labour from 
them – This might be referred to as abjection.  
 
2.7 – Abjection 
Related to theorisations of subjection, are those of abjection. Abjection is a state of exclusion from 
full subjectivity – the abjected individual is produced from systems of power which put a barrier in 
place to full realisation of subjectivity (Tyler, 2013). While Skeggs (2004b) does not use the 
terminology of abjection specifically, it appears to be close to what she is describing when she talks 
about how working-class individuals often get viewed as valueless when considered by Bourdieu’s 
(1986) model of a capital accruing subject. Skeggs describes the working class as, ‘those who cannot 
accrue value in themselves by dominant symbolic techniques’ (Skeggs, 2004b, p. 91).  
 
While Skeggs has distinguished her critique of Bourdieu away from Foucauldian ideas of subjectivity 
(see Skeggs, 2004b), it is worth acknowledging the Foucauldian nature of class disidentification 
(Skeggs, 1997) and the critique that she poses of the classed language adopted through modern 
scholars’ utilisation of Bourdieu (Skeggs, 2015). In particular we can see how Foucault (2000, p. 331) 
allures to the nature of power struggles which take the form of a ‘refusal of a scientific or 
administrative inquisition that determines who one is’. Skeggs argues throughout her corpus that 
working class struggles are struggles against being identified as valueless (see also Skeggs & Loveday, 
2012). Skeggs provides us with a point of confluence between the languages of Bourdieu and Foucault 
by using the latter to reconsider the theorisations of social power suggested by the former, putting 
the emphasis back on broad symbolic identifications rather than the economised exchange-value 
language of Bourdieu that has been widely adopted by sociologists (See critiques by Fine 1999, 2001; 
2000). However, Skeggs (2015) does not abandon the specifically Marxist roots of Bourdieu, instead 
she reaffirms them by placing the emphasis back on the ways in which broader symbolic judgements 
of value reproduce relations of exploitation and dispossession – verbs that tend to be lost in Bordieuan 
(or indeed, Foucauldian) study.   
 
As a result of this abjection, the individual is framed as disposable (Tyler, 2013). In the Bordieuan (1986) 
model, this means that the person is not judged upon a range of capitals that are read as indicators of 
value – but instead reduced to a replaceable supply of labour. When presented in this way, the abject 
is primed for exploitation because they are denied the form of personhood where, in Bourdieu’s 
model, they are able to set themselves apart as valuable within the market.  
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2.7.1 – Abjection in the “gig economy” 
In this project I want to build upon Skeggs’ (2004b) critique of Bourdieu (1986) to understand how 
platform mechanisms might (re)produce these types of symbolic structuring. Some sense of abjection 
has already emerged within the previous section on precarious labour (2.3). For instance, workers in 
the “gig economy” are not usually considered employees and are subsequently denied the traditional 
rights of the employed subject - as Woodcock and Graham summarise, ‘evidence is pointing towards … 
dangerous working conditions, one-sided contracts and a lack of employment protection’ (2020, p. 5). 
This appears to be a something of process of abjection from the traditional labouring subject who is 
afforded these basic forms of recognition as being someone who is more than replaceable labour – 
worthy of basic protections.  
 
Importantly, I will take this further to understand how this form of abjection is linked to the rating and 
algorithmic management mechanisms of platforms. As discussed earlier in this chapter (2.4), I am 
presenting an argument that not all systems of surveillance are equal within the “gig economy” – and 
while some appear to recognise the value of a subject in competitive marketplaces where choice exists, 
others deny the “entrepreneur” the possibility of setting themselves apart in any meaningful way. As 
a result, the platform limits the subjectivity of the “entrepreneur” by preventing them from personally 
economising their forms of value. My argument here is not that these workers do not have value 
beyond their labour power, but rather, this value is exploited by the platform who retain any 
associated economic benefits by providing a system where all “entrepreneurs” are interchangeable. 
Because economic returns are denied to the “entrepreneur”, they do not realise the subjectivity 
discussed by Bourdieu (1986). 
 
2.8 – Intersections  
The concept of intersectionality was brought into common use by Crenshaw (1991) as a way of 
explaining how the impacts of multiple forms of inequality (such as class and race) can combine to 
produce specific instances of disparity. While this thesis places its conceptual focus around class, it is 
important to acknowledge that class always exists within intersectional context. As Skeggs argues: 
The processes by which capitalists divided labour through difference and work is a complex 
race, gender and class issue. It is not a straightforward analysis of difference. It is a complex 
intersection of different forces that make and unmake value as they materialize on bodies in 
different spaces and time (2019, p. 32).  
That is to say, we cannot ever take class to be something that exists outside of other subject markers 
which allow capitalism to prescribe various ideas of value (or lack of value) to a subject. While Skeggs’ 
(1997, 2004a) work has long underlined the fact that analysis of gender cannot exist without class and 
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vice-versa, Virdee additionally argues that there must be a movement to ‘wilfully entangle demands 
for economic justice with anti-racism and thereby embrace and demystify the differences inscribed 
into the collective body of the proletariat by capitalism’ (2019, p. 3). While a majority of focus is given 
classed inequalities in this thesis, it is important to remember that it is never possible to fully 
disaggregate inequalities of class, race and gender (Crenshaw, 1991).  
 
2.8.1 – Gender 
A body of research on gender in the “gig economy” is emerging in recent years. Scholars have noted, 
for instance, that among Uber drivers there is an ‘extreme underrepresentation of women’ (Berger, 
Frey, Levin, & Danda, 2018, p. 7), this has been attributed to the fact that Uber driving is perceived as 
‘entrepreneurial masculine labour’ (Ticona et al., 2018, p. 12). More generally, studies have shown 
that women tend to engage in less capital enhancing activities online when compared to their male 
counterparts (van Deursen & Helsper, 2017). However, women do not disappear entirely from the gig 
economy’s labour market. Instead, studies have found that they end up using gig economy platforms 
that more closely reflect traditional gendered work such as housekeeping (Churchill & Craig, 2019). 
Galperin finds in his study of Nubelo, now part of Freelancer.com (a geographically untethered 
platform), that: 
gender stereotypes are particularly salient in online hiring because employers typically 
contract for short-term, relatively low-value jobs based on limited information about job 
applicants … female candidates are less likely to be hired for male-typed jobs (e.g., software 
development) but more likely to be hired for female-typed jobs (e.g., writing and translation) 
than equally qualified male candidates (2019, p. 1).  
What these trends suggest is that gender is influencing the perception of “entrepreneur’s” economic 
value – with evidence that the “gig economy” is (re)articulating a gendered division of labour. The 
theoretical implication appears to be close to one of abjection (section 2.6.1) – where the value of 
gendered subjectivities is being limited in particular ways. As Skeggs (2004a) argues, this type of 
gendered distinction emerges when characteristics are inscribed into certain bodies and articulated 
as a (mis)recognition of value – something which occurs both on gendered bodies and on raced bodies.  
 
2.8.2 – Race 
Many of the studies that have looked at race in the platform economy have focused on AirBnB due to 
the aspect of choice (in either choosing which host’s property or choosing to accept a guest). An 
experiment by Edelman et al. (2017) found that requests from AirBnB guests with distinctively African 
American names were 16 percent less likely to be accepted than identical guests with distinctively 
white names. In a study that looked at data for AirBnB hosts in San Francisco, Kakar et al. found that: 
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‘Asian and Hispanic hosts charge 8%-10% lower prices relative to their White counterparts on 
equivalent rental properties’ (2018, p. 25). Another study by Laouénan and Rathelot (2017) took a 
wider dataset of 400,000 properties in North America and Europe, consisting of 3,500,000 
observations, and found an ethnic price gap within cities of 3.2%  The evidence therefore suggests 
that racial discrimination is taking place on AirBnB. This suggests that the racial inscription causes 
realised economic differences for hosts as perceptions of value become tied to bodies.  
 
On the other hand,  ‘anecdotal reports about Uber suggest that it may make hiring a cab easier for 
African Americans’ (Ravenelle, 2019, p. 35). Certainly, in London, private hire driving is a market that 
is already almost exclusively non-white (Transport for London, 2018) – but research is needed to 
understand these racial dynamics in greater detail. It is likely that the low barriers to access in Uber 
driving, especially with the rise in sub-prime lending (discussed earlier), make Uber driving a possible 
source of income for those excluded from more traditional labour markets due to language and 
educational barriers. However, it is important to remember the economic limitations and lack of 
worker rights provided to Uber drivers, which has been discussed throughout this chapter alongside 
the role of sub-prime lending. Inclusion within this type of labour market does not always equate to 
empowerment, but rather, as I will argue, to abjection.  
 
2.9 – Summation and research questions 
In this chapter, I have established links between aspects of the “gig economy” and classed 
subjectivities. One of the key points I have aimed to highlight is the under-theorised roles that forms 
of capital and debt might play in the experiences that “entrepreneurs” have. The term “gig economy” 
seems to reference platforms that focus more on labour (Woodcock & Graham, 2020) while “sharing 
economy” focuses more on assets and capital which can be rented out for short periods of time (see 
discussions of “sharing” by Ravenelle (2017, 2019) and others (Frenken & Schor, 2017; Schor & 
Attwood-Charles, 2017; Schor, Fitzmaurice, Carfagna, Attwood-Charles, & Poteat, 2016). But, as I will 
show, there is an overlap between the two – and there are ambiguities across this terminology. For 
example, AirBnB hosts may be renting out their property but also do some work cleaning the property 
and arranging bookings. An Uber driver might be providing labour as their main function, but they also 
rely upon the capital asset of a car. Are these “entrepreneurs” labouring workers or rentier capitalists?  
This is complicated further still by the role of debt: what happens when the capital assets are not 
owned but rented or held through financial products? These are core questions that emerge from a 
body of literature which appears to talk about vastly different experiences of “entrepreneurs”. Here I 
address these complexities through the first research question: How do relations of economic capital, 
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labour and debt present themselves within the platform economy? This question will be addressed 
predominantly in chapter 4 of this thesis.  
 
After this, I turn attention towards the wider aspects of the model of subjectivity offered by Bourdieu 
(1986), which accounts for forms of capital outside of immediately convertible economic forms. How 
do these forms of capital, such as cultural knowledge, skills and symbolically endowed resources allow 
“entrepreneurs” to set themselves apart? This question places an emphasis on value recognition, on 
what forms of capital become recognised as “valuable” or “useful” within the platform economy. But 
what happens when an “entrepreneur” lacks these forms of capital? Or when the platform (or the 
market) fail to recognise these forms of value? Do the theoretical tools developed elsewhere to 
understand these phenomena translate to the “gig economy”? Collectively, I address these inquiries 
through the second research question of this thesis: How are cultural and social capitals put to work 
in the platform economy? This question is considered across two chapters, 5 and 6. In chapter 5 I 
discuss instances where cultural and social capitals are valued and can be utilised for economic gain. 
In chapter 6 I turn attention to cases where value is not economically recognised.  
 
One of the key things to which I have aimed to draw attention in this chapter is the problematic of 
“gig economy” exceptionalism (or even the notion that the “gig economy” is a clear conceptual 
category at all) – and through this critique I have aimed to steer the discussion towards existing 
theoretical understandings that may offer workable understandings of these new platforms. After the 
forthcoming analysis I will conclude by the end of this thesis that existing theoretical tools do work for 
helping us understand how inequalities reproduce in the “gig economy” and why some succeed while 
others fail. What I will do, in particular, is map the theoretical approaches discussed in this chapter 
onto the empirical examples that I investigate in this project – to show where and how they are useful. 
Within the “gig economy”, I will argue, there is not only labour exploitation, but also rentier capitalism 
and value extraction – platforms are pluralistic and inconsistent with any singular theoretical approach 
to class. By bringing the approaches discussed in this chapter together we can begin to make sense of 










3 – Methodology  
3.1 – Introduction 
This chapter provides justifications for the data collection methods chosen for the study, and further 
explains the methodological development through piloting to the final implementation.  Challenges 
and shortcomings in the data collection are noted to aid an understanding of the qualitative data 
validity; indicating what the data can and cannot tell us from an epistemological perspective. Also 
discussed is the use of thematic analysis in this study and its suitability to the data and the project as 
a whole – as well as the subsequent limitations. 
 
In the following section, I briefly discuss the logic through which interview data from “entrepreneurs” 
was chosen as an object of study and pose a justification of the suitability of this approach in answering 
the research questions. Next, I discuss in more practical terms how the methodology was developed 
through piloting – including the difficulties and limitations that occurs. I then go on to set out the final 
practicalities of the research design that were implemented. Ethics of data generation are discussed 
in some detail. I then turn attention to the thematic approach to analysis that was utilised.  
 
3.2 – Defining the object of study  
Some researchers of the sharing economy, such as Sundararajan (2016) and Srnicek (2017) have 
focused their empirical study on the platforms themselves: their internal organisation, business 
strategies, the applications, and the potential outcomes that they could deliver. Others such as Zervas 
et al. (2017) conducted a market analysis, looking at quantitative data. But work by Schor (2015, 2017) 
and Ravenelle (2017) has highlighted the role of interview data for its value in describing the various 
experiences share-economy workers face. While direct analysis of the platform and its business model 
provide vital insights into why and how the platforms become structured as they are, this study makes 
“entrepreneurs” its primary object of study to put the focus on who is attracted to platforms, for what 
reason, their experiences with the platform and the outcomes that they experience.  
 
But the platforms are never fully separated from this analysis, as they repeatedly become intertwined 
with the experiences of workers through their mediating characteristics – and, therefore, become a 
secondary object of study through reports of lived interaction that come forward within interviews. 
Likewise, the customers who engage with the services offered by platforms such as AirBnB and Uber 
also become indirect objects of study. As the data unfolds in analysis, the key focus often becomes 
the recounts of social and economic relations that constitute the “entrepreneur’s”position. As 
Wacquant emphasises, the tradition stemming from Marxism sees ‘the basis for heterogeneity and 
inequality [consisting] of relations. Not individuals or groups ... but webs of material and symbolic ties 
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[that] constitute the proper object of social analysis’ (2013, p. 275). This study, therefore, uses the 
individual “entrepreneur” as a gateway towards an understanding of these ties; this data provides 
insights into how the individual becomes situated within social relations. This study is, therefore, 
looking at individual “entrepreneurs” but also looking at how the “entrepreneur” is socially 
constituted through their experiences of interaction with the platform, customers, creditors, debtors, 
employees and so forth.   
 
This study addresses two key research questions: 
 
1) How do relations of economic capital, labour and debt present themselves within the 
platform economy? 
2) How are cultural and social capitals put to work in the platform economy? 
 
The first of these questions looks at the “entrepreneur’s” economic positioning. While in positivist 
epistemologies this might mean a measurable sense of economic capital and labour time attached to 
notions of individual possession (something that is indulged as a starting point within this thesis), it 
more accurately refers to the underlying social relations to which capital, debt and labour refer. A 
person might, for instance, have debt which places a demand upon their future labour which they 
“owe” to a creditor - this study aims to not just look at the debt itself as a quantifiable attachment of 
individuality, in a positivist sense, but rather the social ties that are referenced by the debt and their 
subsequent impact upon experiences.  
 
The second question places an emphasis on value recognition, on what forms of capital become 
recognised as “valuable” or “useful” within the platform economy. This means that the object of study 
is both the capitals possessed by the individual and also the social contexts of recognition that the 
individual experiences. In particular, this research question is answered in this thesis through a 
consideration of the rating and review mechanisms that serve as mediations of intertwined social 
relations between the “entrepreneur”, the platform and the platforms customers.  
 
Within this section, I have aimed to set out the empirical focus of this thesis from an epistemological 
perspective – describing the objects of study in abstract and theoretical terms. Over the next two 




3.3 – Development and piloting  
The pilot set out with four key aims:  
- Firstly, testing sites of analysis and their appropriateness (if they are accessible and productive 
of useful data for the purpose of this research); 
- Second, the recruitment methodology for the interview sites and its manageability 
(productive of participation, suitable for the required sample sizes, and ethically considerate); 
- Third, the interview topic guide and its ability to produce the type of data needed to address 
the research question; 
- Finally, the pilot was used to test the possibility of using text from specific Facebook groups 
for “entrepreneurs” as additional data in the study (this was excluded from the main study for 
reasons soon to be discussed).  
 
3.3.1 – Choice of London 
The majority of qualitative studies looking at workers in the “gig economy” have focused on North 
America, and in particular the United States (see for example: Rosenblat, 2016; 2018; Ravenelle, 2017, 
2019; Schor, 2015, 2017). There is a need to understand how these findings might translate into 
European socio-economic geographies.  
 
This study looks at geographically tethered platforms where the types of opportunity they offer 
require ‘workers to be in a particular place’ (Woodcock & Graham, 2020, p. 43). This distinguishes 
them from other parts of the “gig economy” where platforms such as Fiverr and Freelancer allow for 
customers to outsource small labour activities to workers anywhere in the world. Platforms which are 
not geographically tied produce globalised effects whereby ‘employers in advanced economies are 
likely to gravitate towards countries with large pools of lower-cost white-collar workers’ (Galperin & 
Greppi, 2017, p. 2). However, geographic biases still exist quite pervasively on these platforms, where 
customers will choose labourers based on preconceived biases about where they are from, resulting 
in unequal global distributions (Galperin & Greppi, 2017; Gefen & Carmel, 2008)).  
 
Because the platforms in this study are geographically sticky, they (and their “entrepreneurs”) are tied 
in more fixed ways to the local economy within London. There are also interesting racial dimensions 
to this geographic context as in London where the vast majority of private hire drivers are non-white 
(Transport for London, 2018).  It is therefore interesting to consider how locality might impact upon 
geographically sticky platforms in different locations.  
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3.3.2 – Development of a sampling architecture  
The initial sampling architecture for the study was informed by Robinson (2014)’s four-point sampling 
approach which begins with defining a sample universe. The sample universe for this study can be 
discussed at two levels: the platform level and individual level. Platform level sampling refers to the 
logic by which platforms become the focus of the study, whereas individual level sampling refers to 
which “entrepreneurs” from each platform are interviewed. There is a rationality overlap between 
both levels of sampling regarding the key conceptual dimension around which the study finds focus, 
the capital-labour relation. This relation manifests both in terms of platforms, which can be 
predominantly geared either way towards the marketing of capital or labour, but also at the level of 
the individual who might outsource labour to put capital to market on a platform - or take on debt (an 
obligation on future labour), to put current labour to market.  
 
While many studies choose to focus on one particular platform, (for example, studies of AirBnB (Zervas 
et al., 2017) or Uber (Chen, Chevalier, Rossi, & Oehlsen, 2017)), a four-platform scope has been 
executed previously and proved manageable, consisting of 80 interviews (Schor et al., 2016), as well 
as three platform studies with a total of 43 interviews (J. B. Schor, 2017). Other scholars have 
successfully conducted similarly sized projects with a focus on change over time, such as the 
longitudinal interviews conducted by Thomson and Holland (2003) who focused on 120 subjects in 5 
separate sites of interest.  
 
3.3.2.1 – Platform Choice 
Platform level sampling was based around the capital-labour division previously discussed, along with 
indications of ease of recruitment. Originally 7 platforms were considered: Funding Circle, Property 
Partner, AirBnB, Uber, Amazon Flex, Deliveroo and Fiverr. These 7 were positioned based upon an 
estimation of dominance between the requirement placed on capital or labour. For example, AirBnB 
is largely a capital-based platform in that people are renting the space, but the host must also arrange 
bookings and cleaning – both of which constitute labour. On balance, AirBnB is considered to be a 
capital-based platform here because people book primarily based on getting temporary access to the 
housing (rather than for the cleaning or other surrounding services). On the other hand, Uber is 
considered a predominantly labour-based platform because the customers pay to be driven 
somewhere, rather than for simply being able to access a car (however, the driver must have access 





Type Name Capital Elements Labour Elements Potential Recruitment Sites 
Capital AirBnB Housing and digital 
device for taking 
bookings 
Arranging Bookings and cleaning  London Hosts Facebook Group 
(623 members); Direct messaging 
AirBnB hosts.  
Capital Funding Circle Savings (liquid) and 
computer  
Choosing Investments (no longer 
true, investments now 
automated), transferring money 
into and out of account.  
Targeted Facebook advertising at 
people who ‘like’ funding circle 
and live in London; Contacting 
Funding Circle to request a 
recruitment paragraph within 
their email newsletter. 
Capital Property Partner Savings (liquid) and 
computer 
Choosing Investments, 
transferring money into and out 
of account. 
Targeted Facebook advertising at 
people who ‘like’ Property 
Partner and live in London 
Labour Uber  Car and Phone Driving Uber Drivers London Facebook 
Group (10,857 members); 
Providing recruitment flyers to 
Uber drivers during journeys 
Labour Deliveroo Bike/Scooter and 
Phone 
Delivering  Targeted Facebook advertising at 
people who ‘like’ Deliveroo and 
live in London; Direct messaging 
Deliveroo deliverers; Providing 
recruitment flyers to Deliveroo 
Deliverers  
Labour Fiverr Computer (potentially 
other) 
Various Labour Activities Fiverr online forum 
Labour Amazon Flex Car or Van and Phone Delivering UK Amazon Flex Facebook Group 
(2,479 members); Providing 
recruitment flyers to deliverers.  
Table 1 - A Selection of UK Operating For-Profit Digital Platforms 
 
The seven sites were then narrowed to 3. This decision was based on two considerations: a need to 
balance mainly capital platforms and mainly labour platforms to look for a conceptual class distinction, 
alongside a consideration of accessibility for recruitment. Deliveroo, Fiverr and Property Partner were 
taken out of consideration due to the fact that they have small/undetermined “entrepreneur” 
population sizes within London or significant access difficulty. Fiverr was omitted from the 
predominately labour platforms largely because it is geographically unbound, being focused around 
remote work from anywhere in the world and this makes it distinct from the other platforms where a 
sample of participants within the greater London area can be drawn.  Funding Circle was omitted from 
the study following recruitment problems noted in the pilot. It became apparent that Funding Circle 
is a difficult site of study to access, with the recruitment method of targeted Facebook advertising 
generating no results. It also lacks a Facebook group or any other form of online community, putting 
community-based recruitment out of reach.  
 
The three case sites that this thesis will draw upon - AirBnB, Uber and Amazon Flex - have individually 
defined characteristics that problematise any fixed attachment to the preeminent colloquial titles of 
“gig” or “sharing” economy. In this section, I will discuss the literature around each case study in a bit 
more detail to provide an academically grounded understanding of the way in which each platform is 
structured, and to reflect upon their places within wider discussion of the “gig economy”.  
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Uber is often considered the quintessential “gig economy” app, with new platforms adopting the tag 
line “the uber of x” (Srnicek, 2017). Others have referred to an “Uberization” of the economy (Berger 
et al., 2018). Woodcock and Graham position Uber as the ‘most recognizable geographically tethered 
platform … [with] 3.9 million drivers across the world. It holds so much brand recognition that the 
company is regularly used as a synonym for new platform ideas’ (2020, p. 46). It is also one of the 
most valuable; By December 2015 it had raised 8.61 billion United States Dollars (USD) in venture 
capital, putting it far ahead of the often-compared AirBnB corporation (at 2.39 billion USD) 
(Sundararajan, 2016).  
 
Uber was included in this project not only because it is the most infamous “gig economy” platform – 
but also because it is predominantly a labour-based platform. While drivers do require a car to work 
on the platform, as Ravenelle (2019) points out, they often obtain this through financial products and 
debt. Uber, therefore, provides insights into the labour perspective of the “gig economy”.  
 
In contrast to Uber’s position as a predominantly labour focused platform, AirBnB offers a window 
into asset and capital-based platforms. Despite claims that the promise of AirBnB’s business model 
exists with a ‘huge economic efficiency’ (Sundararajan, 2016, p. 8) from utilising temporarily unused 
living space – an idea that would be in keeping with the more optimistic premises of the “sharing 
economy” – evidence has shown that AirBnB is much less about sharing than it is about renting: 
‘AirBnB hosts typically join the platform because they have space that they are hoping to rent out for 
a profit’ (Sundararajan, 2016, p. 40). In contrast to Uber drivers who are offering their labour, AirBnB 
hosts are receiving rents on their capital.  
 
This use of the platform does not necessarily deliver upon the “sharing” economy’s promise of 
disruption. There is an additional discussion over how different types of platform usage on AirBnB 
might distinguish individual transactions as being part of the “sharing economy” or not. Ravenelle 
builds upon a quote from The Guardian to clarify a distinction that: 
if a person is hosting while on-site or on vacation, it is part of the sharing economy; but “if 
people live permanently in another house, and continuously rent out their own house, they 
are actually just running a (often illegal) hotel” (2019, pp. 27–28). 
If we are to follow this line of logic, AirBnB is sometimes a facilitating part of the “sharing economy” 
and at other times, is part of traditional rentier capitalism. This further complicates the problem of 
terminology if individual platforms can simultaneously exist inside and outside of a conceptual 
 45 
definition. This might create a question over whether a study of the “sharing economy” that looks at 
AirBnB should only include certain hosts who meet this definition and exclude others. However, as 
the terminology and definitions of the “sharing economy” remain extremely ambiguous and contested, 
there is likely a great deal of scholarly value in trying to understand these edge-cases – as their 
existence may reflect back with some meaning upon how we define the sector.  
 
Amazon Flex departs from many of the “gig economy” platforms, such as AirBnB or Uber, because the 
“entrepreneurs” who provide their labour on an on-demand basis through the platform do so 
exclusively for one client: Amazon. Instead, scholars from business schools have referred to Flex as a 
form of “crowdsourced logistics” (Castillo, Bell, Rose, & Rodrigues, 2018). The business model of 
Amazon Flex ‘relies on independent contractors to deliver Amazon Prime Now packages, which have 
a short delivery deadline, usually 1–2 hours. Those delivery workers enjoy the flexibility of setting their 
preferred delivery times’ (Ibrahim, 2018, p. 234). While providing a good overview of the image of 
Flex that Amazon provides, is not clear what empirical data Ibrahim is drawing upon in his use of the 
word “enjoy” (in either its possible affective or possessive meaning) to describe the experience of Flex 
workers. In general, there is a lack of empirical research that actually speaks to Flex drivers to 
understand if they affectively enjoy the flexibility of the job – or indeed if they even have a true 
experience of setting their preferred delivery times. As Ravenelle argues, scholarship on the “gig 
economy” has been driven by business school professors, and, as seen above, it often problematically 
borrows the discourse provided by corporations to describe worker experience. In general ‘little is 
actually known about the actual, lived experience of working in the gig economy’ (Ravenelle, 2019, p. 
7). Castillo et al. attempt to categorise Flex within the “sharing economy” based on a definition that it 
‘offer[s] multiple users temporary asset ownership benefits at a reduced cost’ (2018, p. 7) – this is not 
an entirely convincing categorisation as the benefit of asset ownership (in this case the asset would 
presumably be the car or van that is used by the Flex driver) would only be an ability to fetch/deliver 
products. Access to this asset would not automatically result in the outcome of having a product 
delivered to you - this categorisation ignores the actualised labour.  
 
Flex exists as an Uberisation of the logistics sector – with a large corporation (Amazon) borrowing a 
model of labour management from lean platforms. It is included here because it offers a useful insight 
into this special case where a “gig economy” platform does not serve as a lean matchmaker between 
a customer and a labourer – but rather is exclusively designed to meet the needs of one particular 
company. This highlights how aspects of “gig economy” platforms are being adopted by a wider base 
of corporations within the economy.  
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3.3.2.2 – Participant recruitment   
For the purpose of the pilot Individuals were selected for the interviews based upon a process of the 
researcher generating interest from which the potential participants self-select to complete the 
screening questionnaire, and finally, the researcher selecting participants for interview from the 
responses to the questionnaire.  
 
 
Figure 1 - Participant recruitment flow-chart 
Initial interest was generated by advertising in a number of different ways, depending on the platform 
and its particular recruitment opportunities. In all cases the study was advertised as offering £20 
compensation for chosen participants, either in the form of cash for in-person interviews, or as a 
digital Amazon voucher for online interviews.  
 
Platform Methods 
AirBnB AirBnB hosts Facebook group 
 
Uber Offering recruitment leaflets to Uber drivers at the start or end of a journey (when vehicle is 
stationary and parked) 
London Uber Drivers’ Facebook group  
Amazon Flex Amazon Flex drivers’ Facebook group 
**All Platforms** Digital recruitment posters in online community spaces  
Physical recruitment posters in community spaces   
Table 2 - Methods of Access to Share-Economy workers 
 
The most successful method of generating interest for the pilot was posting on Facebook groups for 
“entrepreneurs” using a particular platform. This method delivered a high number of interested 
participants but limited the sample to those who use these groups. 
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The selection questionnaire was designed to ascertain six criteria used for selection purposes: 
1. ensure the individual uses the given platform 
2. ensure they live/work predominantly within London 
3. determine how long they have used the platform for 
4. determine how reliant they are upon it as a source of income 
5. determine how much they earn 
6. obtain their contact information for recruitment.  
 
In total, 9 people responded to the screening questionnaire for the pilot. 3 of these used AirBnB for 
income, 3 used Uber, 4 used Amazon Flex (there was one overlap, as a respondent used both Uber 
and Amazon Flex). Of these 9, two were dismissed because they did not live within London (one lived 
in Scotland, another in Italy). The final 3 were selected based upon the practicality of being available 
to participate within a reasonable amount of time.  
 
3.3.3 – Interviews  
All three interviews for this pilot were conducted remotely – two via skype and one via a phone call. 
This was, in all instances, the choice of the participant. Participants commented that by doing the 
interviews remotely it fits into their day much easier, especially in positions of precarity or while 
dealing with disability (something I discuss further in relation to the full study). Skype proved a 
successful platform for interviewing – and the visual link appeared to build trust: One participant 
noted before the recording stated, ‘you look just like your photo!’. For these reasons, I proceeded to 
the full study with the allowance for interviews to take place over video chat where in-person 
interviews were not possible.  
 
The instance of a phone call interview was less successful and was a final measure after in-person and 
skype interviews had been rejected for being too inconvenient for the participant who commented 
on his lack of time due to his workload for Uber (this ended up being generally true for Uber drivers 
in the research that followed). In this case, a combination of a poor phone line and the participant 
having a strong foreign accent meant that the interview did not progress well, and opportunities for 
follow up questions were missed because at times it was unclear what the participant had said. As a 
result, I decided on omitting phone call interviews from the final research to ensure that, as an 
interviewer, I was able to gauge facial reactions to better steer the conversation.  
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3.3.3.1 – Interview Guide 
An interview guide was produced with an index of questions on the topics of capital, class, sharing 
economy apps, their barriers, investment, expectations and risks. These questions are largely designed 
around the logic of capital, they intend to ask the participant to talk about how they accrue capital 
and manage risks and barriers. If this guide were strictly followed and answers were “to-the-point” 
then no data on affective value, or debate over values would come forward.  
 
In practice, the questions in this guide were often intended as starting points for discussion. The closed 
questions still proved too limiting, and during the interviews the guide was used only for reference, 
instead the interviews followed Guest’s suggestion that ‘the opening questions should be “soft,” 
inviting, open-ended. Let the participant tell his or her story; encourage a story. Avoid jumping into 
closed-ended questions’ (2012, p. 24). The discussion progressed naturally into the topics, but rather 
than being framed in the closed and generalised wordings of the questions within the guide, context-
specific questions could be formed. The guide served as a point of reference when a particular topic 
had ended, and conversation had halted, to refresh on a different starting point. These restarting 
questions were often adapted from the guide during the interview by taking notes on how something 
the participant said relates to a theme that occurs elsewhere in the guide, and then applying this 
context to a pre-given question.  
 
 
3.3.4 – Methodological findings from the pilot  
Snowball recruitment methods were implemented in the full study following the success of these 
during the pilot; especially as interviewees noted that their contacts had a range of different 
experiences. One participant noted a friend who relies completely upon Amazon Flex’s income and 
another knowing a range of AirBnB hosts with different sizes of portfolio, meeting  the need to engage 
with subjects who have a diverse range of experiences (Pyett, 2003). During the piloting process, 
details were recorded for four potential participants who were known to the pilot AirBnB host, three 
of these ended up participating in the final study. However, it is important to keep in mind that 
snowball sampling generally produces a homogenous sample by relying upon diversity within social 
networks.  
 
The interview guide will be used as a point of reference, rather than a strict prescription for the 
interviews, as it became clear during pilots that giving interviewees room to tell their story while 
gently guiding them towards the topics is a more effective method than reading pre-prepared closed 
questions. The interviews therefore became much less structured during the main data collection for 
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this thesis in comparison to the pilot – with the exception of a few less talkative interviewees who 
were prompted with the questions in a more structured way through necessity.  
 
The pilot also included a second methodological approach: analysis of conversations which took place 
on closed Facebook groups for platform “entrepreneurs”. I have removed the detailed account of this 
part of the pilot from this chapter as it was never implemented in the fully study, however, I will 
discuss briefly why it was removed from consideration: While Facebook group data proved extremely 
valuable in showing instances of value judgments playing out socially within threads of discussion (the 
formation of fields, within Bourdieu’s conceptual language) – as well as thematic occurrences of 
shared experiences and grievances that could allow for a productive analysis - there were deeper 
ethical considerations needed in relation to this type of data collection. After the pilot had concluded, 
there was a generalised recommendation given by the London School of Economics to not engage in 
data collection from the Facebook platform without prior consent from Facebook, as this was in 
breach of the platforms policy. There were also ethical questions I considered regarding consent. For 
my pilot I posted on groups to inform members that I would be collecting their data, and to give them 
an option to opt-out of any of their posts being included. However, in groups with thousands of 
members it is extremely improbable that more than a small fraction of members saw these posts. As 
such, I was not satisfied that it would be ethical to include this data collection method in the full study.  
 
3.4 – Final sample and limitations  
The intention of qualitative research is not to produce generalisable statistics through sampling a 
representative population, as is the case for much quantitative research, but rather a purposive 
sampling where the researcher engages with particular groups to understand lived experiences 
(Higginbottom, 2004). Rather than making generalised claims, qualitative interview research aims to 
work with specific and detailed lived experiences to develop theoretical understandings. Sim et al. 
(2018) found that determining qualitative sample sizes a priori, while offering benefits to practicality, 
remains intrinsically problematic for research with an inductive aspect as the purpose is to gain 
enough data to confidently develop theoretical understandings, rather than to make statistical claims. 
Nonetheless, qualitative research must reflect upon whose experiences are given voice within a study, 
and who might not be spoken for. As such, I will briefly discuss the demographics of people I spoke to 









From other recruitment 
methods   
AirBnB 18 11 6 0 
Uber 8 7 0 1 
Amazon Flex 12 12 0 0 
Table 3 - Final Sample Recruitment Methods 
 
While the AirBnB hosts I spoke to tended to belong to active social groups with high levels of inter-
personal interaction and support, such networks are limited or even non-existent in the cases of Uber 
and Amazon Flex workers. As such, while 6 of the AirBnB hosts were recruited through snowballing 
tactics, no Uber or Amazon Flex participants were obtained this way. Resultantly, this study speaks 
strongly to the experiences of Uber and Flex drivers who also participate in Facebook groups.  
 
3.4.1 – AirBnB hosts  
AirBnB’s recent UK Insights Report (2017) revealed that across the UK as a whole 62% of hosts are 
female, and the average age of hosts is 43 – likewise, I spoke to more women than men who were 
using the platform. Only 3 of the hosts I spoke to rented out space on AirBnB that was separate to 
their own home where they live. This sample therefore speaks more to the experiences of hosts who 
live within the property that they let.  
 
AirBnB does not reveal data on the ethnicity of its hosts, making any overall understanding of the host 
community in London difficult. However, it was noteworthy that only one of the participants in my 
study defined as non-white (BAME). It is perhaps worth noting, while not representative in method, 
that during the recruitment processes and while interacting with many hosts through groups, I 
encountered only two visibly non-white hosts. This may be backed up by government data on 
homeownership in the U.K.: Black African households constituting the least likely to be homeowners 
(just 21%). Chinese (38%), Black Caribbean (37%) and Arab (27%) are also significantly less likely to be 
homeowners compared to White British (68%). In London specifically, data shows that 63% of White-
British households were homeowners, compared with 34% for other groups (Government data 
(2019)). For the purpose of this qualitative study, I spoke to mainly white hosts who were women in 
the majority. While this study does not make any generalisable claims about these groups, it is useful 
to understand the context of how these hosts fit into the broad gender and ethnicity makeup of the 
platform, to understand how their experiences might be framed by these factors.  
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3.4.2 – Uber drivers  
Oversampling of white persons was most apparent among Uber drivers. While data for drivers working 
with Uber specifically is not available, a report from Transport for London (TfL) has claimed that ‘[a] 
majority of PHV drivers (around 94 per cent) are from Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic backgrounds 
(BAME) and many are from deprived areas’ (Transport for London, 2018, p. 20). In contrast to this 94 
per cent figure, which would allow for 6 per cent white drivers, around a third of the interviewed 
sample was white. This is a particular problem because the range of interviews for Uber drivers is 
already small (2 white and 5 BAME drivers were interviewed). What this means is that the interview 
data speaks to a whiter experience of Uber drivers than would be common, racial issues might be less 
prevalent in the data of this study than they are within London’s Uber driver community. The reasons 
why BAME people were less prevalent in this study is likely due to many factors. Less BAME people 
self-selected for the study, which could be because of a feeling of cultural difference to myself as a 
white researcher or potential language barriers. It is also likely that the BAME drivers face 
intersectional challenges that white drivers do not which place extra time and financial burdens upon 
their shoulders that would make participation increasingly challenging. My own positionality as a 
white-British researcher may have made recruitment more difficult.  
 
3.4.3 – Amazon Flex  
Of the three case studies, Amazon Flex workers present a rather unknown demographic. Unlike AirBnB 
and Uber, there are no publicly available statistics that provide an indication into who is working on 
the platform. The Flex workers interviewed for this study were entirely male and predominantly white 
(8 out of 11), which roughly matched the impression of demographic makeup present on the Facebook 
groups for Flex workers.  Amazon Flex workers appeared much more eager to take part in the research 
than Uber hosts – this could be partly due to the fact that more of the Flex drivers I spoke to were 
white, meaning that my own positionality may have posed less of a barrier. They also tended to have 
more flexibility in their schedules compared to Uber drivers.  
 
3.5 – Ethics  
According to Webster et al. (2013), there are seven ethical considerations for research: Avoiding 
undue intrusion, informed consent, voluntary consent and pressures of participation, avoiding 
adverse consequences, confidentiality, enabling participation, protecting researchers from adverse 
consequences. I will discuss these in turn, focusing on how I attempted to maintain high ethical 
standards throughout the study.  
 
 52 
3.5.1 – Avoiding undue intrusion  
Participants in this study were self-selecting. A large proportion contacted me after seeing an 
advertisement posted in Facebook groups for people who earn incomes from the particular apps that 
were the focus of this study. In these cases, the permission of the group administrators was obtained. 
A possible recruitment strategy of ordering Ubers and then interviewing the driver during the trip 
(with consent) was not implemented partly due to the fact it poses a risk of intrusion by being in the 
driver’s car at a time of requesting them to take part in the study. This could be especially problematic 
as I would be able to review the drivers after the trip, which could also pose a risk to truly voluntary 
participation. However, it is important to note that this comes with a trade-off in terms of excluding 
drivers who are not active on social media.  
 
3.5.2 – Informed consent  
Participants were given basic information about the study before participating, as well as my contact 
details and an open invitation to get in touch with any questions. This was done through the opening 
screen on the pre-interview questionnaire. On two occasions I did not proceed to interview a 
participant because I was not confident that they had the necessary understanding of the study and 
their participation that would allow for informed consent to be given. On both occasions this related 
to Uber drivers who had limited literacy skills, at least in English. On one occasion a participant, in 
email contact prior to completing the pre-interview questionnaire, misunderstood the £20 gift for 
participating to be a £200 gift. This participant also communicated in broken English to a point where 
basic understanding was difficult. I therefore considered this to be significant evidence that a truly 
informed consent would not be possible without the aid of a translator. For the purpose of this study, 
it would not have been financially feasible to proceed (though it is worth noting that this may limit the 
range of data from more marginalised Uber drivers).   
 
3.5.3 – Voluntary consent  
Consent for participation in the study was given by participants before beginning the pre-interview 
questionnaire and was confirmed verbally at the beginning of each interview. The former of these 
allowed for consent to be given in a private environment away from the researcher, while the latter 
allowed for a more thorough confirmation that the purpose of the study and the role of the participant 
was fully understood. Participants were reminded at several points in the process that participation 
was voluntary and that they were free to leave the study at any point.  
 
3.5.4 – Avoiding adverse consequences  
In this study, avoiding adverse consequences was closely linked to confidentiality of participation (the 
next point that I will discuss). For this reason, I will use this section to talk about adverse consequences 
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during the interview process itself, and in the latter, adverse consequences which relate specifically 
to confidentiality.  
 
3.5.5 – Confidentiality   
I protected the identity of all participants in this study, apart from those who openly identified 
themselves as participants in public forums (such as publicly responding to calls for participants on 
Facebook to say that they recommend participation to others, having done it themselves). Even in 
these cases of self-identification, the data from that individual would be difficult to connect with the 
participant due to the use of pseudonyms throughout the study and obscuring of identifiable 
information. For instance, one host is referred to as owning a property that constitutes a London 
landmark – while narrowing the scope of possibilities, this avoids identifying the host by directly 
naming the landmark in question.  
 
The ethical tension over confidentially became most pronounced with AirBnB hosts who told me 
about openly engaging in racial screening of potential guests, turning away people from particular 
countries or who have particular skin colours that they do not want to host. These moments during 
interviews made me feel uncomfortable, especially as I did not want my own beliefs to influence the 
data that I was receiving, and so I had to avoid showing any disapproval. But it was also an ethical 
tension in that these hosts are still actively engaging in these practices and racially discriminating 
against potential guests to this day. My responsibility as a researcher is to protect the anonymity of 
these hosts but doing so is allowing acts which could be criminal (as they are deciding whether or not 
to provide accommodation services based on race), but are at least deeply racist, to continue. These 
racist practices will not only increase the struggle to find accommodation for people of colour visiting 
London but will likely also increase the cost as they are forced to choose less preferred options (which 
may also be further away from desired locations and subsequently increase transportation cost or 
increase risk). My response to this is to ensure that these cases are anonymously highlighted as a 
general problem on the platform which needs further address (Maier, 2020).  
 
3.5.6 – Enabling participation  
Participation was made more accessible to volunteers by offering the ability to conduct the interview 
via video calling software. In particular, this proved effective for AirBnB hosts with disabilities or who 
were pregnant and could not participate in standard interview conditions – in total this allowed three 
participants to be included who told me that they could not attend a physical interview.  
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In other instances, the use of video call interviews allowed Uber drivers who are experiencing financial 
and time deficits to participate when otherwise the money involved in traveling or the time taken 
away from work would have limited participation. One Amazon Flex worker chose to take part in a 
video call interview while simultaneously on duty as a first aid response worker, noting that he might 
have to end the interview early and continue it another time if an emergency where to arise. For this 
worker, flexibility was essential in order to allow for equal participation in the context of his work 
commitments.  
 
3.5.7 – Protecting researchers from adverse consequences 
In the context of this study the level of risk for the researcher (myself) was relatively low. I was mainly 
meeting participants in public spaces with other people present, and generally these interviews took 
place within working hours. Only once did an interview take place at a participant’s house, and in this 
instance, the participant had become well known to me through extensive prior discussion. This host 
was also known to other participants as she was recruited through snowball sampling.  
 
3.6 – Transcript Analysis  
Interview transcripts were anonymised through the use of pseudonyms and then imported into the 
NVivo Software for analysis. Thematic analysis followed – in this section, I intend to justify my decision 
to conduct thematic analysis and describe how this analysis was conducted.  
 
Broadly speaking thematic analysis was chosen because, as Braun and Clarke describe, ‘thematic 
analysis is a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data’ (2006, p. 
79). Unlike quantitative data which also allows for the identification of patterns, thematic analysis 
permits an adaptive and inductive process of building conceptual ideas from the descriptions provided 
in the text (Guest et al., 2012). The initial intention of this research was to identify the common social 
experiences that “entrepreneurs” faced, through interactions with forms of capital and debt, 
customers, platforms and so forth, and then tie these to specific social relations that exist in practice. 
Because this research project developed with conceptual understandings from existing theoretical 
literature, some themes were decided prior to analysis and could be engaged with deductively. 
Thematic analysis allows for deductive reasoning to generate conceptual understanding from within 
the text. That is not to say that solely deductive reasoning was utilised in analysis, indeed, the benefit 




In particular, the analysis deductively sought out a number of themes that emerged from the 
theoretical perspective of the study. Firstly, economic capital was sought after, as defined by Piketty 
to include wealth (2014) – this emerged in relation to income, homeownership, investments and 
savings. Social and cultural capital based upon the definitions provided by Bourdieu (1986) were also 
investigated. In practice, the key elements that emerged to fit into these concepts were skills, 
objectified and institutional cultural capital. Social capital appeared also of some importance – where 
“entrepreneurs” joined the platform based on a recommendation or found small ways to gain an 
advantage from discussions online or in person with other users. The other main deductive theme was 
struggles over value as theorised by Skeggs (2004a, 2004b, 2005) – in practice this consisted of 
affective feelings of being devalued, or being valued, and links between these and economic 
exploitation and advantage, respectively. Because the interview questions were designed, in the first 
instance, to prompt responses that might speak to these themes they emerged systematically across 
all responses.    
 
However, the interviews also invited less-structured conversations which provided plenty of 
opportunity for other themes to emerge. The analysis used inductive grounded theory tactics in an 
attempt to look for emergent patterns in the data which can inform theory production (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967). Inductive grounded coding took place after I had familiarised myself with the data, as 
suggested by Braun and Clarke (2006). One aspect that emerged during analysis was the importance 
of debt (predominantly for Uber drivers). While the pre-interview questionnaire and the interview 
guide did encourage some discussion of debt, it was only afterwards that the importance of debt 
became apparent as a critical mechanism underpinning the relationship between the Uber platform 
and its drivers. While the initial analysis allowed for deductive analysis of rating systems based upon 
Bourdieu’s (2013) notion of distinction, what emerged inductively was a rather more Foucauldian 
(2000) theme of surveillance and subject legibility which is often operationalised through rating 
systems (and ended up being one of the key findings of the study) that is discussed extensively in 
chapter 6.  
 
3.7 – How the analysis is reported  
This thesis splits the reporting of the thematic analysis into three chapters. The first of these, chapter 
4, deals with economic capital, labour and debt. These concept driven themes unpack divergencies 
between each of the three platforms and also the individual “entrepreneurs” who utilise them – 
showing how, in the first instance, labour is positioned by both economic capital and debt. It goes 
further to deal with the concept of risk in so far as it connects to these economic workings. Then, in 
chapter 5, I unpack themes related to Bourdieu’s (1986) capital-accruing subjectivity with the 
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exception of economic capital. In practice this relates to skills, objectified and institutional cultural 
capital predominantly – as these were the forms that emerged from the analysis. I discuss how these 
relate to the classed history of the subject and their former labour, and importantly, how these forms 
of capital might allow “entrepreneurs” to gain economic advantage within certain parts of the “gig 
economy”. Then in chapter 6, I look at themes that emerged in tandem with a consideration of 
concepts of abjection and Skeggs’ (2004b) critiques of Bourdieu for the potential of his model to 
devalue working class subjectivity. Connected to this, the chapter also deals with the theme of 
disciplinary rating systems. I show how, all-in, these forms of devaluation serve to extract further value 
from the “entrepreneur”.  
 
As I have set out from the beginning of this thesis, the platforms that this study engages cover a diverse 
range of experiences. As such, I found that some themes seemed to relate more to particular 
platforms. Chapter 5, which looks at capital accruing subjectivity will extensively refer to AirBnB 
because this is a platform where this type of subjectivity seemed prevalent – I connect this to the 
platform itself as one which enables this by offering a competitive market and allowing hosts to set 
themselves apart for greater economic advantage. On the other hand, chapter 6 will bring more focus 
to Uber and Amazon Flex due to the nature of these platforms in denying the possibility for capital 
accruing subjectivity among their “entrepreneurs”. These differences are theoretically important, as I 
will proceed to argue – here I wanted to establish the expectation that this thesis will not devote equal 
attention across the three platforms within each chapter, as the narrative that unfolds is driven by the 
analysis.  
 
3.8 – Methodological summary 
The methodological approach taken for this thesis produced interview data that speaks to the 
experiences of a selection of “gig economy” “entrepreneurs” who use Uber, Amazon Flex and AirBnB 
as a way to earn an income in London. While this data is limited by the selection of “entrepreneurs” 
who I spoke to, in particular for the case of Uber where recruitment proved difficult, I will nonetheless 
explore many thoroughly discussed experiences across all three platforms in the following chapters. 
This interview data builds upon that collected in previous studies by expanding focus to a more 
comprehensive discussion of resources available to the “entrepreneur” and debts or other obligations 
that they may have to service. This conceptual expansion into broader considerations of class is critical 





4 – Economic capital, labour, and debt  
4.1 – Introduction 
In this chapter I address the research question: how do relations of economic capital, labour and debt 
present themselves within the platform economy? I do so in a number of steps: Firstly, I talk about 
the important role of debt for the Uber drivers I spoke to – to understand how this debt positioned 
their labour and their relationship with the platform more generally. Next, I discuss uncompensated 
labour on Amazon Flex, specifically the requirement of drivers on the platform to spend long periods 
of time refreshing the app in hopes of finding a block of work. I then turn attention to the role of 
economic capital for AirBnB hosts – showing how hosts in this study leveraged their economic 
resources to utilise the platform as a way to recover rents on their property. I also discuss, towards 
the end, how these economic relations relate to the concept of personal risk for “entrepreneurs” in 
this study.  
 
The main argument that I put forward in this chapter is that “entrepreneur” labour is positioned by 
both debt and capital – where the former produces obligations and removes flexibility, while the latter 
reduces obligations on labour and increases flexibility. These positionalities of labour then go on to 
shape risk. If an “entrepreneur” is obliged to provide their labour without flexibility, then this often 
means taking on riskier work that they would otherwise reject. On the other hand, those who have 
the privilege of flexibility may choose to avoid riskier income opportunities. Throughout this chapter, 
I also discuss economic risks and how “entrepreneurs” with greater amounts of capital are able to 
offset their risk through insurance policies and mitigation strategies which are not available to all. I 
argue that these unequal distributions of risk are a product of the underlying economic relations that 
are the main focus of this chapter – in order to understand these outcomes, I present the mechanisms 
of inequality that shape “entrepreneurs”’ experiences.  
 
4.2 – Debt, financial obligations and Uber 
Mike is an Uber driver in London who fits well into the company’s marketed image as a flexible form 
of work. As described on their website, he sets his own schedule and makes money on his terms (Uber, 
2020). Mike owns his car and drives occasionally for Uber as a way to earn a bit of extra money each 
month. He told me:  
I didn’t need to earn much money, and you don’t… After a while of doing very responsible, very 
high-pressure jobs, you just want something a little simpler to do in your fifties rather than, 
you know, having to have lots of stress and working all the hours God gives. So, it’s very 
appealing from that perspective. And, indeed, I enjoyed it.  
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Here there is a clear positioning of the subject within fields of economic (in)dependence. Not only 
does Mike own his own car, but also his own flat in the city with two spare bedrooms. For Mike, driving 
for Uber is a retirement activity to earn extra money, rather than an income stream upon which he is 
dependent – this affords him with a great deal of flexibility on the platform. But Mike’s experiences 
were not common of the drivers I spoke to. In fact, Mike himself admitted that he doesn’t drive for 
Uber very often anymore because of the low pay and high degree of risk involved with the work 
(elements of work on the platform that have been well deliberated in previous work, discussed in 
chapters 2 and 3). But apart from Mike, none of the other Uber drivers who I spoke to own their car 
outright; he is also the only driver I spoke to who works less than 38 hours per week on the platform.  
 
As Mike, explained to me: ‘You can come into this with nothing other than a British driving licence. You 
can rent your Toyota Prius for £200 a week, sign up to Uber and the thing goes ping and off you go.’ 
In the literature, discussed in chapter 2, low barriers to access emerges as a general feature seen 
across many platforms in the “gig economy” – what I argued there is that we should shift away from 
looking at simply barriers to look more broadly at entry point inequalities. This research is, therefore, 
interested in the differences that “entrepreneurs” experience based upon their class positioning. 
While Mike’s experiences were largely positive, he is not typical of Uber drivers in London; data from 
Transport for London (2018, p. 20) shows that majority of private hire drivers in the city come from 
socially excluded communities.  
 
While it has been noted that Uber requires the capital of a car as a barrier to entry (Ravenelle, 2019), 
this barrier was often overcome by the Uber drivers that I spoke to through the use of debt or other 
financial products which place an obligation on the future labour of the driver. While this might reflect 
a low barrier to entry, as drivers are able to access sub-prime credit options, the obligations that come 
with this type of entry reduce the income capabilities of the driver while increasing their exposure to 
risk, which has the potential to increase inequalities. Uber’s credit schemes have two key implications: 
firstly, it reduces barriers to access significantly as drivers do not need to own a car to earn an income 
from Uber. Secondly, in accordance with Lazzarato’s (2012, 2015) theorisation of debt, it enters those 
drivers without their own car into financial obligations that ties their future labour to the company. 
As Shoaib explains, this is a common “trap” for new drivers who enjoy the low barriers to access but 
soon find themselves in inescapable cycles of debt: 
So new people, when they come in, the first option they will have is rent [a car]. And to be 
honest, in the beginning, new drivers might have the energy to do about a year and after that 
they'll start feeling the effects on their body, their social life, their personal life. And I went 
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through it several times, and if you don't keep on top of it, it can get out of control because 
you're making financial investments, huge financial investments, and if you don't keep on top 
of it you end up with huge debt. 
 
For Shoaib, debt is not just an economic materiality, but also an affective burden which is felt. It is also 
cyclical as he explains he has been through it a number of times. This is the debt trap of Uber which 
affects those without capital – wherein value is extracted from the labourer through multiple 
simultaneous mechanisms. This conditionality is not an accidental side-effect of the platform, Uber 
now directly profits from the sale of financial products to its drivers by serving (and earning money) 
as a credit broker. Xuberance (trading as Partner Point), is a subsidiary company of Uber, advertising 
financial products framed as “vehicle solutions” to drivers. Uber is directly involved in multiple forms 
of profiteering through vertical integration strategies that seek to profit from their drivers in various 
ways. Shoaib explains this credit brokering service in his own terms: 
On the Uber website they've got a marketplace aimed at drivers, and they basically advertise 
car hire companies and what not through there … they're going to be enslaving drivers for even 
longer, that's all that's going to happen, they're not encouraging personal freedom. 
 
Drivers in this study were acutely aware of the “trap” that debt produces.  Shoaib’s use of the term 
‘enslaving’ is telling of the affect many drivers expressed in relation to their indebtedness – relating 
to Ravenelle’s (2019) use of the term “indentured servitude”. Drivers who needed to take on car 
financing complained about an extensive lack of freedom or choice over when or how often they work 
– and subsequently felt that their time no longer belonged to themselves. Arron explained to me that 
he now spends the majority of his time servicing his debts: 
 
Arron:  [I filed for] bankruptcy … I have debts also to look after. 
George: And you mentioned that your car is on credit? Some sort of financial... 
Arron: Yes, it is on finance. I mean I pay the small amount of deposit, and then I'm paying 
monthly, making monthly payments, yes. 
George: Are you ever able to take a holiday, or anything like that? 
Arron: Not really, no. No, I couldn't 
 
For drivers such as Arron, debt is a constant burden that makes his work for Uber a relentless 
requirement in order to avoid repossession of his car and the subsequent loss of his ability to earn an 
income. Against the illusion of the gig economy as something that individuals can move freely in and 
 60 
out of, choosing when and where to work, drivers in my study who did not own a suitable car were 
often trapped into Uber by debt and had little choice about how much they worked. This relationship 
with debt places extensive requirements on the labour of indebted Uber drivers, who have to work 
many more hours than a traditional full-time job in order to both meet all of their repayments and 
have enough money to support themselves. Drivers such as Lukasz, who obtained his car through 
finance, told me that they usually work a six- or seven-day week – rarely taking a day off.  
 
While others (cf. Schor & Attwood-Charles, 2017) have found the level of dependency on the income 
that a platform provides to be a key factor in perception of the platform, I argue that the terminology 
of dependency requires greater specificity. We should bring the focus to more exact underlying socio-
economic relations of capital, labour and debt that produce various forms and extents of dependency. 
Rather than seeing a subject (the Uber driver) as simply being dependent on the income that they 
receive from the platform, I argue we should see how their relationship with the platform produces 
dependency though debt “traps” that extenuate existing inequalities by disproportionately affecting 
those who enter the gig-economy with the least capital available to them.  
 
Uber’s direct credit brokering is not the only mechanism found to produce dependency. Some of the 
drivers in this study who had some capital when they began working for Uber soon found themselves 
in relations of debt-based dependency as a result of low pay and Uber’s transfer of risk to drivers. 
Sebastian, a driver who is now in considerable debt, told me about how he felt financial pressure while 
driving for Uber which led him to buy a reduced insurance policy to save money. As a result, he was 
left financially exposed when his car was stolen: 
 
Sebastian: I actually used to own my own car, it got stolen last year. 
George: And did you get an insurance pay out when that was stolen? 
Sebastian: Unfortunately, the second year of my insurance I decided just to pay less, and not to 
insure for that. So, I was not lucky. 
 
Now, like most Uber drivers in this study, Sebastian is in a position where he rents his car. He, 
therefore, transitioned into a position of increased economic dependency due to the risk-transference 
business model of Uber, wherein the driver is forced to accept all responsibility for their vehicle. This 
model of self-employment that Uber employs also leads to workers being dependent on labouring for 
Uber during times of crisis. A driver named Said, told me about an instance where he had to take time 
out due to a family illness: 
 61 
One time I took three weeks off, purely because I have to go to Bangladesh because my wife’s 
father wasn’t well. So, I had to take time off… but that time off, three weeks, I had to take a 
loan out. Because there was no real cover plan in place for holidays or absences.  
Because Said had no economic protection in place to cover him in case of a family emergency, he 
ended up having to take out a personal loan, making him further dependent on his income from Uber 
as a means of covering his debt. Said went on to tell me: 
Say [your car] got damaged or the engine has broken down or it doesn’t work. So, you’re going 
to take out a loan to repair that. That loan might not be small, it could be five grand, ten grand. 
So, to pay that, you’re still in this job. You can't just jump out … But you’re paying it back slowly 
and to pay it back, it takes a long time so you’re still in this job. This job has a trap and the trap 
is that the more you work in it and the more repairs you have to do to it … It just keeps going 
around in circles. 
 
It is easy to see how this evidence fits into the theorisation of debt offered by Lazzarato (2012, pp. 
46–47); to quote, debt functions by  
subordinating all possibility of choice and decision which the future holds to the reproduction 
of capitalist power relations … debt appropriates not only the present labour time of wage-
earners … it also pre-empts non-chronological time, each person’s future. 
Uber drivers find themselves trapped into cycles of debt because the capitalist power relations that 
underpin Uber’s model of operation (re)produce this type of dependency – a dependency where the 
driver is compelled to keep driving for Uber.  
 
Indentured servitude refers to a specific contractual relationship between a labourer (who is also a 
debtor) and a capitalist (who is also a creditor) – the labour of the former becomes tied to the latter 
(Graeber, 2014). This relationship is distinguished from the more general concept of a labourer who 
owes money to a creditor – this labourer is still forced to sell their labour power on the market in 
order to repay their debts (Lazzarato, 2012), but they are free, in the liberal market sense, to sell their 
labour to any provider of work.  
 
The debt experienced by the Uber drivers in this study is complicated. The fragmented nature of legal 
relationships means that it does not really fit the definition of indentured servitude. Firstly, the debt 
itself does not come from Uber – they merely broker this debt to their drivers (though they do profit 
from brokerage commissions). Second, contracts with creditors, often for the financing of private hire 
vehicles, does not limit the driver specifically to the Uber application – they are theoretically welcome 
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to work elsewhere. Third, the Uber driver is not an employee of Uber, and therefore not legally bound 
to provide their labour to the platform for any particular length of time into the future. These facts, 
when considered together, allude to a situation that feels at odds with the lived experiences that 
drivers described – as Shoaib told me, ‘they’re … enslaving drivers’. This type of affect, which was 
common among the drivers discussed, should not exist in a theoretically free market.  
 
As explored previously, many came to Uber because they had little other choice – the platform attracts 
those who are often excluded from traditional labour markets. It then encourages them into what 
some have described as sub-prime lending (Rosenblat, 2018). This sub-prime lending does not, 
theoretically, limit them to working for Uber – but in practice it often does. Uber is the dominant 
operator in London’s private hire market; if a driver has established themselves with a private hire 
vehicle on finance, then their best chance of getting work to make payments on the vehicle is by using 
Uber’s platform. In this way, the power of Uber’s position in the market limits the free exchange of 
labour. At the same time, Uber takes advantage of the self-employment relationship to transfer many 
of the risks and costs that would traditionally be absorbed by an employer to the driver themselves, 
while also maintaining a relatively low rate of pay (see also Chen et al., 2017). These conditions, at 
their confluence, put drivers in a situation where it is very difficult to stay out of debt and, in turn, 
almost impossible to stop working for Uber without encountering extreme financial complications.  
 
The language of the free market, which Uber adopt throughout their public relations, suggests that 
drivers choose freely to drive for them, and liberally opt to take on debts – in this discourse, drivers 
are presented as the blameful party for their situation. The reality is that drivers are usually doing 
everything that they can to avoid destitution, working long hours and taking home little pay. At the 
same time, the platform benefits from commissions both on their labour and on credit sold to them. 
By having a pool of drivers bound to debt, the platform maintains a labour force that is always 
available, on demand, to make their platform appealing to customers who can, at any given moment, 
order an Uber.  
 
In chapter 6, I discuss how the mechanisms through which Uber delegates managerial authority to 
riders further extenuates personal risk. But these circumstances of risk, that I will go on to do discuss, 
are preconditioned by the economic dependency that is produced by Uber. The worker is not always 
free to exchange their labour, as is implied by liberal models of capitalism, instead, the capitalist 
relations that Uber enters with its drivers produces many of them as indebted subjects who owe their 
future labour to the platform. Those who enter with significant amounts of capital are able to escape 
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these forms of dependency. Those with some capital are at risk of becoming dependent as Uber places 
operational risk in the hands of its drivers. Those who enter with solely their labour power have little 
chance of escaping dependency. The theoretical approach that I am suggesting here goes further than 
many who, while recognising Uber’s role in exploiting labour (see 2.3), do not show how the platform 
actively produces dependency in its labourers through mechanisms of debt. While this dependency 
does not fit into the usual legal frameworks of indentured servitude, the lived outcome is often de 
facto the same. What manifests is a new form of indentured servitude that is born out of market 
authoritarianism – where Uber’s monopoly in the market (discussed further in chapter 6) limits the 
choices available to those who provide their labour as private hire drivers.  
 
4.3 – Unpaid labour and Amazon Flex  
Amazon Flex drivers in this study did not have the same relationship to debt that Uber drivers 
experienced; all but one of the Flex drivers I spoke to own their car outright. Due to the high number 
of Flex drivers available to Amazon, the number of blocks offered to any particular driver is often 
limited – drivers are not able to rely on a full-time equivalent income from Flex in the same way that 
Uber drivers can. While one Flex driver told me that he worked 22 hours per week using the platform, 
the majority worked between 5 and 16 hours.  
 
However, because of a scarcity of Flex work, many of the drivers I spoke to engaged in extensive 
amounts of unpaid labour in an attempt to secure a block of work. The design of the Flex app requires 
drivers to manually refresh the app on a regular basis on the understanding that, firstly, a block may 
become available at any time, and also, that they have an extremely limited time to accept a block 
that appears. This leads to drivers spending hours of time with their phone in their hand, constantly 
refreshing the app in hopes of a block appearing. As one driver, Andy, told me: 
In my first month [I was refreshing the app for] about four hours every day, from seven to nine 
I was refreshing it, and then later in the afternoon from four to six, for the next day block I was 
refreshing.  It wasn’t nice.  It was really bad at the beginning. 
Another, Simon, told me: 
there’s nothing regular about it at all.  There have been days where I’ve just got up early and 
spent most of the morning trying to find blocks on there because I really needed to work that 
day. But there’s no element of guarantee at all really. 
As these examples show, the amount of time that a driver takes refreshing the app in hopes of finding 
a block can be substantial. In a study of Uber drivers’ effective earnings, Chen et al. (2017) defined 
“working time” as time in which a driver is actively willing to supply labour. If we take this definition, 
then the hours that Andy and Simon have spent actively refreshing the app in hopes of finding a block 
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of work would count as uncompensated working time. Concerningly, the drivers in this study who 
were most dependent on the income from Flex were disproportionately engaging in this unpaid labour, 
doing so out of desperation.  
 
More experienced Flex drivers developed ways to decrease their unpaid labour and increase their 
opportunity of getting a block. The first of these methods involved learning the times that blocks are 
more likely to become available. The second involved utilising pre-existing skillsets. These both 
constitute forms of cultural capital – which for the most part is dealt with in chapter 5 of this thesis 
where I show how some “entrepreneurs” are able to set themselves apart on certain platforms. 
However, as I made clear in the theoretical chapter, cultural capitals are both the product of labour 
and a way to yield higher returns from labour time. Here I want to talk about these forms of cultural 
capital specifically in how they relate to this uncompensated form of labour. 
 
Ramesh told me how he manages to avoid some of the unpaid labour associated with acquiring 
Amazon Flex blocks by learning the patterns in when they become available:   
It’s really competitive to find blocks because you have to keep refreshing ... All day, you have 
to click on the blocks, so it’s a bit of a task. There's a bit of competition. But if you know the 
secret ways ... Like, if early in the morning, you get quite a lot of blocks. And evening, 2 to 3 
pm, if you're looking for blocks, then it’s easier. Otherwise, the other times, like 5, 6 pm, or 11, 
12, it’s really hard.  
A few other drivers within the study also noted key times when blocks were more likely to become 
available at their local depot.  
 
However, it is worth noting that this form of capital (the knowledge of when blocks are most likely to 
become available) is usually reliant on extensive amounts of unpaid labour that allow the individual 
to learn such patterns – as Bourdieu (1986) underlines, all forms of capital, including skills and forms 
of knowledge are accumulated labour. Many drivers reported that the amount of unpaid labour 
reduced the longer that they had worked through Flex, as they learn such patterns – meaning that the 
capital translated into more efficient working patterns for the drivers. It is important to remember 
that this knowledge does not constitute a transferable skill. Knowing the most efficient times to check 
for Flex delivery blocks does not have value elsewhere in the economy. The investment of labour time 
that drivers make only benefits their efficiency in working for Amazon Flex.   
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The second way in which some drivers avoided unpaid labour is not technically permitted by Amazon. 
Additionally, it requires a relatively high level of technical skill to implement. This involves a method 
of “hacking” wherein drivers install software on their device that will automatically refresh the Flex 
app on their behalf and accept any blocks that become available. Only one driver in this study, Ryan, 
admitted to engaging in this practice. Not only did he manage to obtain blocks automatically, but he 
also reported a much higher rate of block discovery than those who had to refresh the app manually:  
With Flex, during the lean times, you’re going to have to cheat to get blocks. There has been 
some chatter on the groups, you can buy auto-tapper devices. I have an android simulator on 
my PC. I have downloaded the app; it sits there on the screen and you add an auto-clicking 
macro-script. You get up in the morning, switch it on, and by the time you’ve brushed your 
teeth it has accepted several blocks for you, and you choose the one you want and forfeit on 
the rest. It’s cheating. 
But Ryan’s ability to automatically accept blocks is reliant upon a range of skills, knowledges and 
understandings that are not available to all Flex drivers. His work for flex sits alongside another income 
source where he builds and manages websites for a rage of clients, work through which he has gained 
a wide range of technical skills: 
I like tech. I have a small side-line where I construct, manage and host websites for a few 
people. Nothing terribly big, friends of friends, I’ve just always liked it. When the internet first 
started, I got my nose into HTML code, a bit of CSS. I’ve always liked it. 
No other drivers in this study told me that they use automated systems to avoid the labour of manually 
accepting blocks. This suggests that many drivers simply do not have access to the same forms of 
capital required to gain this advantage on the platform. It appears from Ryan’s description that this 
method of algorithmic block acceptance can catch blocks that would never become visible to drivers 
who manually refresh. Opportunities for work could therefore be horded by those with these 
advanced technical skillsets.  
 
Overall, it appears that the most privileged Flex drivers engage in the least of this unpaid labour both 
because they are less desperate to find blocks and because they have accrued forms of capital that 
can, to some extent, avoid such engagement. To reflect back to Bourdieu, in the footnotes of ‘The 
Forms of Capital’ he states that cultural capital: ‘makes it possible to derive greater profit not only  
from labour-time, by securing a higher yield from the same time, but also from spare time’ (1986, p. 
29). Bourdieu recognises that this not only has an immediate impact (less time spent working), but 
also has a secondary impact as this acquired spare time can be used to gain further advantage through 
other forms of capital accrual. Flex drivers who are not forced to spend their time refreshing the app 
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in search of blocks may be able to spend that time earning money in other ways, gaining qualifications 
or new skills, or simply having more free time to spend doing things that they enjoy. In this study the 
majority of Flex drivers who I interviewed were doing blocks of work around other work, studying or 
family commitments.  
 
This is an inequality that appears to be built into Amazon’s Flex platform – specifically their choice not 
to provide a notification system in place of one where the worker is required to constantly refresh. 
Ryan suggested that Amazon are indifferent to this problematic: ‘I don’t think they mind because its 
people clambering over each other for work. What’s not to like about it from their perspective?’ It is 
possible that this system provides advantages to Amazon’s workflow at the expense of unpaid labour: 
if users are constantly refreshing then they will likely accept a block within seconds of it becoming 
available, rather than a potentially delay which might be present in waiting for drivers to check and 
respond to a push notification. As Ibrahim (2018) found, Flex relies on contractors to deliver packages 
within extremely short deadlines, sometimes within two hours. This could suggest that Amazon’s 
streamlined workflow comes at the expense of unpaid labour from drivers who consistently refresh 
the app – these “entrepreneurs” might otherwise spend this uncompensated time on their studies or 
other work.  
 
4.4 – Capital and AirBnB  
AirBnB hosts have a distinct advantage over Uber and Flex workers in that they are not as replaceable. 
While Uber and Flex rely on low barriers to access in order to saturate their market with anyone who 
can provide their labour – Uber even providing credit options to those who might be restricted by the 
lack of a car – AirBnB is reliant on “entrepreneurs” who have accrued sufficient economic capital to 
have spare sleeping capacity. As Ravenelle (2019) emphasises, AirBnB is about renting out housing 
based capital, but this is also intersectionally positioned, as discussed earlier (see section 3.3), home 
ownership in London has high levels of racial inequality. Resultantly, AirBnB’s potential pool of 
“entrepreneurs” is limited by homeownership, but this pool is also dramatically skewed by race. White 
British households are much more likely than Black African households to have the potential to be 
legitimate AirBnB hosts due to the fact that they are more likely to own their own home. However, 
the requirement for AirBnB is not simply home ownership by itself, but surplus sleeping space, a higher 
barrier.  
 
Most AirBnB hosts in this study had long and economically successful professions before starting to 
use AirBnB, which allowed them to purchase a property with additional living space. In some cases, 
they were now fully or partially retired from these careers – or shifted to alternative working patterns. 
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Clara described herself as semi-retired, telling me that when she does work it is geographically flexible: 
‘I’m a copy editor so I can work anywhere. If I’ve got the work, it doesn’t matter where I am’. Flexible 
working was a common theme among AirBnB hosts. Another, Tony, tells me: 
I’ve stopped working full-time for other people, I now do consulting… generally for overseas 
governments, usually internationally funded for developing their pension systems. So, I worked 
in Mongolia last year, I’ve been working in Gambia recently. But the job comes for two or three 
months and then goes away for six months, so you know, I will go and work there for the time 
it needs.  
This indicates two things: Firstly, these subjects who use AirBnB are positioned in a different set of 
economic relations to the Uber and Flex drivers. Hosts usually had specialist skills that make them 
highly valuable in employment markets – to continue with Bourdieu’s (1986) idea of capital exchange. 
This indicates that hosts, compared to Uber and Flex workers, are more advantaged with a range of 
capitals that allow them economic stability both inside and outside of the platforms – allowing them, 
overall, to reduce the labour time that they are required to provide in order to get by. This builds upon 
a conclusion made by Ravenelle that ‘workers who succeed in the sharing economy … often have 
significant skills or capital that would also enable them to succeed outside the sharing economy’ (2017, 
p. 13). The majority of hosts in this study already have succeeded economically before using the 
platform.  
 
Secondly, the data point towards a conceptual realisation of housing, for the purpose of this analysis, 
as capital – as an economic accrual from a subject’s labour that can transfer back into economic gains 
for the subject. Bourdieu’s definition of economic capital has always been extremely broad compared 
to those utilised by economists, referring to that which is ‘immediately and directly convertible into 
money and may be institutionalized in the form of property rights’  (1986, p. 16). Economists have 
traditionally distinguished capital (as the means of production) from wealth (a store of value). 
However, Piketty argues that the two often share overlapping economic functionalities. In particular, 
he comments that ‘residential real estate can be seen as a capital asset that yields “housing services” 
whose value is measured by their rental equivalent’ (2014, p. 48). Here it seems logical to accept this 
duality as housing is not only serving as a store of wealth, but as a means for AirBnB hosts to earn an 
income.  
 
In one case, a host had no history of employment at all and got by entirely on the income from capital. 
The host, James, told me that he is in the process of inheriting a portfolio of properties from his mother, 
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and currently lives on the income from listing them on AirBnB. This allowed James to go straight from 
university to a financially secure life that requires very little, if any, labour.  
 
George: You mentioned it’s your mum who owns the properties? 
James: For the time being. We’re trying to put them in my name. I would say HMRC are a 
horrible organisation and inheritance tax is ridiculously high and they’ve got all kinds 
of rules in place to try and stop you even from gifting a property. 
 
James tells me that he has, at points in time, outsourced aspects of labour in relation to AirBnB hosting 
– finding gig-economy cleaners on platforms such as TaskRabbit. The AirBnB platform therefore 
provides an opportunity for some to avoid entering labour markets entirely. As Piketty (2015, p. 27) 
argues, there is a clear divide between those who inherit capital and those who only inherit their 
ability to perform labour which is ‘not only unjust but also inefficient, because it reproduces itself by 
limiting the ability of the poor to invest and thus close the gap between themselves and the rich’. As 
with the Amazon Flex drivers, those with capital were able to free up their time and resources which, 
in turn, allows them the opportunities to pull further ahead. Intriguingly, James’ experiences appear 
to fall outside of the description of the “gig economy” provided by Woodcock and Graham (2020, p. 
11) that emphasises ‘a relationship in which one person sells their time to another’, as in this case 
James is not selling his time – he is receiving rents on his capital. As discussed in chapter 2, the 
terminologies of these platforms are highly contested. Some would argue that AirBnB is not part of 
the “gig economy” because of its focus on renting assets. However, as I discuss in the following 
paragraph, there is a significant role for labour.  
 
While the majority of AirBnB hosts in this study have, or previously held, long term professional 
occupations which allowed them to amass sufficient economic capital (in the form of property 
ownership) to peruse hosting as a source of income, others such as Hannah peruse riskier strategies 
to earn an income from the sharing economy. Unlike most of the hosts I spoke with, Hannah does not 
own her own property. Instead, she rents three properties in the long-term rental market and sub-
lets them through AirBnB – making profit from the gap between the long-term and short-term market 
rents. In some cases, she does this without the landlords’ or leaseholders’ permissions. In the past this 
has led to Hannah being evicted from properties and her deposit being kept by the landlord. Despite 
letting an entire flat, Hannah also intends to bypass London’s 90-day short term letting regulation by 
deleting and relisting properties on AirBnB to avoid the automatic regulatory enforcement of the 
platform – a necessity as she cannot afford to continue paying rent on properties when they are not 
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rented out on AirBnB. Overall, this leads to a much riskier experience hosting on AirBnB as she is 
leveraging significant financial obligations.  
 
Hannah’s economic positioning means that the only opportunity for her to earn an income from 
AirBnB is through illegitimate means. AirBnB has a barrier to access in the form of legitimate 
ownership or rental of a sleeping space which you can lawfully rent out – and this provides an exclusive 
opportunity for profit to those with sufficient economic capital. Hosts like Hannah are framed as a 
threat to the landlords who demand absolute control of their property and the ability to earn money 
from their capital. As Hannah explained, while she promised to take liability for damage to the 
property, the landlord still refused based on the idea that ‘he didn’t want me to profit from his 
property’. While a few landlords have allowed their tenants to host on AirBnB, there remains a 
persistent economic barrier to who can and cannot legitimately profit from housing. 
 
As with Uber and Amazon Flex, experiences for AirBnB hosts appear to be unequal in ways that 
circulate the distribution of capital. Beck (1992, p. 35) argues that ‘poverty attracts an unfortunate 
abundance of risks. By contrast, the wealthy (in income, power or education) can purchase safety and 
freedom from risk’ – but the data presented here suggests that risk needs to be integrated into 
relational understandings of capitalism. In the case of Uber, relief from risk is not purchased, but 
instead transferred to drivers – and reemphasised through relations of debt that force drivers to 
continue working. As Ravenelle (2019, p. 102) argues, ‘Uber has not entirely ignored worker risks – it’s 
just that any costs associated with protecting drivers are borne by workers’. Likewise, with Flex, drivers 
feel like the risks have been passed to them by the platform. Tommy told me: 
Apparently, I’m insured for when I’m working as a Flex driver and according to the app there’s 
a thing. But, I mean, I did have an accident the other day … so I did actually look at the thing 
yesterday, or two days ago, to see what sort of claim, but it’s like a £500 minimum. So, you 
know, you’re slightly on your own. 
Because the platform often fails to provide protection to “entrepreneurs”, they are usually required 
to utilise their own economic resources to accommodate for risk.  
 
In the case of AirBnB, risk still appears to be distributed in ways that relate to capital. This points 
towards a nuancing of arguments made by Ravenelle (2019): while risks are passed from platforms to 
“entrepreneurs”, the latter group is not equal in its capacity to accommodate and manage these risks. 
Some “entrepreneurs” are affected more than others. It was common for AirBnB hosts in this study 
to have some form of specialist insurance to cover them in the case of something going wrong while 
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they were renting their property though AirBnB. The most extreme example of this came from Peter, 
who owns a property that is considered a London landmark and who personally works within finance, 
consulting a range of international governments. Peter tells me about his bespoke insurance: 
I’ve got special insurance. I’ve had a policy written at Lloyd's of London for me specially. Had it 
designed bespoke for me… public liability. The scare story I throw at people is the guest who 
drops something out of a window that hits a pedestrian in the street below, as it were, are you 
covered for that? And you would, in most household insurances, be covered if you or your family 
did something, but if an AirBnB guest did something your insurance company would probably 
say it was void … My bespoke insurance covers that.  
Peter’s extensive financial capacity allows him to have insurance policies written to meet his individual 
requirements – something beyond the reach of most hosts. A more common case for hosts in this 
study was to utilise insurance policies offered by start-ups specifically targeting the host market.   
 
However, working class hosts, who generally participated in AirBnB’s market to make ends meet, did 
not have the same ability to avoid financial risk. A host called Katie who relies on income from AirBnB 
to pay her mortgage, told me about her flat being destroyed during a flood: 
I actually couldn’t do an Airbnb for a while … I have building insurance, but I had no contents, 
so all my dry goods… All my white goods, all my brown goods, damaged. Well, everything was 
damaged… If you saw it, it was just a… I couldn’t live there, like I said, for nearly nine months.  
Because of her economic restrictions, Katie had to reduce her insurance coverage to cover just the 
building, rather than her contents, which resulted in her being financially exposed when her flat 
flooded. This risk resulted in significant outcomes for Katie, who now sleeps on a camp bed while 
letting her guests sleep on the one bed she owns. Beyond this, she was unable to rent out her spare 
room on AirBnB for the duration of repairs on her property – temporarily losing a significant segment 
of her income. Despite earning a commission on every guest Katie hosts, AirBnB offered no support 
when Katie experienced disruption. AirBnB’s business model protects the company from exposure to 
these types of risk that hosts have to directly face and manage themselves – and those without 
sufficient resources end up in the most precarious positions when risks materialise.  
 
4.5 – Economics of personal risk 
Throughout the previous three sections of this chapter, I have discussed economic risk on each 
platform – I integrated economic risk into the previous discussions because it usually directly impacted 
upon the economic relationship with the platform. That is to say, if an AirBnB host or Uber/Flex driver 
loses their form of capital (surplus sleeping space or a car, respectively) then they no longer have the 
means to utilise the platform. Personal risk is separated here because its role, while related, is slightly 
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more complicated. The main argument I make here is that personal risk can be reduced by capital, 
and increased by debt – that it corresponds with the requirement to provide in-person labour  
 
In the first instance, the most notable divide emerges in the requirement for physical presence: It is 
possible for some AirBnB hosts, such as James, to avoid all physical involvement in order to earn an 
income from the platform. This is made possible through both the platform’s nature (which allows 
possibilities for hosts with sufficient capital to separate themselves) and the economic positioning of 
an individual host. Among AirBnB hosts, this tends to create a spectrum where different hosts, by 
having access to different quantities of capital, are able to provide themselves with different amounts 
of physical separation.  
 
Tanya, a host who rents out a garden house at the bottom of her garden, describes how she would 
not feel safe if she had to rent a room within her house:  
Yeah… I think I would feel inclined to put a lock on my door… who’s to say… I mean, I have an 
alarm on my house. I was thinking of putting my spare room on AirBnB… but then I think no… 
I’d have to give them my alarm code and a copy of my key. The garden room is totally separate; 
the worst thing that they can do is trash that.  
But many hosts in this study were not so fortunate as to be physically separated from the space that 
they rent out. Hannah, who hosts with her daughter, mentioned how one male guest behaved in ways 
that made her daughter feel uncomfortable: ‘he was staring at her chest when he was talking to her 
and asking if she wanted to go out’. Another host, Sandra, spoke of a number of different occasions 
where male guests behaved in ways that she found inappropriate: ‘I had one married guy that 
suggested we went for a drink but in a kind of slightly flirtatious way. That felt a bit uncomfortable.’ 
Both Hannah and Sandra share space with their guests – meaning that they are unable to physically 
separate themselves from these types of risk.  
 
The type of physical separation that some hosts, like Tanya and James, experience is not possible at 
all on labour-focused platforms like Uber and Amazon Flex. Wealthy Uber drivers or Amazon Flex 
deliverers can do little to physically separate themselves from customers – they will always experience 
this type of bodily exposure because of the platform’s requirement for their labour. In chapter 6, I will 
discuss an Uber driver, here called Sebastian, who is economically dependent on the platform and 
therefore has tolerated a high degree of personal risk from passengers who sexually assaulted him. 
Unlike AirBnB hosts who can utilise economic capacity to escape from personal risk, Uber drivers are 
constantly engaging in intimate situations with customers as a necessity of their role as a driver. These 
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examples show a platform level divide, as different platforms offer different possibilities for 
“entrepreneurs” – and those such as AirBnB can be utilised to facilitate an exposure that purely 
consists of capital. Among Uber and Amazon Flex workers, labour must always be exchanged in ways 
that require physical presence.  
 
Apart from physical separation with customers, another way in which some risks can be mitigated is 
through choosing which jobs to accept. However, as with physical separation, the ability to reject jobs 
is an economic privilege – others are ‘obliged to [work] in order to subsist’ (Huws, 2014, p. 152). There 
is also evidence that platforms increase potential earnings for drivers who were willing to take on 
more risk. As Andy explains: ‘when it was snowing it was very risky … they increased the prices so high. 
£70 to go and deliver...’ This shows the use of economic power to trade risk onto those most in need 
of money. Those with more economic resources will have a greater degree of choice for when they 
work. This highlights that Beck’s (1992) argument that those with resources can buy relief from risk, 
in this reality, means paying to pass it on to someone who has little choice but to accept it in order to 
subsist.  
 
Hannah mentioned how, when she first started on AirBnB, the ability to accept only female guests 
provided her with a degree of comfort: ‘I think for the first year I would only let women stay, or 
families.’ Likewise, Anna describes the benefits of being able to control the gender of the guest for a 
member of her local home-sharing club who perceives higher risks:  
[she] is a pensioner, she lives on her own. So, she only accepts women in her flat.  She doesn’t 
want guys in her house because she’s an old lady who lives on her own, you know, so she’s 
more comfortable.  
While the majority of women who host in this study did accept male guests, they liked having the 
ability to choose. This choice allows women with sufficient economic resources (who have the ability 
to turn guests away without substantial consequences) to avoid gendered devaluation in contexts of 
intimacy.    
 
4.6 – Conceptualising the “gig economy” for economic class analysis  
This chapter has addressed the research question of: How do relations of economic capital, labour 
and debt present themselves within the platform economy? In answering this question, I have 
attempted to respond to those who have argued that a new theoretical understanding is needed to 
determine how categories such as labour, profit and rent relate to digital economies (Fuchs, 2017; 
Huws, 2014; Schor & Attwood-Charles, 2017). While others (Schor & Attwood-Charles, 2017) have 
found the level of dependency on the platform to be a key factor in perception of life in the “gig 
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economy”, I argue that the terminology of dependency requires complicating. As Skeggs argues, we 
must look beyond labelling and describing differences to, instead, ‘understand the processes of 
classification: exploitation, domination, dispossession and devaluation, and their legitimation’ (2015, 
p. 205). I, therefore, try to shift away from describing those who are dependent – in its place, I bring 
the focus to more specific underlying socio-economic relations of capital, labour and debt that 
produce various forms and extents of dependency. By shifting the epistemological focus from 
individuals to these socio-economic relations that produce their subjectivities, we can shift from an 
individualistic concentration to a more contextual understanding of the role that platforms 
themselves play in determining the experiences of their workers. AirBnB hosts may, for instance, have 
a privileged relationship to the market because of their capital which significantly reduces their need 
to sell their labour through their rental profiteering. On the other hand, an Uber driver’s positionality, 
often having only their labour to sell, puts them into relations of debt which serve to exploit their 
labour further.  
 
I argue that we can reconceptualise this economy, in the first instance, by looking back to the relations 
of capital and labour that Marx (1887) put forward. Labour becomes crystallised into capital which 
can subsequently be utilised to earn further income by replacing requirements for labour. Many works 
have looked at the role of labour exploitation in the “gig economy” (To name just a few: Hill (2015), 
Ravenelle (2017, 2019), Schor and Attwood-Charles (2017), Woodcock and Graham (2020)). However, 
as the Marxist tradition has generally argued: ‘the fundamental source of inequality is … the unequal 
ownership of capital’ (Piketty, 2015, p. 26). The “gig economy” is not simply a space in which labour is 
put to work – but also capital(s). Both labour and economic capital are vitally important for 
understanding the trajectories that “entrepreneurial” subjects experience on these platforms – those 
who enter the economy with capital have a decidedly different experience to those who enter without.  
 
I also argue that  those without capital often end up in debt, serving as an obligation on their future 
labour (Lazzarato, 2012) – meaning that the worker not only needs to utilise their labour to earn their 
income, but also to repay their debt that is often undertaken on in order to gain access to the 
platform’s market. However, the indebted Uber driver does not exist as an isolated object of study – 
the indebtedness of the driver is (re)produced through ongoing class relations. As Wacquant (2013) 
emphasises, the tradition stemming from Marxism sees the basis of inequality being built around 
relations of power. The connection between debt and class is not a new phenomenon, in fact, Marx 
points out that ‘the class-struggles of the ancient world took the form chiefly of a contest between 
debtors and creditors’ (1887, p. 87). In the case of Uber, I have tried to argue that the platform itself 
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produces relationships of dependency through mechanisms of debt which work as an obligation on 
the future labour of the “entrepreneur” and corrode their ability to leave the platform. This is a class 
relationship that plays out through mechanisms of debt.  
 
Finally, I reflect back upon the classed nature of risk. Risk has been recognised as a feature of the “gig 
economy” before (discussed in chapter 2). What I try to underline in my argument is that risk is not 
equally distributed among “gig economy” “entrepreneurs” – which some theorisations might imply 
(Ravenelle, 2019). But rather than being distributed in ways which are ‘unfortunate’ (Beck, 1992, p. 
35), or built upon ideas of an agentic subject, the experiences of risk are dispersed in ways that reflect 
underlying class relationships. Those who enter the “gig economy” with the least resources are the 
most exposed to the greatest risks due to the economic relations that trade risk onto those with the 
least power in ways that are difficult to refuse.  
 
Overall, I am arguing that a classed conceptualisation of the “gig economy” cannot only look at labour 
exploitation in isolation. The roles of capital and debt, and how these relate to labour practices, risk 
and exploitation, are equally as important in trying to understand classed subject trajectories in this 
type of “entrepreneurship”. This has theoretical implications in that it requires us to go beyond 
Marxist theories of labour exploitation to also include approaches which account for debt and those 
which provide further insights into the role that capital can play. Here I am starting to pull apart the 
idea of a singular class theory that explains the “gig economy” by drawing out the pluralistic nature of 
platforms and the forms of class relationship that exist. It is precisely because the “gig economy” is 
such a diverse and imprecise terminology that we require a theoretical toolkit that can account for 
the diversity that exists both between and within platforms. In this chapter, I have analysed the first 
axis of differentiation that emerged from the study: the mixture of labour, capital and debt that is 
utilised on platforms – and showcased how this variety requires an adaptive way of looking at class 
that goes beyond a straightforward analysis of labour exploitation.  
 
In the following chapter, I will build upon this to show how some “entrepreneurs” on competitive 
market platforms are able to leverage non-economic forms of capital for economic advantage; before 
turning attention (in chapter 6) to look at how non-competitive platforms exploit these additional 
forms of capital by only compensating the “entrepreneur” for their immediate labour time. Across 
these two chapters, I will build insights into the second axis of differentiation in the “gig economy” 
that exists around the level of competitiveness within a platform – which helps guide a theoretical 
analysis of class.  
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5 – Becoming a subject of value  
5.1 – How different platforms recognise subject value  
In the previous chapter I highlighted how some Amazon Flex workers were able to accrue skillsets that 
allowed them an advantage on the platform (see 4.3). Those who had learned hidden patterns in the 
platform’s operation or utilised their technological knowledge to “cheat” in obtaining blocks, were 
able to get ahead and have a beneficial outcome (in less labour time expenditure and more access to 
blocks of work). These skillsets constituted forms of cultural capital that are attached to the subject. 
While these forms of capital are not strictly economic, they were convertible into economic 
advantages where the platform allowed – following the logic of a capital accruing subject put forward 
by Bourdieu (1986).  This chapter addresses these occurrences, where cultural and social capitals yield 
economic returns, more thoroughly by answering the second research question of the project: How 
are cultural and social capitals put to work in the platform economy?  
 
One of the most significant findings I present across this chapter and the one which follows it is the 
difference in possibility for cultural and social capitals to be utilised for the “entrepreneur’s” economic 
benefit across platforms. While some have argued that Uber requires minimal skills beyond being able 
to drive (Ravenelle, 2019), I will take a slightly different stance. While driving for Uber may not require 
specific skillsets or other forms of cultural and social capital as an access barrier, drivers often still 
provide these – in the form of dedicated customer service and commitment to the customer 
experience more generally. However, they do not yield economic rewards from these skills and forms 
of capital utilisations. The Uber platform does not have a competitive market. A driver with a higher 
rating is not given more trips than a driver with a lower rating. An Uber customer cannot choose which 
driver they want. Additionally, unlike AirBnB hosts who can set their nightly rates, ‘Uber unilaterally 
sets and changes the rates at which [drivers] earn their income’ (Rosenblat, 2018, p. 87). There is, in 
other words, a platform differential wherein cultural and social capitals are less easy to convert into 
economic advantage for an Uber driver than they are, for instance, an AirBnB host.  
 
That is not to say that there are no ways at all for an Uber driver to gain an advantage. Like Amazon 
Flex drivers who developed the knowledge of when to check for blocks, Uber drivers learned peak 
times and hotspot areas. On Uber driver, Mike, told me that he could earn ‘£100 on a weekday, [but] 
£150 on Fridays and Saturdays. Because there’s more work.’ Another, Richard, went into further detail, 
telling me:  
I only work nights, and I work… Usually, I try to work like 6:00 PM to 6:00 AM, and I work kind 
of like Tuesday to Saturday. So, like, I finish Sunday morning, at 6:00 AM … I think the return 
on the investment of the hours I put is much higher. 
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Uber drivers did show strategy and were able to put their knowledge to use in gaining some economic 
advantage, despite the limited opportunities that the platform provides for drivers to set themselves 
apart.  
 
However, of the three platforms in this study, AirBnB clearly stood out as a platform that provides a 
multitude of opportunities for a wide range of social and cultural capitals to be put to work. Hosts can 
put their hospitality skills forward and showcase their house with the right “character” in hopes of 
setting themselves apart from the crowd, enabling them to gain better reviews and, often, to set a 
higher price.  In some cases, hosts were able to achieve “Superhost” status, a reward given to hosts 
with sustained high ratings. This status provides ways for hosts to stand out on the platform and gain 
substantial economic and affective returns. However, differences remain within platforms as well as 
between them. In this chapter, I also pay attention to hosts who do not have the right forms of capital 
to be recognised as valuable, and the subsequent outcomes that they experience. I therefore aim to 
show a complicated realisation of subjectivity in the “gig economy”, where both the potentials of the 
particular platform and the resources of the subject come to a point of market-value legibility that 
relates to the outcomes that  “entrepreneurs” experienced.  
 
In this chapter, I deal with the competitive platform that AirBnB provides, showing how hosts utilise 
cultural and social capitals to set themselves apart and market themselves on the platform – a form 
of subjectivity linked back to Bourdieu (1986), discussed extensively in an earlier section (see 2.6). In 
the next chapter (6), I will turn attention back to the other platforms within this study (Uber and 
Amazon Flex), where the lack of a competitive marketplace or price-setting stops “entrepreneurs” 
from distinguishing themselves in ways that have substantial economic results. As I mentioned in the 
methodology chapter (see section 3.6), this distinction between subjectivities on competitive and non-
competitive platforms ended up being one of the key findings of the study – while the former use 
rating and review systems to allow “entrepreneurs” to set themselves apart and receive economic 
rewards, the latter utilise surveillance systems as a disciplinary mechanism without reward. To be 
clear, AirBnB is far from the only “gig economy” platform with a competitive marketplace (this is also 
utilised on labour-focused services such as Fiverr), but as it is the only competitive marketplace-based 
platform analysed within this study.  
 
5.2 – Who hosts?  
In the previous chapter, I mentioned that hosts had often maintained extensive professional careers 
that allowed them an economic advantage before they started seeking additional income on AirBnB. 
Tony, who attended Cambridge University, now runs his own company and consults governments. 
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Another, Jonathan, designed parts for the space shuttle while doing his degree in electrical and 
computer engineering in the United States – but since then changed professions and became a 
business consultant. Katrina and Vanessa, both work at research companies in central London. 
Eleonora, who gained her master’s degree in biomedicine while she was living in Italy, now works at 
a university hospital in London. These careers would classify as “elite” (in the case of Tony), or “middle 
class” for most others, according to Savage et al.’s (2015) study of class in the United Kingdom.  
However, as Savage et al. (2015; 2013) also argue, these types of career pathways often co-exist with 
a high number of social and cultural capitals. Attendance of elite universities alone provides an 
extensive range of social and cultural advantages (Wakeling & Savage, 2015). In this study, just 3 of 
the 18 AirBnB hosts interviewed had a level of education below a complete university degree – while 
this is not statistically representative of hosts in London, it speaks to the socio-economic circumstance 
of the hosts that I spoke to.  
 
Evidence of capital-rich hosts emerged even during the recruitment process. In the first instance, posts 
to AirBnB host Facebook groups requesting participants were met with community members 
searching my name online and questioning my research agenda. The fact that hosts were able to 
investigate me in this way speaks to a capability that was not equally present across all of the 
recruitment sites. After interviews had taken place, some served as unprompted advocates for myself 
and the study, responding to comments on my behalf to tell other hosts that I was worth talking to. 
This attests to the significant social capital to which some hosts had access – developed both online 
and offline through hosting events and meetups. One host told me that she had previously travelled 
to Paris to meet other hosts at an AirBnB arranged event, showcasing a significant economic 
investment in the accrual of social and cultural capitals. Hosts trusted each other and utilised their 
community as a reliable source of information.  
 
Likewise, these AirBnB hosts made clear attempts to network with me. Unlike the participants from 
Uber and Flex, AirBnB hosts appeared interested in developing a relationship of mutual benefit. They 
often asked if we could keep in touch after the interview, sending me follow up messages and asking 
me questions about my life as a PhD researcher. This type of interaction points towards a theorisation 
of subjectivity that operates with strategies co-ordinated towards a projected future self, who might 
benefit from being able to exchange and recover value from the development of a social network. In 




This type of social behaviour that focuses on building a network of contacts can provide hosts with 
economic rewards. One host, Marjorie, told me about how building connections with guests leads to 
repeat custom for her: 
 
Marjorie: I have people come back again, and you know, yes, so that’s a lot of fun too, to keep 
up that connection as well.   
George: So, in some ways, it’s almost an investment - having a good relationship with a guest 
in the first instance it means that they’re going to come back again, do you think? 
Marjorie: Oh yes, definitely, yes. Or they will send other people, because I’ve had people from 
Australia that have sent like one couple sent the sister and brother-in-law when they 
were coming, yes.   
 
Building a social network is, therefore, translatable into economic returns, as Bourdieu (1986) 
theorises - this type of capital accruing subjectivity is beneficial to AirBnB hosts who have the 
resources to build these connections. The hosts I spoke to, for the most part, possessed the embodied 
cultural capitals necessary to build social networks wherever possible.  
 
The fact that hosts embody this type of personhood is important because it shows that they have the 
capitals necessary to be successful elsewhere, not just in the “gig economy”; This affords them a 
greater agency over their use of the platform. Along with economic capitals, cultural capitals have the 
capacity to reduce dependency on the platform in addition to providing an economic advantage within 
the platform. In this way, I go further in my response to the passive notion of dependency provided 
by Schor and Attwood-Charles (2017) than I did in the previous chapter. In the previous chapter, I 
argued that my “gig workers” have their dependency produced by the platform. Here, I show how 
dependency can be reduced by cultural and social capitals and the socio-economic relations that exist 
around these on competitive market platforms. As I have argued in this section, hosts have access to 
valuable symbolic resources such as education from elite institutions and experience working on 
prestigious projects. These forms of capital are valued through the dominant symbolic ordering of 
society (Skeggs, 2004b) and are, therefore, exchangeable for economic advantage more generally 
(Bourdieu, 1986) – it is these underlying symbolic power relations that serve to reduce the 
dependency that hosts experience (on top of their economic power discussed previously in section 
4.4) and recognise them in society more generally as subjects of value. Hosts in my study, for the most 
part, arrived on AirBnB pre-recognised in society as valuable. 
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However, not all AirBnB hosts in the study were so capital-wealthy. Katie, who was mentioned in the 
previous chapter in relation to her flooded apartment, works night shifts as a London Underground 
station attendant. She comes from a Scottish working-class family and, although she has a degree, she 
obtained it through evening classes over the course of five years while working full time on the 
railways. Unlike Marjorie, Katie did not profess to using AirBnB as a way to construct a valuable social 
network. Instead, she told me: ‘I’m only doing it for the money, and that’s a terrible thing to say. And 
I don’t believe anyone who says, I do this to meet other people. Get stuffed! Join a club then! You don’t!’ 
This suggests that Katie doesn’t see the same economic potential in building social networks with her 
guests – this also demonstrates that AirBnB hosts form a pluralistic group that cannot be simply 
condensed into a theoretically conceived capital accruing subject.  
 
5.3 – Labouring for ratings  
On AirBnB’s platform, ratings can make a difference to a host’s ability to earn an income. Because the 
guest chooses which property they will stay in, a host with lower ratings will likely have a reduced 
ability to earn an income from the platform as guests choose higher-rated options. Hosts are able to 
achieve “Superhost” status on the platform if they sustain an average rating above 4.8, cancel less 
than 1% of bookings, respond to more than 90% of booking requests within 24 hours and host more 
than either 10 stays in the past year or 3 stays totalling over 100 nights. Several of the hosts who took 
part in this study were “Superhosts” and therefore had access to the respective benefit package that 
AirBnB offers. Paybacks of “Superhost” status include priority placing of your property across the 
platform (resulting in increased possibility for bookings), the choice of a $100 voucher for AirBnB 
accommodation each year or free professional photography for your property, as well as priority 
support and discounted accountancy. I argue that high ratings on AirBnB, and the associated 
“Superhost” status that some achieve, are forms of institutional cultural capital. For Bourdieu (1986, 
p. 20), institutional cultural capital is ‘a certificate of cultural competence’, a recognition that is tied 
to an institution and convertible to economic gains. However, like all forms of capital within Bourdieu’s 
frame of reference, ratings on AirBnB are the product of labour or transformation.  
 
Katrina, a host who relies on her “Superhost” status, explained the labour that she and her partner 
commit in order to maintain their status on the platform: 
I think at one point we dropped off from being Superhosts and had to earn it back again. It’s 
definitely a lot of work. Especially my boyfriend, he puts a lot of work into recommendations 
and getting them set-up and sending those images, and whatever. We definitely take it 
seriously; we have a checklist for cleaning when we are getting the place ready. It’s a lot of 
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work. A few weeks ago, I was up till two o’clock in the morning, mopping the floors and 
scrubbing walls and whatever. So yes, we definitely take it seriously. 
Anna, a working-class host who sublets the bed of her one-bed flat while sleeping on the living room 
sofa, described the experience of getting a four-star rating: 
as a super-host, if I get four-out-of-fives, I take them very seriously - not always personally but 
very seriously because if I get too many of those I’ll lose my Superhost status and I’ll be 
downgraded which means that I won’t be as visible, I have the potential to lose customers 
coming to my place which I rely on for my income. 
For these Superhosts, the status that they have achieved on the platform represents an accumulation 
of the labour time. Additionally, in the perception of these hosts, it has a clear and tangible link to the 
economic outcomes that they experience.  
 
 But not all hosts felt that they needed Superhost status. Those with a secure income from other 
sources, or a property in a more prestigious location, often had a more relaxed approach to their 
ratings. Tony, who makes more money on the platform than any of the other hosts I spoke to (in 
excess of £4,000 per month), told me that he uses ratings as a tool for assessing his pricing strategy: 
‘I sometimes get rated four for value, that’s good. If you get five every time for value, you’re not 
charging enough, as it were’. This attitude places significantly less dependency on the rating system – 
for Tony, the income benefit derived from the rating system is less significant in relation to his overall 
income. Another host, Sandra, told me that she remains more indifferent to her ratings because she 
is not dependent on the income from AirBnB, and would rather escape from the labour necessary to 
uphold Superhost status: 
To some people, the Superhost status is absolutely crucial. Because for a lot of people, this is 
their livelihood. I don’t care about it, but I know my neighbour is obsessed with maintaining it 
and she does anything she can to keep it. And I just think, you know, you shouldn’t have to 
jump through hoops like that just to try and keep kind of in their good books.  
However, while hosts like Tony remained indifferent to their ratings and Superhost status, openly 
accepting 4-star reviews, they continued to be fully booked and were able to continue charging high 
rates. Not all hosts are required to labour to set themselves apart, some are able to do it through 
transforming their existing capitals as I will discuss in the following section.  
 
5.4 – Transforming capital 
Hosts in this study did not simply engage with cultural capital for their own enjoyment. Instead, they 
explained how it made them better hosts and gave them an advantage on the platform through 
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intricately designed profiles and listings, professional photography and the rating and review system 
that recognises their value through transformation of existing forms of capital.  
 
Tanya, the host who rents out her garden room, told me that she feels her Superhost status connects 
to the vast cultural knowledge that she has built up over her life through living and working in other 
countries, as well as her more recent involvement in organising charity events:  
I do a lot of social things, I do a lot of charity stuff, I’ve organised bingo nights and cake sales 
for a hospice … I used to be a waitress when I was in New York and France … and I worked in 
a ski resort … you know, you learn how to present things. 
For Tanya, the high ratings and “Superhost” status originate from her accrued development of skills 
and understandings. These embodied forms of cultural capital allow her the possibility of being a 
‘hospitable’ host and reaping the economic rewards that come with a high average rating.  
 
Hosts also engaged in Bourdieuan (2013) distinction, setting themselves apart from the marketplace 
by utilising unique cultural capital. Nikki, an AirBnB host based in Camden told me that ‘[her] home is 
very different from most IKEA places’, referencing her collection of vintage ornaments. Another, Kelly, 
told me that to be a good host ‘you need to have some sort of decorating and design skill’. But rather 
than simply being an internal reflection, these distinctions become recognised through ratings and 
reviews. Nikki attributed her high ratings in part to her objectified cultural capital, claiming that 
‘people say it’s like a museum’. Nikki’s value has also been recognised by AirBnB directly as they chose 
her to be one of the faces of their London marketing campaign. AirBnB paid Nikki to photograph and 
film her house – this footage was used extensively in online, television and physical advertising 
banners. As she explained ‘I’ve been used by AirBnB quite a bit for publicity, I’ve been part of various 
committees, and now I’m part of a home sharing club in Camden’.  Another host, Jane, who attended 
an AirBnB event in Paris told me that ‘there was [a] guy, now on the staff of AirBnB, but he spoke to 
me about interior design for AirBnB properties to make them look expensive, to appeal to a particular 
kind of market. And he waved pictures of One Hyde Park, suggesting we do it like that’ – indicating 
that these forms of objectified “high culture” capital (Savage et al. 2015) are recognised and valued 
within AirBnB’s market.  
 
Tony, the aforementioned Superhost who welcomes four-star reviews, owns without mortgage an 
iconic London property. When talking of his property, he told me: 
It’s unique and it’s unusual, it’s a listed building, it’s full of character, you know, it’s a landmark, 
and as such it attracts an awful lot more interest than something that’s just a bedroom in 
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somebody’s house. So, people like the idea of staying somewhere unusual and quirky. It’s 
normally been listed in those sorts of places to stay in Airbnb, so therefore people, quite a lot 
of people will have seen it in newspaper or magazine articles listing places to go. 
The property that Tony owns exists inside a highly recognisable structure within central London that 
has received institutional accreditation from Historic England, who provide its listed status. As with 
ratings, I argue that this listed status constitutes another form of institutional cultural capital 
(Bourdieu, 1986). While Bourdieu used institutional cultural capital to talk predominantly of academic 
institutions bestowing legitimacy through qualification, it is possible to adapt the concept to look at 
other types of institutions whose qualifications have a similar functionality within the symbolic 
economy. Like with educational qualification, ‘the material and symbolic profits which the … 
qualification guarantees … depend on its scarcity’ (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 248). The highly selective nature 
of the listing process, in recognising properties it believes to be of historic importance, provides a 
presumed legitimacy to the cultural importance of the structure. The host’s use of language also points 
towards this distinctive cultural scarcity surrounding his property, pointing to its unique and unusual 
character. The scarcity here is not a materialistic supply and demand scarcity of London’s housing 
market, indeed, the host makes a clear distinction between his own property and others which are 
materially identical – ‘a bedroom in somebody’s house’ – what draws the property apart is its cultural 
identification. There is also a distinction of the subject taking place within this declaration, as he is not 
just somebody whose house is ordinary – he is recognising not just his property but also himself, as 
the owner of such a property, as being distinguished and visible against others.  
 
Tony describes his property as being consistently booked 365 days of the year and he is able to 
demand £150 per night for a room within his property – much higher than the earnings of most AirBnB 
hosts within London who are renting a room within their property. In the pre-interview survey, he 
declared his AirBnB specific earnings to be above £4,000 per month (this was the highest category 
made available to participants and Tony was the only study participant who receives such an income 
from a platform). This income can be compared to materially similar listings from hosts in the same 
part of London who are also renting one room within their house. Jannette declared her earnings 
within the £800-£899 per month category and described her property as being occupied between half 
and two-thirds of the time - significantly less both in income and occupancy rate compared to what 
Tony is able to achieve. Another host, Anna, who is also renting one room in the same part of London 
declared greater occupancy rates, aiming for 90 per cent, but her monthly earnings were less, 
between £700-£799. These data point towards a cultural value that allows Tony’s property to be 
valued much higher than hosts with materially similar offerings. Hosts like Tony and Nikki utilise their 
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cultural distinction to separate themselves from the market – rather than being like ‘most IKEA places’ 
or ‘just ... a bedroom in somebody’s house’ they recognise their properties as being unique due to 
their cultural endowment – something that is recognised through AirBnB’s systems of legibility and 
produces economic rewards.  
 
Interestingly, these forms of recognition also had an affective impact on some of the hosts in this 
study. Those with the right forms of capital, who were able to distinguish themselves on the platform, 
begin to recognise themselves as subjects of value through the mechanisms of the platform. Alex, a 
host in Soho, told me: 
I’m a bit smug, I get the ratings that I’m getting and the fees that I’m getting, so I’m doing a 
pretty good job. So, I’m not sure what I could do better. You know, you can only get five stars. 
You can’t get six. 
For these hosts, having their value datafied is a positive affective experience because they are being 
quantified and qualified as valuable, and gaining economic rewards from this judgment. Nikki told me 
‘I have to say AirBnB absolutely empowers people, I’m an absolutely classic, average host … I believe 
it’s empowering…’ But this feeling of empowerment was not universal among hosts in the study. The 
recognition of value inherent in AirBnB ratings relies on particular forms of capital which are 
translatable within the platform. Hosts who don’t present the “right” form of capital experienced a 
very different relationship to the rating system and platform. 
 
5.5 – If you don’t have the right capital  
Katie, a previously discussed AirBnB host who describes her background as being ‘very working class’, 
was eager to tell me how much she disliked being rated by guests:  
I hate it because … the way they review you is really subjective, and I know it’s going to be. But 
I’d rather… Airbnb, if they’re going to have ratings at all, they should have questions. Did they 
have this? Did they have that? Did you find the house was pleasant and friendly? Did you…? 
You know, really closed answers because people can get really nasty when it’s a personality 
thing.  
Because of her economic positioning, Katie’s apartment is not adorned with vintage one-of-a-kind 
furnishings like Nikki’s. Nor is it a place of special historical value, like Tony’s. It’s a basement flat that 
is missing many basic necessities that were destroyed when it was flooded. If Nikki were to aim for 
Superhost status, she would not be able to simply transform value from accrued cultural and social 
capitals. Alternatively, she could use her labour, like Anna and Katrina do, to try and set herself apart 
by providing the best possible service. But, unlike Katrina, Katie lives alone, and all the labour 
associated with hosting falls on her shoulders. Anna also lived alone like Katie, but only worked 
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occasional freelance hours, meaning she was free for extended periods of time to do the labour 
associated with hosting. Katie, on the other hand, works nightshifts and told me that she regularly 
signs up to do overtime to help pay the bills.  
 
Like many of the other hosts, Katie saw the rating as a subjective judgment upon herself – but unlike 
the other hosts in this study, Katie is repeatedly judged negatively by her guests and these judgments 
are made highly legible by the rating and review system. Without access to the right forms of capital, 
without embodying the right cultural capital in her person, she feels little agency over her ratings: 
You can’t do anything … I don’t like the way it’s done, as I say, because it’s subjective. I think 
it should be closed-questioned, really, rather than… You know, because you’re giving people 
an open forum. In a way… I think a lot of them don’t realise that you actually see, and there’s 
a bit on the review where it’s says, “anything else?” and I don’t think they realise. I think they 
think it’s for Airbnb. They don’t realise that when they write something here, and the worst 
thing is they don’t say it to your face. They flipping say it to everything but your face, and that 
annoys me so much because you were there in the house with them. 
 
Katie’s experience is notable for the lack of control that she feels over her ratings and reviews when 
compared to other hosts in this study. Unlike them, she does not have access to the forms of capital 
necessary to be valued through the platform. She particularly took issue with the fact that the platform 
allows guests to rate hosts (and vice versa) without a face-to-face communication – meaning she has 
little capacity to address judgments made against her before they become publicly visible. While this 
is true for all hosts, Katie found it particularly difficult because she has little understanding of what 
she might be doing to get the low ratings (as she describes, it’s ‘really subjective’). In my interview 
with Katie she appeared to embody the working class woman’s habitus, as drawn out by Skeggs (1997), 
being loud, boisterous and lacking in the middle class presentation of embodied capitals.  
 
This reflects a range of findings by other scholars who have shown that the dominant class and gender 
relations that inform symbolic subject formation devalue women, especially working class women 
who are seen only as deficit due to their lack of the correct forms of capital (Skeggs, 1997). Additionally, 
single women, such as Katie, are perceived as being particularly symbolically lacking (Reynolds & 
Taylor, 2005), fading with age towards invisibility (Sharp & Ganong, 2011). But this remains inherently 
classed – as middle class white women can engage in strategies of resistance to such devaluation 
(Zajicek & Koski, 2003). While the middle-class female hosts who participated in this study described 
being able to utilise their agency to accrue the right skills to fare well against judgement, Katie 
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describes how she ‘can’t do anything’ – rather than engaging in practices that attempt to construct a 
valuable future, Katie is simply trying to secure her present, mirroring a theoretical distinction drawn 
between middle and working class forms of personhood by Skeggs (2004b). 
 
Katie’s experience is important because it showcases the way in which inequality functions through 
this type of competitive market platform. Hosts like Katie are judged against dominant symbolic values 
which reflect existing class and gender inequalities and actively reproduce them on the platform. 
While my study does not account for racial differences among AirBnB hosts (see the sample limitation 
discussed in 3.4), scholars such as Skeggs (2004a) have noted from the theoretical level how symbolic 
devaluation of race often functions in a similar way, and evidence from Galperin (2017) appears to 
show this alongside gender (2019) when looking at other competitive market platforms. This is 
different to the way in which inequality functions on platforms without a competitive market (see 
chapter 6). In the following section I develop competitive market inequalities approach further by 
showing the interactions between economic, cultural and social capitals in the context of the 
commodified host.  
 
5.6 – Presence and commodification of the subject  
Being an AirBnB host often involves a heavy focus on social intimacy (Schoenbaum, 2016) – the host 
is sometimes sharing a living space with their guests. The economic restrictions on Katie make it 
impossible to physically separate herself from her guests in ways that many of the other hosts in this 
study could do. As Huws (2014) argues, commoditisation in digital economies is often based around 
processes of standardisation. This theme of standardisation is noted by Bourdieu in relation to 
institutionally endowed capital. Bourdieu describes, in relation to his example of the academic 
qualification as an institutional cultural capital, that ‘by conferring institutional recognition on the 
cultural capital possessed by any given agent, the academic qualification also makes it possible to 
compare qualification holders and even to exchange them (by substituting one for another in 
succession)’ (1986, p. 21). So, to follow my line of argument, a Superhost (to some degree) is 
replaceable with another Superhost. Both have proven themselves as valuable within the AirBnB 
marketplace through the rating and review system. But what we then have, also, is the process of 
standardisation that is associated with commodification – as Nikki told me: ‘AirBnB are also trying to 
get us to constantly increase our standards so that we can provide a far more professional experience’.  
 
Hosts who can separate their own physical presence from that which they rent out often talk about 
how they have commoditised their AirBnB space through the transformation of capitals. Tony, for 
instance told me about how he ‘put a little studio kitchen in’ his guest room, so that guests would have 
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the ability to make their breakfast – but this form of separation was not available to all hosts. Those 
who shared intimate space with guests would not provide a commoditised separate space, but rather, 
their own space would be commoditised and judged against dominant symbolic value. As Skeggs who 
argues, ‘all standards of value are expressions of power’ (2015, p. 214) that form conflict and struggle 
between groups. The dominant symbolic values that present themselves in society have generally 
reflected middle class taste, building upon Bourdieu (1986, 2013), Skeggs argues claims that ‘capacity 
to judge which people, activities and objects have value, is … one of the main ways through which the 
middle class legitimate their own power’ (2015, p. 215).  
 
Hosts who share intimate space but who embody middle-class values and tastes were less impacted 
by these pressures – as discussed earlier, they often simply saw it as a recognition of their value. Nikki 
was pleased when her guests described her home as a museum because of her range of vintage 
ornaments. They live their lives in ways which are perceived as valuable through the “dominant 
symbolic” (Skeggs, 2004a, 2004b, 2011). But where does this leave hosts like Katie, who do not have 
the cultural capitals necessary to be seen as valuable? One particular aspect of my interview with Katie 
that proved intriguing was her extended interests in talking about her cats. Examine the following 
quote: 
I have cats… Not that there’s like ten or something ridiculous, but there’s two photos of my 
cats on my listing. Then people said, can you move the cats out when we’re there? … And I’m 
like a stranger in my own home. I’m the one who’s literally… No pun intended, pussy-footing 
around, so that I’m not actually upsetting these people. I’m actually like a stranger in my own 
home. One girl invited the cats into her room … She goes, “yes, yes, it’s great! They’re all 
here!” … And then she wrote a review saying, “but the cats leave hairs in the bedroom”.  
What Katie is resisting here appears to be a conversion of her cats into rental commodities. Katie feels 
that her private life and her cats are being packaged and devalued as in terms of a market 
standardisation imposed through rating and review mechanisms. Her lack of economic capital that 
means she has an inability to separate her private life from that which is commodified for her guests 
is combined with a lack of cultural and social capital, resulting in devaluation of her personhood.  
 
Katie’s resistance to this devaluation manifests in her displeasure with reviews which she sees as a 
misrecognition of her value. As Foucault argues, power struggles often take the form of a ‘refusal of a 
scientific or administrative inquisition that determines who one is’ (2000, p. 331) – a struggle that can 
be seen in Katie’s rejection of her reviews. Instead, Katie was eager to tell me about the ways in which 
she values herself that exist outside of market mechanisms of exchange: She volunteers at soup 
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kitchens and has let homeless people stay in her spare room when it’s available. One of the key 
differences that arises with AirBnB, when compared to traditional forms of distinction outlined by 
Bourdieu (2013) is the visibility of this value judgment: On AirBnB your recognised value is quantified 
through star ratings, qualified through written comments and made increasingly legible. The ‘open 
forum’ that Katie describes is an open debate on her lack of market value, becoming painfully 
individualised and presented publicly to anyone who comes across her listing.  
 
In the previous chapter, I discussed how hosts with sufficient economic capital could escape from the 
personal risks associated with hosting by physically separating themselves. But what they can also 
escape from is the commodification of their personal life. A host like James who rents out multiple 
properties will never be subjected to the same personal value judgements as Katie. For hosts like 
James, their AirBnB offerings are something separate to themselves, malleable through economic 
capital. When I asked him his opinion on the rating system, he told me nonchalantly: ‘I don’t have a 
problem with it.’  
 
5.7 – Capital ties to the platform  
In the previous chapter, I mentioned how the knowledge that some flex drivers developed that 
allowed them to know when blocks would become available was a form of capital that had no 
realisable value outside of the specific field of the Amazon Flex platform. The same is true for ratings 
and Superhost status on AirBnB. As James told me: ‘I’ve got 370 reviews on Airbnb, so I’d just have to 
start all over again on another platform’. For hosts like Katrina and Anna, who labour over their ratings, 
their accumulated capital would cease to exist if they lost access to the platform. But does this equate 
to a dependency on the platform in the same sense that Uber drivers are dependent through debt? 
 
It is also notable that AirBnB is monopolistic. Many hosts in this study had originally started using 
alternative hosting companies who were subsequently bought out by AirBnB. Clara, Sandra and Katie 
all originally started using a service called Crashpadder that was subsumed into AirBnB – as Sandra 
explained: ‘they rang me one day and said we’re kind of being bought out by a company in the States 
called AirBnB. I kind of went, “no, no, I don’t like the sound of that. Not happy.”’ For others, the 
alternative services to AirBnB didn’t seem to deliver what they expected. Tony told me that when he 
first started to rent through AirBnB he investigated the alternatives:  
There were other platforms, [but] I discovered later, they were all pretty shoddy. And the big 
thing against Airbnb is the monopoly. So, they’ve got monopoly power. But you know, it 
delivers. One of the challenges is really, you know, it would be ideal if there was Airbnb One 
versus Airbnb Two, if there was some competition there. 
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In general, hosts didn’t feel that there was a direct competitor to the AirBnB platform in London. The 
alternatives are considered insufficient as income sources (often due to the monopoly that AirBnB 
holds on the market) or, were simply bought out as part of AirBnB’s expansion into the market. As 
James told me, ‘probably one of the worst things is the dominance of Airbnb in the short-term letting 
industry. There are other platforms but generally speaking they’re just not as good. The money thing 
just doesn’t… It’s not as dependable’. If hosts are tied in by both their accumulated rating (a specific 
form of capital that is tied to the platform) and the monopoly that AirBnB holds over the market – 
that it might imply that there is some level of dependency that exists. 
 
But many hosts in this study have economic and cultural capitals which have value outside of AirBnB, 
as discussed previously in sections 4.4 and 5.2. Tony’s iconic London landmark is still a listed and highly 
desirable property, even without its high rating on AirBnB. And, while he told me that ‘there [is] 
nothing like Airbnb’, he is nonetheless currently in the process of setting up more channels to take 
direct bookings. He explained: ‘I’m actually building my own website and I’m planning for the future 
on just having, you know, if I can, running it myself.’  Importantly, he adds that he has ‘so many more 
[guests] coming as repeats or regular visitors.’ Like Marjorie, who invests time in building social 
connections to her guests to encourage repeat custom, Tony’s connections with his guests constitute 
a form of capital that could be put to work for economic returns without the AirBnB platform.   
  
Many hosts also noted the option of switching to more traditional letting markets – This is an option 
that James is actively considering as he noticed a fall in AirBnB bookings recently: 
I was thinking of … just renting the whole flat on short term tenancy, which is a regular tenancy 
agreement for maybe a period of three months and saying look… Because you do get some 
people who want to stay for a short period of time, and I would then say just pay me the three 
months upfront. Because that would be great, and I’ve got £6000 in the bank. 
Even Katie, who was the most dependent AirBnB host that I spoke to told me that she has considered 
taking longer-term lodger:  
The mortgage still needs to be paid for another 11 years. And this has got me through so far 
without having to have somebody else [in the flat] 24/7. But every now and again I still think 
to myself, uh, maybe I should just get somebody normal to come and lodge. 
While most hosts felt that turning to traditional rental markets would mean a reduction in income, it 
remains a viable option. Because of this, AirBnB hosts cannot be considered dependent on the 
platform in the same way as Uber drivers who have obligations of debt and few realisable alternative 
forms of work – many of them having turned to Uber originally due to the lower barrier to access 
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compared to traditional labour markets which have excluded them. What is notable is that hosts with 
the most capitals, such as Tony, have the most flexibility in terms of alternative options – as he is able 
to establish his own direct booking system.  
 
5.8 – Unequal subjects of value 
This chapter has dealt with AirBnB as a competitive market case study. Within this competitive 
environment, mechanisms exist for hosts to distinguish themselves and set themselves apart. For this 
reason, Bourdieu’s (1986) theorisation of capital accruing subjectivity works well to explain many of 
the divisions and inequalities that exist. AirBnB allows hosts with the right skills and the right property 
to become recognised through high ratings and Superhost status – these institutional capitals are 
accrued either through extensive labour or through transforming existing forms of capital, and provide 
an economic advantage as hosts are able to collect rents not only from the property itself, but also its 
accrued representation on the platform.  
 
As discussed in the methodology chapter of this thesis (see section 3.6 specifically), I began the 
research process thinking that Bourdieu’s (1986) subject would be a sufficient theoretical tool for 
understanding how “entrepreneurs” across my platforms diverge in unequal ways. What became 
apparent was a stark difference between platforms that offer a competitive market and those that do 
not. It is for this reason I have split my answer to the question “how are cultural and social capitals 
put to work in the platform economy?” across this chapter and the one which follows it; because the 
answer is different for these two models of platform operation. On competitive market platforms like 
AirBnB, Bourdieu’s (1986) capital accruing subjectivity allows for richly theoretically insights into why 
some people succeed and others do not. This responds to the work of others (Frenken & Schor 2017; 
Ravenelle 2019; Schor 2017) who, while noting that inequalities exist around resources, do not provide 
a linking to theories of capitalism. This theoretical linking, I argue, adds critical insights into how the 
resources for success on the platform (here theorised as capitals) come to the subject – either through 
labour, inheritance, rent seeking or exploitation. By adding this theoretical depth, we have a better 
understanding of how these competitive platforms fit within our broader cyclical models of capitalism 
and broader scholarship on inequality.  In the next chapter I will show that Bourdieu’s theorisation of 
capital accruing subjectivity begins to fall apart as a way of understanding class difference when 
attention is turned to non-competitive platforms – for those cases, other theorisations become 
important for understanding the platform’s positioning within capitalism.  
 
A limitation to this study is that I only investigated one competitive market platform. Had I known of 
the theoretical importance of this division I would have attempted to include a platform that has a 
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competitive market but also a greater focus on labour (such as Fiverr), to see how cultural and social 
capitals set “entrepreneurs” apart in those circumstances. This limitation aside, the data I have 
presented in this chapter shows that, on AirBnB’s competitive market, cultural and social capitals 
which fall into the dominant symbolic are valued through rating and review systems and appear to 
provide hosts with a privilege on the platform which can be utilised for economic advantage. However, 
while this does allow for an economic recognition of skills and experience, it also reproduces 
inequalities which manifest through symbolic differentiation – leaving working class hosts in a 


































6 – Subjects without value?  
6.1 – A different type of platform  
In the previous chapter, I began to address the research question of “how are cultural and social 
capitals put to work in the platform economy?” There I argued that on competitive market platforms 
like AirBnB, cultural and social capitals provide an opportunity for “entrepreneurs” to distinguish 
themselves within the market. Most were able to leverage forms of cultural and social capital to gain 
positive reception on the platform, earn a reliable income or even distinguish themselves by becoming 
a Superhost. However, hosts without forms of capital which were symbolically recognised found 
themselves devalued and struggled to get by within these types of competitive markets.   
 
In this chapter, I turn attention to Uber and Amazon Flex, platforms without a competitive 
marketplace, where work is distributed more randomly among locally active drivers (Uber) or to the 
first driver who accepts a block of work (Amazon Flex). As I have discussed earlier in this thesis, there 
are some ways in which “entrepreneurs” with particular forms of cultural and socail capital can gain 
some advantage in obtaining jobs – for instance Flex drivers can learn when blocks are usually posted 
or game the system using technological “cheats” and Uber drivers may develop knowledge of popular 
times and places to make themselves available on the app. These are ways in which drivers are able 
to utilise forms of capital to set themselves apart, but these exist outside of the usual operative 
mechanics of the platforms. Unlike AirBnB which utilises property descriptions and photos alongside 
its rating and review systems specifically as opportunities for hosts to set themselves apart and 
showcase their capitals, Uber and Amazon Flex start with an assumption of equality between 
“entrepreneurs” on the platform. The Uber driver who is almost randomly assigned, or the Flex driver 
who chooses the block, will be as good as any other who might have otherwise ended up with the 
work. This supposes that the labour that the “entrepreneur” is immediately replaceable. While 
Bourdieu’s (1986) model of subjectivity helped to explain the experiences of “entrepreneurs” on 
AirBnB’s competitive marketplace, it does little to help us understand how subjectivity works on a 
platform that, from a technological perspective, offers no distinction or differentiation between 
subjects – they are grouped and exploited as a collective – theoretically closer to the model of class 
put forward by Marx (1887).  
 
On first sight, this may sound like a more equal system that produces less inequality between 
“entrepreneurs”; after all, it does not immediately appear (from a technological perspective) to 
support dominant symbolic differentiations between those seen as valuable and those seen as 
valueless. But this is not the case, inequality remains a significant part of these platforms. Throughout 
this chapter, I will show how inequality functions differently on these platforms, often creating more 
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of a power imbalance between the “entrepreneur” and the platform itself, rather than between 
“entrepreneurs” as was notable among AirBnB hosts. I will do this in four parts. First (in section 6.2), I 
build upon the arguments of chapter 4 to discuss how the people I spoke to who utilise these platforms 
tended to have less capacity to put their cultural and social capitals to work elsewhere in the economy, 
as well as being economically disadvantaged, compared to the AirBnB sample. They therefore had less 
choice about working for the platform than AirBnB hosts did. Second, I will show (in section 6.3) that 
ratings and review systems on these platforms function as disciplinary mechanisms – rather than being 
able to set themselves apart through ratings as AirBnB hosts could, their only notable function appears 
to be to deactivate drivers who make mistakes or fall behind. Third, I subsequently analyse this rating 
system further (in section 6.4) to show how it functions in relation to subject value: rather than being 
valueless, drivers on these platforms often bring forward a wide range of skills and other capitals that 
provide a better customer experience and make their work more efficient; but they do not get any 
economic benefit from these. The value provided by these capitals is extracted by the platform who 
are able to turn high levels of customer service into repeat custom. I show how this relates to the 
rating and surveillance systems that forces drivers to go beyond a simple provision of labour in fear of 
being deactivated. Collectively, these platform systems present the “entrepreneur” as a subject 
without value by positioning them as instantly replaceable, while simultaneously pressuring them to 
put additional capitals to work without the economic recognition that is usually related to capitals. I 
theorise this in terms of a subjectivity that is prevented from becoming  Bourdieu’s (1986) capital 
accruing subject. Finally, (in section 6.5) I delve into the ramifications of this type of platform upon 
subjectivity and inequality, discussing how these “entrepreneurs” become abject through the fact that 
the platform inhibits them from accruing value to themselves, reproducing them as replaceable labour. 
I reflect here also upon how the disciplinary surveillance systems on these platforms can, in some 
instances, lead to increased risk and discrimination.  
 
6.2 – Who drives?  
All but one of the AirBnB hosts I spoke to were white – those who grew up outside of the UK had 
emigrated from relatively wealthy countries such as the United States, Canada and Italy. Almost all 
were highly educated and had prosperous careers. But the Uber and Amazon Flex drivers that I spoke 
to tended to have a different story. In this section I will detail the capital profile of the “entrepreneurs” 
I spoke to in order to show a wider positioning of these workers within the economy – which helps to 
explain why they end up utilising platforms such as Uber and Amazon Flex.  
 
A common occurrence for Uber drivers in this study was a history of working for other taxi companies 
in comparable positions. Richard and Lukasz, for instance, worked for a local mini-cab companies 
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before coming to Uber; Darnell had worked as a driver for Addison Lee; Shoaib told me that he has 
been a private-hire driver since he was 18. But there were also Uber drivers who did not previously 
work for other private hire companies. Sebastian used to do sports massage before turning to Uber 
and Aaron previously ran a business in Turkey that went bankrupt – he started using Uber as a way to 
help pay off some of his debts. As discussed in chapter 4, Mike told me that Uber was part of his 
transition into retirement. However, overall, Uber drivers in this study had less of the cultural and 
social capitals that AirBnB hosts had access to. They tended to be less educated, the majority of the 
Uber drivers that I spoke to did not have university level education. Sebastian, for instance told me 
that he had started a foundation degree but dropped out before qualifying. Said had a similar 
experience to Sebastian, telling me ‘we had some family issues where I had to be the breadwinner for 
my mum and my brother, so I just left [school] and then went into work.’  
 
Something I noticed during recruitment of Uber drivers in this study was the issue of a language barrier. 
Many of the drivers who initially were interested in taking part spoke English as a second language 
and had only received little, if any, formal training in the language. Similar to Ravenelle’s (2019) study 
of Uber drivers in New York, around half of my Uber interviewees were immigrants. One driver 
appeared to misunderstand the nature of the interview, and rather than considering his participation 
voluntary and the £20 a gift, appeared to understand the £20 as direct payment for his labour time in 
participation, and that if the interview took a longer or shorter amount of time, that his payment 
would vary – this was not rectified by subsequent discussion and the driver’s understanding seemed 
to be limited. As the ethics of this project required a consensual voluntary participation, I did not 
proceed to interview this driver as I could not be sure he had a clear understanding of the proposed 
agreement. This same type of misunderstanding could also exclude such a worker from traditional 
labour markets or make them more vulnerable to exploitative conditions. Overall, as a result of limited 
capitals, Uber drivers often had relatively restricted labour-market access – having to accept work that 
came along with lower barriers to access in order to subsist.  
 
During the interview process, I noticed further differences in the approaches of drivers when 
compared to AirBnB hosts. AirBnB hosts often arranged the interview at a locally owned artisan café, 
their favourite local restaurant (where they occasionally knew the owners and interacted with them 
in front of me) or in their own home which they were excited to show me. These all point towards 
ideas of valuable cultural capital as defined by Sava ge et al. (2015) – ranging from “emergent cultural 
capital” (noted as a valorising of specific types of urban engagement (Mike Savage, Hanquinet, 
Cunningham, & Hjellbrekke, 2018)), seen in the case of artisan cafés, to a more traditional “highbrow 
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cultural capital” in the case of one host who invited me to speak to him in the bar of a famous five-
star hotel in central London. However, Uber drivers were more practically minded choosing to do the 
interview in the nearest chain coffee shop, at my office, but overall: much preferring to do the 
interview remotely over a video call. This was partly indicated to be a financial pressure (participants 
noting that coming out to a café or restaurant would mean that they lose money beyond the £20 that 
they are compensated), but it also became apparent that these workers tended not to engage with 
urban spaces in the same ways that AirBnB hosts did. Only two of the Flex interviews took place in a 
café – and in both cases it was a chain café that was recommended by me after the participants 
mentioned uncertainty towards their knowledge of anywhere suitable. One Amazon Flex worker, 
Andy, spent the entirety of our Skype interview locked out of his parents’ house, sat on a bench in the 
front garden while he waited for his parents to return. Another Flex worker, Simon, took part in the 
interview over Skype while on duty as an event paramedic. While Uber and Amazon Flex workers 
treated the interviews as something to be completed in a utilitarian sense, AirBnB hosts had the 
resources necessary to be more playful and indulgent with the process. As a result, hosts engaged in 
capital reinforcing practices, reaffirming their cultural and social advantages.  
 
However, Amazon Flex participants tended to have a slightly different relationship with the platform 
when compared to Uber drivers - partly because Flex cannot constitute a full-time job in the same way 
that Uber can. Working blocks are limited and a driver can go days without work. For this reason, it 
tends to attract “entrepreneurs” like Jake who are ‘in-between jobs’ and have been using it to provide 
some sustenance during a few months of unemployment. As Barney claimed, it is ‘not really a main 
source of income’. For this reason, many of the drivers I spoke to were more highly educated or come 
from white collar careers – wanting to utilise the platform as a way to cover a financial gap. Andy is a 
clear example of this, as he explained: ‘I did my aerospace engineering degree, and then after that I 
was kind of struggling to get work, so I was in desperate need to find a way to pay my bills and the 
student loan.’ What this indicates is that the Amazon Flex drivers I spoke to are not all capital-poor, 
but rather, had difficulty transforming their capital into economic returns in traditional labour markets 
(even if it is temporary).  
 
It is well noted throughout the literature that the low barriers to entry allow for these platforms to 
draw upon a stream of “entrepreneurs” who struggle to find work within traditional labour markets 
(Ravenelle 2019; Woodcock & Graham 2020). To put it in the words of an Uber driver I spoke to named 
Darnell: ‘[we are] disposable units in their business plan. Their thinking is that they can churn through 
drivers and there will always be drivers coming’. In this section, I have attempted to link this 
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replaceability to an assessment of their cultural and social capitals, such as their education and 
professional work experience, adopting a theoretical approach built upon Bourdieu’s (1986) – 
whereby those without the right forms of capital fail to succeed in the economy. In the rest of this 
chapter, I switch from this approach of seeing these workers as simply lacking the right forms of capital 
to instead see how value is extracted from them and how they are misrecognised as valueless by the 
platform – theoretical approaches that draw on the work of Skeggs (2004b), Mazzucato (2019).  
 
6.3 – Disciplinary ratings  
When recruitment began, Uber and Flex drivers noted suspicion at being offered a £20 financial gift 
for participating; Some directly accused me of working for Uber or Amazon, simply disguising myself 
as an academic. This may appear like far-fetched conspiracy on behalf of the drivers, but soon after 
posting my call for participants on a private group organised by Amazon drivers, I received emails from 
Amazon’s public relations staff enquiring about my research and my need to recruit drivers. This was 
a clear indication that Amazon staff were monitoring a group that was supposedly just for drivers. 
What I discovered was a justified sense of suspicion from a pool of workers who are familiar with the 
idea of being monitored and tracked both inside and outside of the platform. As Rosenblat has argued, 
platforms provide ‘the impression that driver behaviour is being monitored within the driver’s own 
car … Uber’s access to phone data also gives the company a remarkable opportunity to proactively 
intervene in driver behaviour’ (2018, p. 142). In this section, I argue that ratings and digital surveillance 
systems on Uber and Amazon Flex function as a disciplinary system where, rather than recognising a 
driver’s value to allow them to stand out in a crowded market, it reaffirms an economic limit to their 
subjectivity.  
 
While AirBnB hosts with the right forms of capital often saw their ratings to be a recognition of their 
value on the platform (often aspiring to become a Superhost), Uber drivers generally spoke of the 
rating system as a disciplinary mechanism. Darnell, an Uber driver and trade union representative, 
told me: 
They never said “well, if you maintain, say, 4.8 then we’re going to bump your earnings up.” So, 
it strikes me that this is only a stick - there is no carrot. The carrot is with them you work as normal. 
Really? Thank you!  
The lack of an economic reward mechanism for highly rated drivers means that providing a good 
service is simply a requirement to avoid deactivation, rather than an opportunity to set themselves 
apart in any meaningful way within the market. This poses a form of subjectivity that diverges from 
Bourdieu’s (1986) capital accruing subject – within the Uber market, subjects are unable to set 
themselves apart and gain advantage so there is little value to the subject from the accrual of capital.  
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Instead, Issam, who has been driving with Uber since 2013, told me about pressure on drivers to go 
above and beyond in order to avoid the potential risks of deactivation: 
They’ve taken on too many drivers … If you drop below 4.5, I think they start having a word 
with you. Anything below 4.3, then they go into certain actions, of course, and some education 
and then I think if you go below 4.1 or 3 something, you’re deactivated. So, you have a 
tendency of high expectation to keep the ratings up, otherwise, what happens is you start 
getting warnings from Uber and then, obviously, without warning, you get deactivated.  
Many drivers in this study spoke of the rating system as a constant overhanging threat to their future 
ability to earn money – rather than rewarding drivers for providing a good service.  
 
It is worth noting that since much of this empirical research was conducted, Uber has introduced a 
system for tipping that may allow some users to gain economic benefit from providing a good service. 
But tipping remains a voluntary action on the part of the rider, rather than something the driver is 
allowed to request or build into the pricing to reflect their experience. More research is needed to 
establish the role of Uber tipping in this regard. It does not, however, change the fact that the rating 
system has no mechanical relationship to earnings.  
 
Amazon Flex does not have a rating system, as such, but does have an automated disciplinary system 
that works in a similar way. Flex drivers can be disciplined if they fail to deliver packages or if customers 
who are scheduled to receive a package file a complaint that the package was never received. When 
such a complaint is raised the system generates an automated email to the driver to inform them that 
they are at risk of deactivation from the service if further packages are reported missing. Drivers 
frequently complained that it was their word against the customer’s – that they might not be 
responsible for a package going missing (if it were stolen, for instance). Some also worried that 
customers might be lying about a package not being received in order to get a refund from Amazon. 
As with Uber ratings, the overall response appears to be based on an average. As Andy told me:  
I left the package in a safe place, I left a note, but I got an email that they didn’t receive it.  I 
think I got – like, they penalise you for a bit, but if you deliver an extra, I think, 500 packages 
successfully, the penalty points get removed 
It is, therefore, possible for a driver to recover from a disciplinary notification by, on average, realising 
the platforms expectations (even if some of these expectations may be beyond the realistic control of 
the driver).  
 
 97 
Across both platforms there was also a notable inability for the drivers to issue a response to a bad 
rating or a disciplinary measure. In Andy’s case of the missing package, he told me that he had no real 
opportunity to respond: ‘I didn’t bother challenging it.  It is just a bot that responds to you, you never 
get close to a human person, it’s just an automatic computer thing.’ Despite drivers sometimes 
choosing to take photos of packages that they had delivered as a form of proof, drivers reported being 
unable to discuss disciplinary emails with anyone from Amazon, meaning they had no opportunity to 
present their defence. Peter, who had his Amazon Flex account suspended after failing to complete a 
route, told me that he was terminated by an automated email. He attempted to respond to the 
accusation on which his termination was based, but suspects the subsequent response that he 
received was also automated: 
I sent an email explaining about the stops and if you looked at the route you could see it wasn’t 
physically possible, and the amount of miles; and they said, “sorry, your response has been 
declined, good luck for the future”, and that’s it.  So, I don’t think people read it, I just think it’s 
an automatically generated thing. 
Neal, another Flex worker, expresses the frustration in simple terms: ‘It’s like talking to yourself’. While 
AirBnB hosts can provide written responses to negative reviews and ratings, which are subsequently 
made public on their listing page, Flex drivers did not have the same opportunities.   
 
Uber drivers also complained about the inability to respond to low ratings and complaints; Darnell, an 
Uber driver, told me: 
Whilst Uber may say here is the comment from the passenger, you know, so and so and so, 
you haven’t given me my chance to respond. And my response in this case was that the 
passenger was extremely rude about me in my own space, my workspace, and I’m not having 
it. And that is perfectly reasonable to me, you know.  
The Uber drivers in this study reported few opportunities to challenge bad reviews or comments. This 
is important because it addresses the issue of who gets a say in the data that is available about you – 
are you able to contribute to that which is legible about you (as on AirBnB), or is your legibility 
constructed by others? In the case of Uber and Amazon Flex, the voice of the market supersedes the 
voice of the labourer; the latter is legible only through the expression of the market and never through 
their own response. In the previous chapter, I discussed (using the example of Katie) how struggles 
over a subject’s ability to define their value is one of the main struggles under capitalism. In chapter 
2, I connected this theoretical idea, which builds upon work of Skeggs (2004b), to that of Foucault’s 
(1984) more general argument that struggles over self-definition constitute the majority of power 
struggles. Here, I make the argument that Marxist strands of theory (such as those advanced by Skeggs 
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(2004b)) are not incompatible with post-structuralist theories of Foucault (1984) – the two appear to 
be intertwined:  On Uber and Amazon Flex, unlike AirBnB, there is no capacity for self-definition or 
defence of value in the face of low ratings or disciplinary measures. This struggle over self-definition, 
which often fits into post-structuralist theoretical understandings, is here structurally reinforced by 
the platform.  
 
Scholars have provided insights into the links between an increasingly datafied society and the 
subsequent impacts upon subjectivity. Bollmer (2016) argues that networks are shaping  a new form 
of nodal citizenship, and likewise Mejias (2015, p. 55) argues that ‘to theorize the networked subject 
is also to theorize the ways in which the digital network has become a universalizing logic for ordering 
the social and providing certain types of agency’. Additional links have been drawn between this 
datafied subject and the dominant relations of capital, showing how datafication as a new form of 
colonialism wherein globalised entrenched inequalities are reaffirmed (Couldry & Mejias, 2019). What 
I show here is not only that subjects from different class positions experience different results from 
this datafication – that is to say: it’s not just that AirBnB hosts like Katie get devalued through being 
rated negatively if they lack the right capitals. In addition, the very way in which datafication happens 
is different based on which platforms an “entrepreneur” has access to. While AirBnB hosts are 
datafied in ways which can recognise and reward their accrual of capitals as well as providing them 
with opportunities to respond, those who use labour-based non-competitive platforms (often coming 
from a different class position) are datafied through disciplinary mechanisms. This is one of the key 
differences between the competitive market and non-competitive market platforms that I studied; 
and it has implications by setting a fixed limit to their subjectivity – they can never be economically 
recognised on the platform as anything more than their immediate ability to provide labour. In the 
following section, I discuss how this is utilised as a tool for value extraction.  
 
6.4 – Ratings as a tool for value extraction  
How do Uber drivers navigate a rating system that puts them under disciplinary surveillance? One 
driver, Issam told me of the pressure that drivers are under to provide additional services in order to 
maintain their rating: 
Drivers have to go way beyond the customers’ expectations to get that five-star rating. I’ve 
had a couple of customers who I’ve spoken to and I said, “how do you rate the review system? 
If I picked you up from A and I dropped you to B, which is your destination, how would you rate 
me?” They said, “I’ll rate you a three-star like everyone else”. I said, “from A to B is three stars. 
How would you get five stars?” That’s when he said, basically, “I would expect them to come 
out, open the door, so on and so on”. I said, “okay, so let me put it in this perspective for you. 
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You give every driver a three-star and if everyone follows your logical reasoning, that driver 
will be deactivated within six months”. 
Because (as Rosenblat and Stark (2016) argue) customers are made into managers, drivers feel 
pressure to please their customers in order to maintain their rating and avoid deactivation. One driver, 
Arron, gave me insights into the ways in which he maintained his rating: 
Arron: I'm one of the top-rated drivers, I'm 4.99. … I do lots of things for my 
passengers. In my car there’s Wi-Fi, chargers, water and snacks… 
George: So, you actually do things specifically to try and get a higher rating? 
Arron: Yes. … It’s a couple of things. My ability to interact with people. The service 
that I provide. 
 
It is clear that Arron’s commitment to customer service comes partly from his own cost in providing 
water, snacks and Wi-Fi facilities within his car - forms of capital. He is reducing his earnings in order 
to attain a higher rating and provide a higher value service. He is also putting his people-skills to work 
for the platform, a performance of labour which builds out of a developed cultural capital.  But he is 
not accruing capital from doing any of these things. I want to argue that what is happening here a 
transference of value. If an AirBnB host provides a good customer service, it adds value in the capital 
that they accrue – high ratings and Superhost status – from which they can individually extract income. 
Where does the value go when a driver like Arron provides a highly valuable service? The individual 
driver does not seem to accrue any tangible capital from these activities that can be utilised within 
the platform to earn a better income. But that is not to say that Arron is not producing value - merely 
that it is being transferred to Uber.  
 
As Mazzucato and Shipman (2014, p. 1063) define ‘value transfer is the realization of the income made 
possible by value creation, and/or its redistribution from one organization or individual to another’. 
Arron’s commitment of labour in the form of additional customer service, therefore, has an impact in 
that it helps to develop Uber’s brand and promote repeat custom and produce realised income for 
Uber overall. However, individually, he accrues nothing beyond a performative 5-star rating and an 
ability (for now) to continue driving on the platform. As Arron himself states ‘I’m doing a job that suits 
me for the time being, not for the future’ – there is no aspiration of a future within Uber – no accrual 
of capitals that Bourdieu’s (1986) subject can utilise to advance further in the market. As Skeggs 
(2004a, p. 71) argues, we need to understand ‘how some people can only be exploited. They are forced 
to enter the labour market with little value that offers minuscule possibilities for accrual over time. In 
fact, their value may depreciate’ – by showing how value is transferred from drivers in the Uber market 
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to the platform, I aim to do that. What is particularly important, is the fact that this form of value 
extraction is built into the structural model of these non-competitive platforms. 
 
This finding is important because it shows that these subjects do produce value that goes beyond 
simply driving, they put additional forms of capital to work and provide exceptional customer service. 
But they are unable to be economically rewarded for these additional provisions because the platform 
continues to recognise them as simply providing their immediate and replaceable labour time. 
Ravenelle (2019) argues that Uber has a low skill barrier, but drivers in my sample seemed to have an 
expertise for customer service that was equivalent to those of many AirBnB hosts that I spoke to. I 
want to recognise that Uber drivers do have a range of capitals that are utilised to produce a great 
deal of value in the economy – but this value is stripped away from the drivers by the platform.  
 
6.5 – Abjection, discrimination and increase risk  
In chapter 4, I argued that drivers were already exposed to high levels of risk because of their lack of 
capital and, in many cases, high amounts of debt. This effect is further compounded by the rating and 
review system that seeks to extract value from workers through disciplinary mechanisms.  
 
Darnell, who is an Uber driver and a trade union representative for other drivers, told me about a case 
he represented where another driver was unexpectedly terminated from the platform and notified 
that because of a passenger complaint a report has been passed to the police. The incident that caused 
this termination, it later turned out, was the driver refusing to let a drunk passenger connect his phone 
to the car’s radio to play music. But originally, Uber did not release details of the complaint. As Darnell 
told me:  
I contacted the police officer – a week later they came back to me and they said: “well, we’ve 
investigated, we’ve finally contacted the passenger. The passenger said yes, they could 
remember doing something and reporting the driver to Uber, but they were so drunk they 
couldn’t remember what it was about!” … We’ve gone back to Uber and said the police have 
said no further action; who is going to pay for all these expenses through the time that he was 
suspended from your system? … Uber have said well we’re switching him off our system, we’re 
cancelling this contract. 
 
This case highlights the precarity of an Uber driver. One customer report, even if proven to be 
inaccurate or misleading, can cause a driver to lose all income possibilities. Not only does Uber 
produce forms of subjectivity where the accrual of value is not possible because it is transferred to 
the platform – but the platform reemphasises drivers as valueless and disposable, asserting a 
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diciplinary power (cf. Foucault 1984). These workers, I argue, are abjected – denied the possibilities 
of personhood that are afforded to the majority. What I want to argue is that, by exploiting drivers 
and denying them their capacity to accrue value and become subjects (in Bourdieu’s (1986) sense), 
they are also abjecting them. This is a form of conditionality which allows for capitalist exploitation 
through the disposability and replaceability of the labourer. 
 
Because drivers in this study were fearful of bad feedback from customers (and the subsequent loss 
of income that could follow), they accepted situations that made them uncomfortable or put them at 
high risk. The platform design which positions the customer as a manager has wide ranging 
implications.  
 
6.5.1 – Racial Intersections 
While all of the drivers on Uber that I spoke to have their value misrecognised on the platform, this 
appeared to be a particular issue for BAME “entrepreneurs”. As Bourdieu’s (1986) theorisation of 
subjectivity falls short of explaining how value extraction works through misrecognition of value (some 
argue his work goes so far as to reinforces this (Skeggs 2004b). It also falls short of providing insights 
into how misrecognition of value in the market is also often a racialised process – a key 
intersectionality between class and race. As Crenshaw (1991) suggests, intersectionality results in a 
different, or more server outcome, for those who exist are subject to multiple forms of disadvantage. 
In this case, class and racial disadvantage come together to strengthen the process of value 
misrecognition on the platform.  
 
Mike, a white-British driver spoke of how customers would tell him that they enjoyed being driven by 
a white-British driver; he believes that being white has given him a distinct privilege (a misrecognition 
of value) in his ratings: 
People used to compliment me on my high rating, they’d say, “you’ve got a very high rating. They 
say, why is that?” And I say, “well, because I’m White and English, basically!” Unfortunately, it 
was the truth. When working people would, obviously, chat to me and everything like that 
because I was English. And they’d say, “oh, it was nice to be driven round by an English person”. 
Mike goes further to suggest that the low ratings he has received from customers have occurred in 
instances when he has called out customers for racism: 
I rather cockily sort of went into that thinking, well, I’m just going to have a five-star rating, ha, 
ha, ha. And then basically sort of discovered that, actually, quite a lot of customers are just 
arseholes, anyway. They don’t say that they’re going to give you a bad rating because you don’t 
agree with their racist comments and things like that. But what are you going to do? 
 102 
Mike’s experiences with his customers raise important issues with regards to the rating system.  
 
Mike’s deductions appear to match the experiences of Issam, a British Asian driver who has 
experienced racist conversations with guests on a number of occasions while driving: 
This guy, he was a very English, typical English guy, very elderly. We were having a great 
conversation on the way to his son’s house. He was telling me he was something like 70 years 
old or something and then he became very arrogant in his conversation saying that, there are 
no more English-speaking people in this country. I was like, “I’m speaking English to you”. He 
was like, “no, not you. Going to a bus stop, there are no English people; I’ve gone to this retail 
shop, there are no English people”. Then, he turned the tables around to type of skin colour, 
then I said to him, “look, my great grandfathers came and supported the country. Where do 
you want me to go?” 
These experiences showcase the extra pressures that face BAME drivers. Racism and xenophobia 
around “speaking English” is well documented in the literature that looks at London (Lisiak, Back, & 
Jackson, 2019). When customers connect value to racial identity (as they appear to do in both Mike 
and Issam’s examples), they show the potential of rating systems to reaffirm racial bias and 
misrecognise value in the subject; constituting a racialised class process.  
 
6.5.2 – Sexual assault  
This dynamic of devaluing the replicable driver, while privileging the customer as a manager, comes 
together to provide a significant power relationship between the driver and any customer they serve. 
One Uber driver, Sebastian, described a troubling incident that occurred while driving two women 
home: 
It was probably 11 pm, or 12, or something like that … they get in and then they start flirting 
with me, and they start touching me, and then they start requesting: “please, I know you have 
a nice part in there … so please show me, show us, show us, please come on, just a little tiny 
bit or something like that”, and they keep continuing, saying sexual things … I know they were 
high, or they were drunk … But then they start touching me, and that’s where I start feeling 
really uncomfortable … I got scared because I didn’t know what’s going to happen. 
 While Sebastian was able to get the women to leave his car, he remained anxious about potential 
implications that might emerge from dropping off a customer early and getting into a disagreement 
with a customer. Uber’s record for taking the side of the customer and for suspending drivers without 
any space for appeal leaves drivers in a vulnerable position where any action that upsets a customer 
could lead to a loss of their primary income source. This leads to drivers simply accepting verbal, racial 
and sexual abuse as part of the job in order to avoid low ratings or complaints.  
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6.6 – Unequal subjects “without value” 
In the previous chapter, I started answering the research question of how cultural and social capitals 
are put to work by looking at AirBnB as a competitive market platform. I found that, within that 
platform environment, cultural and social capitals allow “entrepreneurs” to set themselves apart by 
accruing the types of capital that are seen as valuable – I pointed out that Bourdieu’s (1986) form of 
capital accruing subjectivity is able to explain many of the experiences that occur on the platform. I 
also noted how this has the potential to increase inequalities by reaffirming dominant symbolic 
judgement, which can leave those disadvantaged by their class position behind, along with those from 
minority groups who frequently get misrecognised as lacking in value. It is through these mechanisms 
that symbolic inequalities play out on AirBnB as a competitive market platform.  
 
In this chapter, I switched attention from the competitive platform of AirBnB, to the non-competitive 
platforms within my study, Uber and Amazon Flex, where inequalities function differently. These 
platforms, I have argued, attract those who have had some difficulty putting their cultural and social 
capitals to work for economic gain elsewhere in the economy. Unlike AirBnB, where there is a clear 
potential for hosts (with the right forms of cultural capital) to set themselves apart as being valuable, 
these non-competitive platforms start from a position where every “entrepreneur’s” position is 
limited to a provision of their labour – and, therefore, they are replaceable. On these platforms, every 
worker is misrecognised as lacking any economically recognisable value beyond that attributed to 
their immediate provision of (what is seen to be) unskilled labour. The companies implement a 
disciplinary surveillance system that, rather than recognising value economically, puts “entrepreneurs” 
under a constant threat of deactivation. While “entrepreneurs” on these platforms struggle to provide 
a high level of customer service, putting forward a range of capitals, they do not receive any economic 
reward for doing so beyond being allowed to continue working. The value that drivers provide in their 
customer service skills and learned efficiency, built upon layers of capital, is therefore extracted by 
the platform. Uber and Amazon Flex benefit from the cultural capitals of their workers without 
compensating this or recognising it economically. For this reason, I argue, we need to go back to the 
understandings of class as relations of exploitation put forward by Marx (1887) and built upon by 
Skeggs (2004b). Rather than an analytical perspective that sees how forms of capital produce 
differences in income, the need here is for a focus on how “entrepreneurs” are collectively devalued 
and exploited.  The “entrepreneurs” I spoke to often tolerate this misrecognition and value extraction 
because they are used to it – they are misrecognised and have value stripped from them elsewhere in 
the economy, in their previous jobs, in periods of unemployment and through mechanisms of debt 
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which erode their futures. Once again, I point to a need to shift from “gig economy” exceptionalism – 
these processes of value extraction exist more widely in the neoliberal economy (Crouch, 2019).  
 
I have argued further that these platforms create significant risk for the “entrepreneurs”, not only 
from their lack of economic alternatives and dependency (discussed both earlier in this chapter and 
in chapter 4), but also from the fact that they remain disposable labourers – misrecognised as being 
unskilled and valueless. This misrecognition produces vulnerability to risk through abjection – by 
producing the “entrepreneur” as something less than human who is exposed, in the examples 
discussed here, to racist hate speech and sexual assault. That is to say, the classed relationships 
combine with racial and sexual inequalities to produce additional vulnerabilities. As discussed in 
relation to Skeggs (2019) intersectional approach to class in section 2.7, capitalism produces a complex 
intersection of forces that make and unmake value as they materialise upon bodies.  
 
While much of the theory on the “gig economy” talks about capitals in relation to access barriers and 
chances of success (Ravenelle, 2019; J. B. Schor & Attwood-Charles, 2017), I have taken a more specific 
approach that emerges from seeing the platforms as playing a more active role in the production of 
“entrepreneur” subjectivity in relation to cultural and social capitals. Whether this is a competitive 
platform that produces competitive economic agents, or a non-competitive platform which 
symbolically strips value from the “entrepreneur” as a way of extracting economic profit from their 
labour and capitals, I have aimed to show the importance of the platform in producing the subject – 
in positioning, shaping and representing their value. Importantly, I have now shown a clear division 
between platforms based upon the level of competitivity afforded between “entrepreneurs”. Overall, 
I am arguing that this division is theoretically important for understanding how class works in the “gig 
economy”. While competitive platforms offer an environment where Bourdieu’s (1986) theorised 
subject has a great deal of explanatory power for understanding inequalities, this largely falls apart on 
non-competitive platforms. I have therefore argued that these platforms require a different 
theoretical toolkit for understanding class inequality – one which looks at devaluation as a means to 
prime subjects for value extraction. Overall, I have aimed to establish a theoretically important 
distinction between platforms based on their level of competitiveness as a means of understanding 








7 – Conclusions  
The terminology of the “gig” and “sharing” economy has found a great deal of public attention in 
recent years. While scholars have been attempting to define it within meaningful conceptual and 
theoretical scopes, there remain many unanswered questions. Scholars such as Schor (2017) have 
pointed out that research is needed to determine if people with differing economic or educational 
resources generate different outcomes from the use of “gig economy” platforms. It is in response to 
these unknowns that this project emerged. This thesis began by approaching the “gig economy” using 
the theoretical framework proposed by Bourdieu (1986) to look at how inequalities are (re)produced 
– why some succeed while others fall behind because of pre-existing class difference. It did this by 
breaking the approach down into economic, cultural and social forms of capital across the two 
research questions:  
• How do relations of economic capital, labour and debt present themselves within the platform 
economy?  
• How are cultural and social capitals put to work in the platform economy?  
 
From these two questions, five key findings emerged. First, the analysis of the economic relations of 
capital, labour and debt revealed that debt plays an important role in producing a high level of 
dependency among some “entrepreneurs”, and this is sometimes actively produced by the platform 
itself. Second, economic capital appears to have a particular value among these platforms, allowing 
some “entrepreneurs” to earn money without offering much, if any, of their labour. Third, my analysis 
also shows that cultural and social capitals have a similar impact compared to economic capitals, 
increasing income and reducing labour time requirements, but only on competitive market platforms 
(such as AirBnB) which recognise and reward them. Fourth, non-competitive market platforms (such 
as Uber and Amazon Flex) in this study did not provide substantial opportunities for “entrepreneurs” 
to receive a personal economic benefit from their cultural and social capitals, instead the value of 
these capitals appeared to be extracted by the platform itself. Finally, emerging from a combination 
of these four findings, there is a strong mechanistic potential within the “gig economy” for existing 
inequalities between those with and those without forms of capital to pull further apart, as those with 
capital are able to get ahead while those without fall towards greater indebtedness. As a result of this, 
I argue that we need to be much more precise in terms of defining how the platforms that fall under 
the title of the “gig economy” not only exploit labour, but also extract value from capitals, as well as 
indebt “entrepreneurs” and therefore gaining control over their future labour.  
 
In this chapter, I will begin by expanding upon each of these five findings in more detail, relating them 
to their theoretical implications as well as more broader considerations that arise. I then draw these 
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findings together and offer a conceptual model of how existing theoretical understandings of class 
map onto the “gig economy” based on the different types of capitalist relations which appear 
throughout the platforms addressed in this study. Afterwards, I offer three policy recommendations 
which have emerged from this thesis, all of which offer some form of a practical solution to one or 
more of the problems raised by “entrepreneurs”. Finally, then, I summarise with some of the 
limitations and notes for further research that emerge from the project.  
 
7.1 – The importance of economic capital  
Platforms in this study can be divided by either a predominant marketing of labour or capital. An Uber 
driver, for instance, can never escape the requirement of labour to utilise the platform – but they can 
escape the requirement of up-front capital by utilising debt and financial products to obtain a car. On 
the other hand, an AirBnB host generally requires some form of surplus sleeping space – but they are 
able to escape the labour requirement of the platform through outsourcing if they have sufficient 
economic capital. 
 
Across all platforms, forms of risk and labour requirements could be reduced in some way with 
economic capital. Uber drivers who own an eligible car would not need to get into the debt traps 
discussed previously, for instance; and while some AirBnB hosts avoided the capital requirements of 
the platform by sub-letting sleeping space (either with or without permission), this generally came 
with a higher degree of risk. In these ways, a lack of economic capital led to a riskier and more labour-
intensive experience for “entrepreneurs” in this study. Another way in which hosts could theoretically 
avoid some of this capital barrier is through mortgaging. However, none of the hosts in this study had 
obtained a property through a mortgage for the specific purpose of hosting. It is also important to 
remember that a mortgage, as an asset backed debt, does not necessarily produce the same types of 
risks and obligations on labour as other types of debt (such as those many Uber drivers I spoke to 
faced, discussed later). Nor does a mortgage tie an “entrepreneur” to the platform, as a property can 
be marketed without any intermediary platform on the long-term lettings market.  
 
In this thesis, I have noted that those who have access to the type of capital needed to use AirBnB are 
predominantly White-British (see 3.4.1), constituting an intersectional complication which could be 
studied further in the future. Gendered divisions also emerged quite prominently among AirBnB hosts 
in this study (see Maier, 2019b, 2019a and Maier and Gilchrist 2020) – specifically it was found that 
the vast majority of AirBnB labour in my sample was conducted by women, who often faced gendered 
risks when hosting. Those who made use of cleaners or hired property management often realised a 
devaluation of labour against the capital share of income. That is to say: property owners considered 
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their property to be the source of income, rather than the labour required to maintain it on the market 
(this is expanded upon elsewhere Maier (2019b)) - Labour was devalued in relation to capital. This 
labour was, in my sample, gendered – with women doing the majority of the work.  
 
The majority of AirBnB hosts in this study already have succeeded economically before, using the 
platform because of their access to capitals. However, there is evidence that economic capital is 
particularly privileged on AirBnB compared to traditional markets. As discussed in 4.4, hosts described 
AirBnB as a monopoly with a distinct economic advantage in the short-term lettings market, hosts in 
this study discussed how this allowed them to earn more from their capital than they would be able 
to on other platforms or in traditional rental markets (where rates tend to be lower) – but at the same 
time it meant that leaving AirBnB would result in a reduced income, tying them into the platform.  
 
While other scholars have talked about an importance of resources for determining different 
experiences in the “gig economy” (Ravenelle, 2017, 2019; J. B. Schor & Attwood-Charles, 2017), what 
I have offered here is a more specific understanding of the mechanisms that appear to be behind 
these differences. In particular, differences between labour and capital focused platforms, where 
economic resources are utilised differently; as well as within platforms where economic resources 
work in a range of ways to change the “entrepreneur’s” relationship to risk and how they exchange 
their labour.   
 
7.2 – The importance of debt 
Going beyond the literature which has discussed the precarity of “gig economy” work, I argue that this 
precarity is often structured by debt. In my thesis, I show how most of the Uber drivers I spoke to are 
connected to the platform through debt traps which serve as obligations on their future labour. While 
others (Schor & Attwood-Charles, 2017) have found the level of dependency on the income that a 
platform provides to be a key factor in perception of the platform, I argue that the terminology of 
dependency requires greater specificity. We should bring the focus to more specific underlying socio-
economic relations of capital, labour and debt that produce various forms and extents of dependency. 
Rather than seeing a subject (the Uber driver) as simply being dependent on the income that they 
receive from the platform, I argue we should see how their relationship with the platform produces 
dependency though debt “traps” that extenuate existing inequalities by disproportionately affecting 
those who enter the gig-economy with the least capital available to them – these “entrepreneurs” see 
a reduced income from their labour due to the debt repayments that they are required to service.  
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I have theorised this relationship through Lazzarato’s (2012) conceptualisation of indebted subjectivity, 
which shows how debt works as a means to control the future labour of the worker. In this case, debt 
works as a means to tie the “entrepreneur” to the platform, reducing the risk for the latter while 
increasing it for the former. Lazzarato’s (2012) theorisation here expands upon Marx’s (1887) theories 
of debt as a mechanism of class struggle, building upon the idea that labour exploitation can expand 
outside of the immediate moment as the subject becomes a subject of debt. This perspective adds a 
meaningful dimension to understandings of exploitation in the “gig economy” by showing how the 
balance of power in the labour relations underpinning the platform is shaped unequally.  
 
The digital platform economy has been widely recognised for its trajectory, expanding into unmapped 
regulatory space faster than policy is able to react (Katz, 2015). The relationship between Uber and its 
drivers explored in this paper appear to constitute a new and unrecognised form of indentured 
servitude. The notion of indentured servitude, where workers are bound through debt to their 
employer, is not new. Graeber (2014) traces a thorough history of debt and notes indentured 
servitude emerging at many points in time, though it is often now illegal. But this recognition of 
indentured servitude relies upon an employer who is simultaneously a creditor, and an employee who 
is simultaneously a debtor – a specific relationship that has been avoided by the type of corporate 
structure that Uber have utilised.  
 
Many came to Uber because they had little other choice – the platform attracts those who are often 
excluded from traditional labour markets. It then encourages them into sub-prime lending(Rosenblat, 
2018). While this sub-prime lending does not, theoretically, limit them to working for Uber –in practice 
it often does because Uber is the dominant operator in London’s private hire market; if a driver has 
established themselves with a private hire vehicle on finance, then their best chance of getting work 
to make payments on the vehicle is by using Uber’s platform. In this way, the power of Uber’s position 
in the market limits the free exchange of labour.  This, I argue, constitutes a new form of indentured 
labour that operates through complex legal distinctions and free-market ideology. What is signalled 
as a move towards liberalisation (the free “entrepreneur” who chooses how and when they work), is 
for these Uber drivers instead a move towards market authoritarianism – as they become trapped 
through mechanisms of debt.  
 
As Graeber argues, ‘there’s no better way to justify relations founded by violence, to make such 
relations seem moral, than by reframing them in the language of debt – above all, because it 
immediately makes it seem that it’s the victim who’s doing something wrong’ (2014, p. 5). The 
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language of the free market, which Uber adopt throughout their public relations, suggests that drivers 
choose freely to drive for them, and liberally opt to take on debts – in this discourse, drivers are 
presented as the blameful party for their situation. The reality is that drivers are usually doing 
everything that they can to avoid destitution, working long hours and taking home little pay. At the 
same time, the platform benefits from commissions both on their labour and on credit sold to them. 
By having a pool of drivers bound to debt, the platform maintains a labour force that is always 
available, on demand, to make their platform appealing to customers who can, at any given moment, 
order an Uber.  
 
7.3 – The importance of cultural capitals  
Bourdieu (1986) proposed a form of subjectivity based around the accrual of capitals which result in 
economic advantage, the unequal distribution of these forms of capital is a key mechanism that drives 
inequality. I have argued throughout chapter 5 that AirBnB’s platform provides a marketplace within 
which hosts accrue capitals that become recognised through ratings and “Superhost” status, in turn 
these provide an economic advantage on the platform. Both Uber and Flex drivers found some ways 
to increase their earnings through the attainment of particular forms of knowledge and skill (forms of 
embodied cultural capital) – but in comparison to AirBnB this was limited. The role of the platform is 
important here – for providing different framings of the “entrepreneur’s” subjectivity. A competitive 
market platform like AirBnB allows “entrepreneurs” to utilise their forms of cultural and social capital 
to set themselves apart, while, as discussed in the following section, non-competitive platforms limit 
the utilisation of cultural and social capitals as a means to enhance their income.  
 
As with the distinction found between capital and labour leaning platforms, the distinction between 
types of platform (competitive vs non-competitive) appears to be a key contribution here. While 
others have made general connections between resources and success on “gig economy” platforms 
(Ravenelle, 2017, 2019; J. B. Schor & Attwood-Charles, 2017), I have attempted to go a step further 
by understanding how these mechanisms for resource utilisation relate to different platform designs. 
I, therefore, argue we have to be more specific about where and how these types of resource have 
value within the “gig economy”. Here they are found to have value on competitive market platforms, 
like AirBnB, where “entrepreneurs” with the right forms of capital and symbolic power are able to 
distinguish themselves within the market.  
 
7.4 – Platforms that limit capital accruing subjectivity  
The inability for some to distinguish themselves utilising capitals is not a new phenomenon. As Skeggs 
(2004b) has argued, this can be traced back historically to points of imperialism and class differences 
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where some were able to be seen as possessive individuals who own objects of exchange value and 
control the qualities embedded into their bodies, against others who did not have the same capacity 
given in their subjectivity – who would often be reduced to their labour. Building upon Skeggs’ work 
which shows that not all people are able to “play the game” of capital accruing subjectivity that 
Bourdieu proposed, I addressed the role of “gig economy” platforms in the shaping of this subjectivity.  
 
The platforms of Amazon Flex and Uber limited capital accruing subjectivity by denying opportunities 
for economic returns from cultural and social capitals. While some Flex workers were able to use 
certain skillsets to set themselves apart, and uber drivers targeted their hours and location of activity 
for those they found to be most profitable, these had only a limited impact and agency on the overall 
economic gain they were able to receive. Overall, the platform structures their “entrepreneurs” as 
replaceable subjects who are maintained by a disciplinary rating system that serves to extract 
additional value from them. While scholars (Rosenblat & Stark, 2016) have talked about the role of 
the Uber rating system in controlling and altering driver behaviour, I link this to the underlying 
economic relations that utilise this control to extract value while maintaining the driver as a disposable 
labourer – misrecognising them as valueless through the given incapacity that stops them from 
accruing value. This stops them from accruing power within the platform-driver relationship, and 
within the economy more generally.  
 
It is important to note that majority of Uber drivers come from minority groups. There appears to be 
an intersectional link where class and race combine to compound inequalities in that racialised 
minorities are disproportionately exposed to these forms of exploitative labour relationship. I also 
noted instances where Uber drivers faced direct racial discrimination while driving, and that the 
platform itself often increases the risk of racial discrimination through its classed positioning of drivers.  
 
7.5 – Platforms will widen economic inequalities in both directions  
In the previous 4 sections I outlined how, within the “gig economy”, those without economic capital 
often end up in debt, whereas those with substantial economic capital are able to get higher returns 
than they would in traditional markets, those with valued resources are able to pull ahead further on 
competitive market platforms and, finally, those restricted to non-competitive labour platforms are 
unable to accrue value in themselves. Together, these arguments present an image of growing 
inequalities in the “gig economy”, precisely because those with capitals pull ahead and those without 
fall further behind, in line with the well-known “Matthew Effect”, where the rich get richer while the 
poor become increasingly destitute. Marx (1887) and Bourdieu’s (1986) work offers insights into the 
underlying class processes that drive this effect; the former by showing how the owners of capital 
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extract value from the labour of other workers, the latter showing how those with the most forms of 
capital are able to get the best economic returns from markets.  
 
Piketty’s work, that reached prominence in Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2014), highlighted the 
growing importance of capital inequalities in the present era. Piketty argues that the rate of return on 
capital regularly exceeds the rate of growth in an economy, and when this occurs, capital accumulates 
among a wealthy few. Earlier in this thesis I presented a counter argument by Sundararajan (2016) 
wherein he claims that the “sharing economy” may allow more people to see return on their capital – 
citing the example of Funding Circle as an opportunity for people to invest smaller amounts of money. 
My thesis has highlighted that this type of opportunity does not seem well represented among the 
case studies I investigated. While it is true that some AirBnB hosts use the platform to rent a room in 
their property as a way to get by, it is seldom the case that this wouldn’t be replaceable with 
traditional lodging. The “entrepreneurs” I spoke to who are excluded from traditional ways of utilising 
capital for income (predominantly Uber and Flex drivers in this study) remained excluded from this 
type of economic activity. Further, they seemed to be exposed to increased obligations of debt.  
Therefore, Sundararajan’s optimism for these platforms seems to have not been realised. Piketty’s 
argument, that the benefits of economic growth disproportionally go to those with capital, appears 
hold in relation to the findings of this study.  
 
Overall, my thesis has shown the division between capital and labour growing on AirBnB, Uber and 
Amazon Flex. While AirBnB offers increased possibilities for return on capital, Uber and Amazon Flex 
showcase value extraction and subjects where are not able to accrue value in themselves. The 
platforms I have investigated have a detrimental effect on inequality– by providing more opportunities 
for capital return to be increased while simultaneously pushing down possibilities for labour. As the 
“gig economy” grows and expands, without substantial policy interventions, it is highly likely that 
these types of inequality will increase.  
 
7.6 – Theoretical implications  
This thesis offers a theorisation of class in the “gig economy” that brings a number of approaches into 
a point of confluence. Labour exploitation is at the core of many theoretical inquiries into the “gig 
economy” (Hill, 2015; Rosenblat, 2018; Rosenblat & Stark, 2016; Woodcock & Graham, 2020), often 
building directly upon Marx’s approach to productive capitalism. This approach is particularly useful 
for understanding how platform owners exploit the labour of those who use the platforms as a way 
to earn money. In this thesis, I have also drawn on theorists who have developed outwards from 
Marxist conceptualisations of class to produce a range of insights into classed subjectivity.  Bourdieu 
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(1986) expands from Marx by offering a theory of capital accruing subjectivity – in this context the 
concept of capital is expanded beyond what Marx envisioned, complicating also the binary between 
the owner of capital and the labourer noted in Marx’s model of productivity. In Bourdieu’s 
conceptualisation, any product of labour which can be realised for some return within markets of 
exchange can count as capital. This approach has been highly influential in sociological study over 
recent years for explaining gradations of class inequality that exist across a population, rather than 
the distinct positionalities of class noted by Marx – it is particularly useful for understanding how the 
middle class and working class come to be economically separate, despite neither usually having 
access to the types of capital that Marx was referring to. Further to this, I draw insights from Skeggs 
(2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2015) and Tyler (2013, 2015) for their theorisations of working class subjectivity, 
abjection and symbolic violence as a means of exploitation. Unlike Bourdieu, Skeggs and Tyler retain 
a focus on Marx’s interest in class difference as a means of exploitation, rather than as an explanation 
of how people end up in different positions in society. They investigate this difference by looking at 
how cultural and social differences are utilised as a means of exploitation, by symbolically presenting 
the abjected working class as lacking in value and therefore legitimising low pay and exploitative 
conditions. Finally, I draw upon Lazzarato (2012, 2015) for his insights into indebted subjectivity. 
Lazzarato builds upon Marx’s (1887) insights into debtor relations as a form of class relations, to show 
debt as a claim upon future labour that produces subjectivities. These strands, while all building upon 
Marxist ideas, offer somewhat divergent ways of approaching class. What this thesis shows is that 
these strands must be pulled back together in order to derive a full theoretical understanding of class 
in the “gig economy”.  
 
One of the inherent challenges that emerges in trying to conceptualise the “gig economy” for class 
analysis is the diversity of platforms. As I found in this thesis: Lazzarato’s (2012) theories of indebted 
subjectivity provide crucial insights into Uber drivers, but not so much for AirBnB hosts who do not 
always have any requirements placed on their labour. For the latter case, Bourdieu’s (1986) theories 
of capital accruing subjectivity allow an understanding of how certain hosts set themselves apart using 
the cultural and social capitals on the platform and achieve economic success when these are 
symbolically recognised. Where workers cannot set themselves apart in the market, on non-
competitive market platforms, the explanatory power of Bourdieu’s theorisation of subjectivity starts 
to fall apart; but the work of Skeggs (2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2015) and Tyler (2013, 2015) become more 
valuable because they show how workers can become collectively portrayed as lacking in value and, 
subsequently, how this is utilised as a means of legitimising exploitation.  
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I began this research project believing that “gig economy” platforms could largely be divided between 
those which are focused on putting forms of capital to work (such as AirBnB) and those which were 
more about labour (such as Uber and Amazon Flex). This division between capital and labour platforms 
hasn’t really been explored in any detail – but I was hopeful that it could offer interesting theoretical 
insights into how class operates in the “gig economy”, in particular with regards to growing gaps 
between capital and labour in our economy that Piketty notes (2014). What I discovered was that 
some labour platforms, such as Uber, complicate this division between capital and labour further by 
making drivers promise their future labour to the platform. In many ways, this constitutes the 
theoretical opposite to capital: rather than being accumulated past labour, debt works as a claim on 
future labour. In attempting to make sense of these theoretical complexities, I came to conceptualise 
the “gig economy” as broadly putting to work various amounts of debt, labour and capital. Platforms 
occupy a range of conceptual possibilities along these three axes that clarify what economic 
mechanisms are taking place. An Uber driver, for instance, can never escape from the requirement to 
provide their labour while using the platform to seek an income. They have some forms of capital, 
including the skills required to be a driver, but often they also have high amounts of debt. By examining 
each of these three axes we can begin to unpick a range classed processes at work. An AirBnB host 
can escape all labour requirements, if they have sufficient capital to outsource the managing of their 
properties; but a host with less capital will have to perform much more labour. In this way there is a 
double articulation taking place: the platform provides a range of possible positions across these three 
axes, and an individual “entrepreneur” will sit somewhere within that range.  
 
However, these divisions alone do not explain all of the class processes that emerged from my 
interview data. In trying to understand the symbolic nature of class, why some are valued and 
rewarded while others are devalued and exploited based on their forms of capital, I came to 
understand a difference in how power operates across platforms based upon variation in the level of 
competitiveness. In chapter 5 and 6, I drew out the distinction between competitive and non-
competitive platforms, showing how forms of capital, as well as labour, appear to work differently 
across these contexts and require different theoretical tools based on this difference. The lack of a 
competitive market between drivers on Amazon Flex or Uber means that they cannot (to any great 
extent) utilise skill development as a way to increase their income potential; on the other hand AirBnB 
hosts may accrue hospitality skillsets as a means to increase their ability to earn money through the 
platform. This difference brings back the theoretical discussions from chapter 2 in terms of how 
symbolic power operates. There was, for instance, evidence of distinction taking place among hosts 
on AirBnB’s competitive market, indicating an articulation of power between “entrepreneurs” trying 
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to set themselves apart (fitting in to Bourdieu’s (2013) theorisation of symbolic capital). But for those 
utilising non-competitive platforms, like Uber and Amazon Flex, symbolic capital explains very little in 
terms of how “entrepreneurs” get systematically devalued as a collective. For these examples, insights 
into broader power relationships become important. Here more understanding can be gained by 
utilising Skeggs (2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2015) approach to class which allows for a less individualised 
idea of symbolic positioning, in many ways staying closer to the ideas of classed groups put forward 
by Marx (2008). Here the symbolic violence takes place not between individuals in acts of distinction, 
but rather on industrial scale through the design of a platform that strips value from its 
“entrepreneurs”. Bourdieu’s (1986, 2013) approach to class is focused a subject who can accrue 
capitals to set themselves apart in a market to gain opportunities – whereas the approach that Skeggs 
puts forward (2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2015) is more about understanding those who have value 
extracted away from them, who are unable to compete and set themselves apart because of a 
positioning within material and symbolic class relations that makes this an impossibility.  
 
This way of seeing the “gig economy” highlights the need for a more nuanced theoretical approach to 
class in the “gig economy”. A more traditional Marxist approach to labour exploitation would look 
only at labour exploitation, without looking at how an individual’s forms of cultural and social capital 
might position them within labour markets, without looking at the role of debt, without understanding 
the symbolic nature of class.  Instead, the complexity of the “gig economy” crosses multiple aspects 
of capitalism and, in the same way, multiple theoretical approaches to understanding classed relations. 
The output of this thesis is, therefore, not one overarching theory of class in the “gig economy”, but 
rather a conceptual model which renders the “gig economy” theoretically tangible, that points 
towards the types of theoretical interpretation which might be most useful for understanding 
experiences that sit at different ends of a complex and dynamic object of study. This conceptual map 
of the “gig economy” allows for a nuanced and contextualised analysis, that breaks away from the 
idea of the “gig economy” being a clear conceptual category with one form of theoretical analysis and 
instead embraces the ambiguity of platforms that have come to be known by the colloquial title.  
 
7.7 – Policy Recommendations  
Following on from the findings of this study, I highlight three specific practical measures which could 
be implemented to benefit those most negatively impacted by the “gig economy” and bring about a 
more equal range of outcomes.  
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7.7.1 – Uber driver debt 
Uber driver protests are becoming more commonplace in London as drivers have begun to form 
unions and be more vocal about the rights that they expect. As the BBC reported, these protests often 
make reference to commission rates: ‘The IWGB in the UK said it would like Uber's commissions to be 
reduced from 25% to 15% and for fares to be increased to £2 a mile from about £1.25’ (2019). This 
desire for drivers to have less of their labour value extracted by the platform is understandable, as 
many drivers in this study had to work excessive hours in order to get by each week. But one aspect 
that is rarely dealt with by these protests is that of the debt trap that Uber brings to its drivers. This 
may be because the problem is a more complex one to address.  
 
Simply stopping lines of credit for drivers will mean that many of them are unable to work (see 4.2), 
many of the drivers in this study would not be able to earn an income at all without access to this form 
of capital. If we are to accept that Uber drivers are self-employed, as the platform argues, then Uber 
could work to provide cars at preferred rates by underwriting some of the risks themselves (so that 
less of a driver’s income goes to servicing debts). This could also be accompanied by terms which allow 
for drivers to exit the contract more immediately – to avoid the debt trap that drivers told me about 
(see 4.2).  
 
If drivers are recognised as workers, as The Supreme Court has argued some are, then the situation 
changes due to their rights to a national minimum wage after allowable expenses. The liability for the 
car payments could therefore fall onto Uber themselves. At the time of writing (March 2021), Uber is 
arguing that the Supreme Court ruling applies only to a limited number of drivers who used the 
platform in the past, and that current drivers are still self-employed. It is currently unclear how 
matters will unfold over the coming months – but if recognition of Uber drivers as workers were to be 
achieved more broadly, the issue of Uber driver debt may change.   
 
7.7.2 – Being valued on non-competitive labour platforms  
As mentioned earlier in this thesis, one of the main weakness of non-competitive platforms (from the 
stance of their “entrepreneurs”) is the lack of recognition that “entrepreneurs” obtain for their 
continued service. Drivers who worked on these platforms for years remain ephemeral and atomised 
units in a business model that continues to threaten them with deactivation. This disposability, also 
fed by a steady supply of labour, is heavily felt by drivers and it maintains their precarity and 
vulnerability. Platforms could go beyond this by taking further steps to offer drivers increased levels 
of job security – especially for those who have used the platform for some time and have come to 
depend on the income that it provides.  
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While many labour movements around the “gig economy” have focused on the wish for drivers to 
become recognised as employees – and therefore eligible for basic labour rights – not all of the drivers 
who I spoke to seemed to support this idea at face value. There appeared to be a concern that if they 
became employees or recognised workers for Uber then they would no longer be able to choose when 
and where they work to the same extent that they do now. But this does not have to be the case – 
employees or workers may still benefit from flexible working and the ability to choose which hours 
they work. Labour movements that wish to put forward the idea of bringing driver labour in-house 
may have to focus on overcoming this knowledge gap in order to gain wider support from the driver 
base.  
 
There needs to be a clear picture of what in-house driver jobs would look like, and both the flexibility 
and rights that would accompany such a position. As the majority of drivers in this study had only 
experienced low-paid and precarious jobs in the past, they often had little experience of the rights, 
flexibility and benefits that white-collar workers are more accustomed to – this led many to accept 
that, while their conditions are exploitative, they would not be able to achieve anything better. This 
pessimism is understandable, Uber has done very little to improve the conditions of its drivers in the 
past. However, we should ensure that a better working condition that allows for flexibility, labour 
rights and job security does not escape the imagination of drivers – that it is never deemed an 
impossibility. The precarity that drivers experience is a choice made by Uber that passes liabilities and 
risks from themselves to the drivers; this choice can, with the right motivations, be changed. This 
should be a key focus of labour movements for “gig economy” workers.  
 
7.7.3 – Unpaid waiting time 
Amazon Flex workers in this study spent extensive amounts of their labour time refreshing the app in 
hopes of obtaining a block of work – in some cases this constituted hours per day. Unlike waiting time 
on Uber, where the driver would usually be strategically positioned in a zone where they expect jobs 
to occur in order to respond rapidly to requests, Flex blocks are usually made available well in advance 
and do not require the same readiness.  This problem could have a relatively straightforward 
technological fix if drivers were able, on a daily basis, to provide their availability in the app, and then 
were sent a push notification if a block became available during a time that they said they would be 
happy to work. They could then be given reasonable time (perhaps five minutes) to respond before 
the offer is sent to another driver. This change could lead to substantial increases in the time available 
to Flex drivers to pursue other activities, be that productive, educational or personal.  
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7.7.4 – Policies for a diverse host community 
Ravenelle (2019) argues that AirBnB hosts are renting their property, rather than “sharing” anything. 
This is true, in that the transaction is strictly economic. However, the empirical findings within this 
study found a high degree of diversity among AirBnB hosts based upon the mixture of labour, capital 
and debt that gets put to work. While hosts with large amounts of capital did adhere to rentier 
capitalist models of income seeking, there were also hosts who relied on AirBnB as a means to get by 
and pay their mortgage each month and contributed large amounts of labour to the platform. AirBnB 
hosts are a pluralistic group with a wide range of capitals and financial obligations. Rather than taking 
an overall stance on the platform being good or bad for the local economy and housing inequalities – 
a better approach might be to understand the different ways in which AirBnB is used by different 
stakeholders. Hosts in this study who rented out their spare room on the platform as a means to 
support themselves were keen to separate themselves from the image of the corporate host – an 
image which they felt dominated press coverage around the platform.  
 
Many corporate hosts already operate outside of the law. Renting out of an entire property (such as 
a whole apartment) on a short-term basis for more than 90 days per year constitutes a violation of 
planning regulations in London. However, this rule appears to be seldom enforced in the city. Despite 
AirBnB putting in place an automatic limitation on entire-property listings that have been booked for 
90 days per year in London, hosts in this study admitted to re-listing the property as if it were a 
different unit to get around this rule. It is also unclear if the underlying regulation is being enforced 
by the relevant authorities – hosts in this study told me that it was not. A first step in approaching 
AirBnB regulation would be to enforce pre-existing rules.  
 
There also needs to be a discussion on the use of AirBnB as an alternative to taking in a longer-term 
lodger for homeowners with spare space within their house. If a host is using AirBnB because their 
situation would not be suitable for a long-term lodger (for example, if a family member uses the room 
occasionally, or if they use it as a home office for some of the year etc.) then AirBnB may be a useful 
way of utilising the space. But if the host is fully booked with short term guests throughout the year, 
then it may be that AirBnB is reducing the available housing opportunities for people living and 
working in London. One way to address this divide could be to place a limit similar to the 90 day per 
year rule for entire property listings – but with a higher allowance. This study does not produce data 




7.8 – Limitations and Future Research  
This research was limited by a number of factors – largely related to the sampling. By looking at just 
three platforms, this study cannot claim to speak for the entirety of what might be called the “gig 
economy” (even if I do somewhat dismiss the notion of this being a clear conceptual category in itself). 
There were also more specific limitations in the people who I interviewed for this project, especially 
when the question of intersectionality arises. I did not, for instance, interview a sample of BAME 
AirBnB hosts, who might have more complex and nuanced class experiences than those which this 
project discusses. While most Uber drivers in London are male, women also drive for the platform – 
but were not interviewed for this study. Two were approached, but neither ended up participating in 
the study. There is a particular need to research how women might be more vulnerable to the risks of 
the classed positionality that Uber drivers face.  
 
In the decision matrix for choosing the platforms that this study addresses, I considered them all to 
be what Woodcock and Graham (2020, p. 43)  would refer to as ‘geographically tethered’ – that is to 
say, they don’t provide opportunities for globalised outsourcing of labour in the same way that a 
platform such as Fiverr might. The labour requirements of Uber, Amazon Flex and AirBnB must be met 
by workers who live within a commutable distance of where they work, and therefore foreign labour 
outsourcing, which benefits the consumer with lower rates of pay by attracting workers in “developing” 
economies, is not a predominant mechanism in itself here. However, this is not an entirely clear 
division.  
 
The fact that a majority of Uber drivers that I spoke to were first- or second-generation immigrants 
does somewhat complicate this picture; while I do not discuss this matter in detail within this thesis, 
more than one Uber driver informed me that they came to London specifically to earn a higher wage 
than they could in the country where they were born – suggesting that globalised labour disparities 
may still play a part in the makeup of geographically tethered platforms, especially those with lower 
capital barriers to entry. AirBnB constitutes a more confusing case study in this regard, and once again 
the economic division between capital and labour appears to play a part. While the platform does 
require at least some labour to be geographically tethered, the platform does not require the owner 
of the property to be the person who provides this labour. Hosts with substantial economic capital 
may live elsewhere in the world and simply hire local property management to deal with the 
geographically fixed labour requirements – freeing themselves to be globally mobile (hosts in this 
study such as Tony mentioned working overseas while still earning money from their AirBnB property 
in London). For these reasons, I argue that we need to think further about the role of geographic 
tethering in the “gig economy” and how this is linked to economic inequalities. A more interesting 
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question might be: who gets tethered? Uber drivers may be tethered in a country that they do not 
particularly wish to live in (as was the case for Lukasz), becoming separated from family members - 
but they are economically pressured into doing so. I believe that there is an interesting research 
project in more closely examining these questions.  
 
7.9 – A class perspective of the “gig economy” 
This thesis set out with the aim of examining class in the proverbial “gig economy” in way that goes 
beyond theories of labour exploitation alone. Class is a broad concept which looks not only at material 
exploitation, but also the mechanisms of legitimisation and symbolic framing that work on a broader 
scale to produce classed subjects. I have argued that class analysis of the “gig economy” must adopt 
a broader scope in order to understand the inequalities that platforms are built upon. This means 
understanding that debt is utilised by some platforms as a way of producing dependency. It also means 
that outcomes from the “gig economy” are often unequal, as those with more resources can avoid 
riskier work, and on competitive market platforms, receive the highest economic return. Platforms 
pass risk and low payed opportunities onto those with the least capacity to refuse work. Finally, we 
cannot ignore the underlying structures of many “gig economy” platforms which serve to symbolically 
devalue “entrepreneurs” as means to exploit profit from their labour and forms of capital. This 
symbolic aspect is powerful in that it legitimises exploitation on a broad scale; In this study it produced 
hopelessness among drivers and facilitated not only an economically difficult existence, but also 
instances of sexual and racial abuse. These perspectives allow a clear view that class in the “gig 
economy” is not just about exploiting pay, but about producing classed subjects more broadly and 
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Interview Participant Details 
 








Race/Ethnicity Education Homeowner 
Status  
AirBnB Alex Facebook M 1965 53 White Secondary 
School  
I have a mortgage 
on the house in 
which I live  
AirBnB Anna Snowball F 1968 50 American Indian 
or Alaska Native 
Undergraduate 
Degree 
I am a private 
tenant  
AirBnB Clara Facebook F 1956 62 White 6th 
form/College 
I own the house in 
which I live (no 
mortgage) 
AirBnB Eleonora Facebook F 1981 37 White Master's 
Degree 
I have a mortgage 
on the house in 
which I live  
AirBnB Hannah Facebook F 1966 52 White Undergraduate 
Degree 
I am a private 
tenant  
AirBnB James Facebook M 1986 32 White Undergraduate 
Degree 
I own the house in 
which I live (no 
mortgage) 
AirBnB Jane Facebook F 1963 55 White Master's 
Degree 
I own the house in 
which I live (no 
mortgage) 
AirBnB Jonathan  Snowball M 1977 41 White Undergraduate 
Degree 
I am a private 
tenant  
AirBnB Katie  Facebook F 1971 47 White Undergraduate 
Degree 
I have a mortgage 
on the house in 
which I live  
AirBnB Katrina Snowball F 1988 30 White Undergraduate 
Degree 
I am a private 
tenant  
AirBnB Kelly Facebook F 1960 58 White Undergraduate 
Degree 
I have a mortgage 
on the house in 
which I live  
AirBnB Marjorie Snowball F 1943 75 White PhD I own the house in 
which I live (no 
mortgage) 
AirBnB Nikki Facebook F 1952 66 White Undergraduate 
Degree 
I own the house in 
which I live (no 
mortgage) 
AirBnB Sandra Facebook F 1976 42 White Master's 
Degree 
I have a mortgage 
on the house in 
which I live  
AirBnB Lisa Snowball F 1962 56 White Master's 
Degree 
I have a mortgage 
on the house in 
which I live  
AirBnB Tanya Facebook F 1971 47 White 6th 
form/College 
I have a mortgage 
on the house in 
which I live  
AirBnB Tony Snowball M 1959 59 White Master's 
Degree 
I own the house in 
which I live (no 
mortgage) 
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AirBnB Vanessa  Local 
Facebook 
Group 
F 1984 34 White Master's 
Degree 
I have a mortgage 
on the house in 
which I live  
Uber Arron  Facebook M 1966 52 Other Master's 
Degree 
I have a mortgage 
on the house in 
which I live  






Uber Lukasz  Facebook M 1975 43 White 6th 
form/College 
I am a private 
tenant  
Uber Mike Facebook M 1964 54 White Master's 
Degree 
I have a mortgage 
on the house in 
which I live  
Uber Richard Facebook M 1991 27 White 6th 
form/College 
I am a private 
tenant  
Uber Said Facebook M 1977 41 Asian 6th 
form/College 
I have a mortgage 
on the house in 
which I live  
Uber Sebastian Facebook M 1984 34 Other Secondary 
School  
I am a private 
tenant  
Uber Shoaib Facebook M 1977 41 Asian 6th 
form/College 




















Barney Facebook M 1975 43 White Master's 
Degree 




Cory Facebook M 1974 44 White Undergraduate 
Degree 
I have a mortgage 
on the house in 
which I live  
Amazon 
Flex 
Jake Facebook M 1961 57 White Secondary 
School  




Neal  Facebook M 1973 45 Other Secondary 
School  
I own the house in 




Peter Facebook M 1970 48 White Undergraduate 
Degree 
I have a mortgage 
on the house in 
which I live  
Amazon 
Flex 
Ramesh Facebook M 1998 20 Asian 6th 
form/College 




Ryan Facebook M 1966 52 White 6th 
form/College 
I have a mortgage 
on the house in 
which I live  
Amazon 
Flex 
Simon Facebook M 1987 31 White 6th 
form/College 




Terry Facebook M 1996 22 White 6th 
form/College 




Tommy Facebook M 1979 39 White Undergraduate 
Degree 
I am a private 
tenant  
*Most of the data in this table is drawn from pre-interview surveys, with the exception of one 





Thematic Codebook  
 
Economic Capitals  
 Background 
Related to the economic background of the participant – for example: 
previous jobs and inheritance. 
 Competition 
Related to economic competition. For example, an AirBnB host who is 
competing with a neighbour who offers the same service. Also includes 
competition between platforms, i.e. an Uber driver who might also work for 
Lyft.  
 Debt 
Discussion on debt. Multiple forms may include credit, mortgages, family 
borrowing. 
 Expenses 
Ongoing or one-time financial expenses; generally coded in relation to the 
“gig economy” work being conducted.  
 Income 
Income from the platform or from other forms of employment. May include 
income from a partner/parents/other where relevant.  
 Income use 
  How is the income spent? On basic necessities or on luxuries?  
 Labour 
Related to labour time expended, usually for the platform. Includes 
uncompensated labour.  
 Monopoly 
  Monopoly, either at the level of the income seeker or of the platform itself.  
 Opportunities 
Economic opportunities. Often presented as possible future plans, i.e. an 
AirBnB host may be looking to buy a second property to rent out.  
 Risk 
Economic risk, e.g. risk of assets being lost, stolen or damaged. Also includes 
insurance and strategies to mitigate risk.  
 Tax 
Discussion of taxation, paying of tax, registering as a tax paying entity and 
tax strategies.  
 Wealth / Capital 
Wealth is given a dual meaning in accordance with Piketty’s conflation of 
capital and wealth. Can include housing, savings, ownership of tools and 
vehicles. E.g. An Uber driver who owns their own car.  
 
Non-Economic Forms of Capital 
 Cultural – Institutional 
  Persons or objects given a perceived value from an institutional affiliation.  
Cultural – Objects 
Objects perceived as having an exchange value beyond their immediate 
utility.  
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Cultural – Skills/Embodied 
The skills which an individual might be able to draw upon. Also, embodiment, 
for instance: the right attitude, way of being.  
 Social Capital 
  Social ties that can be drawn upon. 
 
Contestation of Value and Values 
 Devalued 
The individual, their skills, attributes or their property is devalued 
symbolically. 
 Distinction 
An entity distinguishes themselves/their taste/their property as being better 
or more worthy than another (more valuable).  
 Personal Risk  
Related to valued/devalued, does the individual experience personal risk? 
Assumes that exposure to personal risk is a reflection of how a person is 
valued.  
 Resistance (to judgments of value) 
  Resistance or affect in response to judgments of value.  
 Valued 
The individual, their skills, attributes or their property is valued symbolically. 
  
 
